Defined spirits

Thomas wrote, “Being is two-fold: material and immaterial. In material beings, which are limited, each thing is only what it is; this stone is this stone, nothing more. But in immaterial beings, which are vast and, as it were, infinite, not being limited by matter, a thing is not only what it is, but in some fashion it is other things as well.”

Several observations: First, souls are immaterial things that are both themselves and also other things. For the soul that knows the sun and grubs and towers “in some fashion” becomes sun, grub, and tower. Second, this Aristotelian-inspired comment shows why angelic natures became so central to late medieval metaphysics, for angels are immaterial beings that have definite, limited natures.

But one wonders if Thomas’s starting premise works. Is it true that “this stone is this stone, nothing more”? A stone doesn’t have the ontological elasticity of a human soul or mind, but might not a stone become something more than a stone by, for instance, becoming part of a narrative (a stone that gives water in the wilderness), by its position in relation to other stones, by its use in a construction project? Are those “accidents” not part of what the stone is ? Whatever we might say about stones, sure we cannot say of material human bodies, “this body is this body, nothing more.” Human bodies bear the scars of suffering, the stoops and bends of age, the hair crown of wisdom. Without minimizing the differences between material and immaterial, might there not be more similarities than Thomas acknowledges?