Consequentialism is an insidious, error-ridden, ethical theory;; typically, those who follow its reasoning will suggest, one way or another, that the ends justify the means. That is, the morality of an act is determined by what the act accomplishes, that is, the consequences which come as a result of the act. If some good end is brought about by a particular act, then the act can be justifiably done. We should not be overly concerned with the way the act would be accomplished if it makes for a greater good, though of course, bad means can and often lead to bad results, allowing for such actions then to be rejected. Perhaps the most striking example of this kind of reflection lies in the way many seek to justify the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They say that ending the war was good, and because the bombings brought about that end, the United States was justified in their use. The problem with this is that the means used was evil; while ending the war certainly was a good, the death was not justified, indeed, it is morally reckless to treat them so nonchalantly. The means of engaging war must also be justified, and in regards to war, it is always impermissible to directly target and kill civilians; it becomes a great war crime, a crime which cries up to heaven, when such targeting is done on scale associated with the atomic bomb. Consequentialism would suggest that the deaths are an acceptable loss, because the war ended, but moral reflection will demonstrate there were other means to bring about the end of the war, and ones which would not have required the use of weapons of mass destruction.
While, contrary to consequentialism, we must recognize that the ends do not justify the means, we must not think that the ends, the goal, might not have some moral weight in determining the overall moral character of a particular action. It will. Both the ends and the means must be taken into consideration, and that means, of course, we must look not only at the objective evil involved, but also the subjective elements which lay behind a particular act. An evil intention, leading to a bad end, using evil means, will lead to a worse act than one done with a good intention, leading to a good end, which nonetheless used some evil in its execution. Recognizing this does not undermine the fact that an evil means should not be approved, but it does mean that the intentions and ends associated with an act have value in determining the moral quality of the act itself. The means are a part of a whole. Consequentialism, contrary to traditional moral consideration, will only look to the end; but traditional moral considerations will look beyond the ends, but also, include in them objective standards as well as the subjective considerations which lie behind the acts in question. This is something Pope Francis knows and understands, and serves as the basis by which he acts as a pastor, developing disciplines to help the faithful on their spiritual journey. Often, because the objective element is already understood, he presents to us how we are to deal with the subjective element behind each act, a dimension which does take into consideration the context of the act, and if we ignore this, we end up embracing a simple but deadly legalism, the kind often associated with various heresies in the past including, but not limited to, Novatianism and Jansenism.
Sadly, some think we should ignore all the complexities involved in moral consideration; they think we should only look at the objective criteria, and so, lead us to the legalism which the church has consistently fought against throughout her history. It is, at times, difficult to know how serious they are in this suggestion. Are they promoting such legalism because it is what they truly believe, and they do not comprehend the greater depth contained in moral analysis, or do they employ such rhetoric, knowing it is faulty, because they think their desired end justifies the rhetoric? For those who want to find reasons to criticize Pope Francis, it is clear, they think his pastoral concern is something they can use to their own end, making people think that it means he is a consequentialist. Thus, as a recent example of this kind of criticism, we find Larry Chapp writing an article in The National Catholic Register which implies (but does not state outright) that Pope Francis is a heretic:
It is my claim that Pope Francis seems favorably disposed to a form of moral theology that has been commonly referred to as “proportionalism” or “consequentialism.” At the very least, I think Pope Francis sees in proportionalism a kind of “corrective” counterweight to what he considers to be an overemphasis in the Church on natural law moral reasoning with its central focus on certain moral objects as intrinsically evil. [1]
Chapp employs the category of intrinsic evil, but in doing so, makes it seem as if some act is considered an intrinsic evil, it is automatically a grave evil (and nothing could be taken into consideration which would reduce its moral gravity). This seems to be the implication he wants us to make when he suggests that those who are concerned about the conditions surrounding a particular act are consequentialists. He implies that using the consequences, in any form, as a way of judging the moral character of an act is a form of consequentialism, but in doing so, he is engaging a categorical error. It must be one of the factors which is considered, but not the only one. The objective character, just as much as the consequences which come as a result of a particular act, both must be examined and used in moral judgments. Just because some act is determined to be intrinsically evil, we do not know the quality of the evil which is associated with the act. Intrinsic evils are not absolute evils. Even objectively, they are not necessarily grave evils. But, even if objectively, the matter is grave, we still have to take into consideration all kinds of conditions associated with the act itself. St. Thomas Aquinas, who was not a consequentialist, made it clear that the consequences of an act has a place in our judgment concerning the act itself. Thus, he began with acts whereupon the person could foresee the consequences of their actions:
I answer that, The consequences of an action are either foreseen or not. If they are foreseen, it is evident that they increase the goodness or malice. For when a man foresees that many evils may follow from his action, and yet does not therefore desist therefrom, this shows his will to be all the more inordinate. [2]
