Faith-Promoting Rumor

Author’s Note: My readings for the following essay started me thinking for the first time theoretically about mothering and care-giving. It also made me reflect a lot on the sacrifices made and love shown by my wife and my mother. I share this for Mother’s Day.

In Love’s Labor: Essays on Women, Equality, and Dependency, Eva Feder Kittay develops a theory of dependency which addresses the needs of dependents and those involved in dependency work. Central to this book is the contention that dependency is a universal fact of human existence. We are born into a state of dependency; we spend much of our lives providing for dependents; and we may again return to a state of dependency as we age and/or if we become seriously ill or disabled. Of course, for many, particularly the disabled, dependency is a constant state of being.

In her argument about dependency, Kittay “articulates some very persuasive and powerful criticisms of contractarian models of justice.” Specifically, Kittay develops a “dependency critique” of John Rawls’ liberal theory of justice. Kittay argues that a theory of justice which does not address the care needed by dependents and the injustices faced by dependency workers is inadequate as a theory of justice. In her critique, Kittay says that Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness fails to address dependency, and falls short in addressing the injustices faced by dependency workers, because his theory idealizes the full-functioning autonomous citizen.

Martha Nussbaum states that the criticisms raised by Kittay “are questions with which all theorists of justice will need henceforth to grapple.” In this paper I will grapple with Kittay’s dependency critique of Rawls’ theory of social justice. I will start by looking at Kittay’s critique of Rawls. In doing so, we will see that dependency is an important issue for social justice.
However, I will argue in this paper that Kittay’s critique mischaracterizes Rawls’s theory. Kittay misunderstands the reason for why Rawls excludes extreme cases of illness and disability when developing his two principles of justice. Kittay also fails to recognize the extent to which care and benevolence are present in Rawls’ theory. I will draw on Susan Moller Okin to show how we can view Rawls as relying heavily on sentiments of care and benevolence in his theory. We can particularly find these elements in the construct of the original position and in Rawls’ discussion of moral development, in which he places a high premium on a caring and loving relationship between parents and children.

After looking at the elements of benevolence and care found in justice as fairness, I will then look at the modifications to Rawls’ theory which Kittay proposes. These modifications include the addition of care as sixth basic social good and the addition of a third principle of justice. I will argue that if we understand the extent to which Rawls already includes care and benevolence in his theory, these modifications are not necessary.

The Dependency Critique

Central to Eva Feder Kittay’s critique of Rawls’ “justice as fairness” is a concern about dependency. Dependency is the state of existence, which is characterized by a reliance on others for functionality and survival. There are three primary categories of dependency: children, the disabled, and the elderly. These groupings show that issues related to dependency cover individuals in differing stages of life and that all of us were dependent at sometime and we all could potentially be dependent again, either in the case that we become disabled (if we are not already) or when we age to the point that we are no longer able to function at a level that does not require regular assistance from others.

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Ralph, you’ve gotten into a bad spot with fellow LDS intellectuals from a lot of different fronts.  My concern with your recent editorializing is that while you claim to appeal to “reason” and to contradict the “fundamental assumptions” of “liberal Mormons,” I don’t see anything substantive in your arguments that amounts to anything more than 1) appeal to prophetic and “majority” authority and 2) vague assertions about what a fictionalized anthropologist might say about the value of normative sex roles.  With respect to #2, suffice it to say that your assertion reflects a misunderstanding of how anthropologists deal with gender norms (anthropologists are more likely the “relativists” you condemn than offering a defense of the kinds of assertions you’re making).  With respect to #1, certainly appeals to authority are important for certain kinds of claims, but they should not be confused with the appeals to “reason” that you assert you are making.  One could certainly argue that Mormons should accept the authority of a particular, even dominant strain of Mormonism, but if such an argument is to arise beyond an appeal to the “authority” of that strain, arguments from reason should be given.  Perhaps you really have real arguments about the problems of equal status for women and non-heterosexual individuals, but so far you have been coy.  Overall, I find your assertions about feminism to be, lets say, shallow in the extreme, but perhaps there is more than what appears to be only a passing familiarity with stereotypes about feminist criticism.  In an effort to draw out your arguments from “reason” in favor of differential treatment, I would like to see you answer a few questions:

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