But, if the consequences are not foreseen, they can still have an effect on the way the moral character of a given act is to be judged:
But if the consequences are not foreseen, we must make a distinction. Because if they follow from the nature of the action and in the majority of cases, in this respect, the consequences increase the goodness or malice of that action: for it is evident that an action is specifically better, if better results can follow from it; and specifically worse, if it is of a nature to produce worse results. On the other hand, if the consequences follow by accident and seldom, then they do not increase the goodness or malice of the action: because we do not judge of a thing according to that which belongs to it by accident, but only according to that which belongs to it of itself. [3]
An act is better or worse, therefore, depending upon the consequences of what is done; this is true for all acts, even ones judged to be intrinsically evil. Thomas is not seeking to justify evil through this analysis. Nor did he create a novelty through his analysis; he was engaging the tradition which was handed down to him. A great example of this tradition, and the considerations which have always been used in order to judge the moral character of any act, can be found in the way St. Augustine engaged the act of lying. Lying is an intrinsic evil, though some lies are graver than others. While making it clear lying itself can never be justified, Augustine said that some lies are minor and can be associated with some great good which is worthy to be honored and recognized (but not the lie itself):
It cannot be denied that they have attained a very high standard of goodness who never lie except to save a man from injury; but in the case of men who have reached this standard, it is not the deceit, but their good intention, that is justly praised, and sometimes even rewarded. It is quite enough that the deception should be pardoned, without its being made an object of laudation, especially among the heirs of the new covenant, to whom it is said: “Let your communication be, Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these comes of evil.” And it is on account of this evil, which never ceases to creep in while we retain this mortal vesture, that the co-heirs of Christ themselves say, “Forgive us our debts.” [4]
Or, as Peter Lombard, reflecting upon what Augustine and others said about lying, wrote:
See, from these authorities, it is clear that every lie is a sin. And yet it is not that every lie that that text is to be applied: You will destroy all who speak a lie; nor the other one: The mouth that lies kills the soul. Nor does it seem that every lie is forbidden by this precept, nor is the amusing lie included in the above discussion. [5]
Not every lie has the same moral weight. The worst kinds of lies, those which are said with great malice and with a great desire to harm those who are being deceived, will be judged much more harshly than minor lies, that is, those which did little to no significant harm and are done out of some good intention:
In some things, then, it is a great evil to be deceived; in some it is a small evil; in some no evil at all; and in some it is an actual advantage. It is to his grievous injury that a man is deceived when he does not believe what leads to eternal life, or believes what leads to eternal death. It is a small evil for a man to be deceived, when, by taking falsehood for truth, he brings upon himself temporal annoyances; for the patience of the believer will turn even these to a good use, as when, for example, taking a bad man for a good, he receives injury from him.[6]
It is, of course, not just lying, but every action, which can and should be examined, so as to discern not only the harm which they caused, but also the intention which led to a particular act, in order to have a proper analysis of the act itself. With intrinsic evils, the greater the good intended by an act, the more it is done out of love, the less evil will result from it (indeed, it might even be insignificant), while the more malice lies behind the act, the more some evil is truly intended, the worse the act will actually be. The category of intrinsic evil only tells us certain actions, no matter the intentions, will always involve some element of evil, something which should not be done. “Consequently, circumstances or intentions can never transform an act intrinsically evil by virtue of its object into an act ‘subjectively’ good or defensible as a choice.” [7] But, it must be made clear, if something is intrinsically evil, we must not think this means the evil associated it is always grave, that what is produced when it is engaged is necessarily some of the worst evil possible. We must discern the subjective element and take it into account. “If acts are intrinsically evil, a good intention or particular circumstances can diminish their evil, but they cannot remove it. “[8] Even if a particular act could lead to a mortal sin, an analysis of what was contained in the act itself could determine the evil produced was slight, and indeed, that the sin associated with it would be a venial, not a mortal sin. The way to deal with venial sins are much different from what is needed to deal with actual mortal sins. Pope Francis understands this, which is shown in the way he acts as a pastor, showing mercy instead of being judgmental. Francis knows that it would be wrong to simply deal with sin in a legalistic fashion, without such moral considerations, and indeed, without any mercy or grace. Jesus, who is the Good Shepherd, showed us the way with his mercy and grace. Jesus made it clear we should not be judgmental but rather merciful in our dealings with others. We are not to follow mere objective legalism, but instead to realize that everyone still possesses some good in them, and even their actions, no matter how faulty they are, still contain some element of good in them (as all actions are geared towards some good, even if the good is a disordered one). [9] St. John Paul II understood this as well, which is why he did not consider the moral law and its objective standards as the sole basis of moral reflection:
For its part, dogmatic theology must be able to articulate the universal meaning of the mystery of the One and Triune God and of the economy of salvation, both as a narrative and, above all, in the form of argument. It must do so, in other words, through concepts formulated in a critical and universally communicable way. Without philosophy’s contribution, it would in fact be impossible to discuss theological issues such as, for example, the use of language to speak about God, the personal relations within the Trinity, God’s creative activity in the world, the relationship between God and man, or Christ’s identity as true God and true man. This is no less true of the different themes of moral theology, which employ concepts such as the moral law, conscience, freedom, personal responsibility and guilt, which are in part defined by philosophical ethics.[10]
Chapp seems to ignore or reject this in his criticism of Pope Francis, for his objection to Francis is that Francis takes everything into consideration, and not just the objective declarations of the moral law:
Second, Pope Francis seems to embrace a form of moral reasoning, closely allied with proportionalism, that says that in the concrete circumstances of life, circumstances which are often complex, difficult, and messy, a person’s ability to live the objective moral law might be so limited that he or she may indeed be inculpable for any moral guilt and may, in fact, be doing what God wills for them in his or her concrete existence, despite what the objective moral norm teaches. In other words, the moral principle in question is affirmed, but it may be set aside in certain complex cases which present us with a proportionate reason for doing so.[11]
Are Sts Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Paul II consequentialists because they point out circumstances, subjective aspects related to the act, bear some consideration when determining the culpability connected to any moral act? Will Chapp also deny the role that freedom has in relation determining an act is morally sinful, that if someone is not entirely free in what they do, their culpability is likewise diminished? Will he say all that is required for a sin to be mortal is that it is objectively a grave evil which is involved, ignoring all the moral conditions Catholicism has traditionally used to determine when someone sins mortally? Catholic tradition has always recognized what Chapp criticizes. Pope Francis does not undermine Catholic teaching; he is engaging it, showing its pastoral implications, such as in Amoris laetitia, where, in chapter eight, which is often attacked by his critics, Pope Francis is highlighting how Catholic understanding can and should lead to pastoral considerations instead of embracing a rigid legality. [12] The mercy Pope Francis notes should be given is exactly the same kind of mercy the church has always given, contrary to the dictates and desires of strict legalists, such as the Novatians who complained about the mercy given to the lapsed. The history of the church is full of such rich mercy being given by the church, with the recognition, indeed, that many people have done wrong through all kinds of mitigating situations, situations which didn’t justify their action but nonetheless diminished the weight of the sin involved. Pastoral care and concern will always take that into consideration when dealing with the needs of sinners, lest, being concerned merely with the objective element of the sin, a lack of mercy will lead to a cruelty which undermines the expectations of justice. “But if anyone, under the appearance of justice, becomes excessive in respect to vengeance and insists on too fierce of punishments, he has devolved from justice into cruelty.”[13] Objective standards must be considered, but their application is not to be seen merely as objective; they must always be applied in concrete situations, taking into consideration all that is had in the act, not just the objective standard, and then it must be met with mercy, with love. This is how we are to understand Pope Francis and his pastoral concern.
Larry Chapp wants us to think Pope Francis is a consequentialist; but what he has done is show how he, not the Pope, dismisses what the church teaches concerning the problems of consequentialism. He is only concerned with one aspect of the moral consideration, the objective criteria, and separates it from all the factors which must be investigated if we are to truly understand the moral character associated with a particular act. The Pope does not deny the objective standards of the church’s teaching, but he also shows, even as Thomas Aquinas showed, that the objective element is only one part of the moral equation. When dealing with people pastorally, we must do so holistically and personally, not objectively and legalistically. The church, by offering grace and pastoral leniency, by engaging dispensation and economia, does not discount sin, but instead, takes it seriously, showing the cure for such sin is not justice without mercy, without grace, but grace mixed with love and prudence.
[1] Larry Chapp, Understanding Pope Francis: It’s The Moral Theology, Stupid. In National Catholic Register (6-14-2022).
[2] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. Translated English Dominican Province. II-I.20.5.
[3] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-I.20.5.
[4] St. Augustine, “The Enchiridion” in NPNF1(3): 244 [c22].
[5] Peter Lombard, The Sentences. Books 3. Trans. Giulio Silano (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 2008), 160 [ Dist. XXXVIII.5].
[6] St. Augustine, “The Enchiridion,” 243 [c19].
[7] Pope St. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor. Vatican translation. ¶81.
[8] Pope St. John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, ¶81.
[9] “I answer that, The will is a rational appetite. Now every appetite is only of something good. The reason of this is that the appetite is nothing else than an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards that thing. Now every inclination is to something like and suitable to the thing inclined. Since, therefore, everything, inasmuch as it is being and substance, is a good, it must needs be that every inclination is to something good. And hence it is that the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 1) that ‘the good is that which all desire.’” [9] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica. II-I.8.1
[10] Pope St. John Paul II, Fides et Ratio. Vatican translation. ¶66.
[11] Larry Chapp, Understanding Pope Francis: It’s The Moral Theology, Stupid.
[12] See Pope Francis, Amoris laetitia, especially chapter 8, ¶302-306.
[13] Origen, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans: Books 6-10. Trans. Thomas P. Scheck (Washington, DC: CUA Press, 2002), 200-1.
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