The Problem Of Divine Hiddenness

When the philosopher and atheist Bertrand Russell was asked what he would ask God if he were to meet Him, Russell responded, “Sir, why did you not give me better evidence?” Russell, of course, is not alone. Many reasonable people of goodwill have asked a similar question.

This paper will explore the question of divine hiddenness and whether the problem is sufficient to warrant atheism. I will also examine the Catholic tradition’s solutions to the problem of divine hiddenness.

What Is Divine Hiddenness?

Divine hiddenness as it pertains to Catholic theology refers to the theological, experiential, and philosophical reality that God is not immediately or obviously apparent to human beings.

Such a definition suggests two avenues of inquiry. The first is ontological. Does the claim of divine hiddenness support an argument for atheism, for the non-existence of God?

The second question is epistemological. If God does exist, does the problem of divine hiddenness suggest the further problem of what, if anything, can be known about God?

As an ontological question, divine hiddenness appears to provide a strong argument for atheism. The philosopher J.L. Schellenberg frames the problem: If a perfectly loving God exists, “reasonable non-belief” would not occur (because God would want a relationship with all who are open to it). Reasonable non-belief does occur. Therefore, a perfectly loving God does not exist.

The epistemological problem created by divine hiddenness is simpler. Because God is “hidden,” He makes it impossible for human beings to understand Him, thereby making a relationship with God impossible.

Having provided a basic definition of divine hiddenness, we can now address the two fundamental problems it raises.

The Presuppositions Of Divine Hiddenness

Before addressing the issue positively, I want to examine two presuppositions that implicitly support divine hiddenness.

The first problem with the divine hiddenness argument is evident when it is placed in a syllogistic form: That which is not discoverable (hidden) to human beings does not exist. God is not discoverable to human beings. Therefore, God does not exist. Stated differently, because God hides Himself, He does not exist. 

When the premises for the argument from divine hiddenness are laid out in this way, it becomes clear that there is an element of non-sequitur to the argument from divine hiddenness. It does not necessarily follow that something that is not discoverable by human beings does not exist. Moreover, the second premise (God is hidden) is not entirely true.

From this, the second presupposition of divine hiddenness comes to light, which is a form of scientism. Scientism is the claim that the only valid form of knowledge is derived from the scientific method. This is a common form of argument: since God cannot be proven by the scientific method, God does not exist.

This argument against theism fails, since the nature of science is that it can never definitively prove or disprove the existence of anything. Moreover, scientism is self-refuting because its claims are not derived from the scientific method. Science cannot be proven by science.

Suffice to say that if the scientific method is not the only way to know truth, then biblical testimony and metaphysical deduction ought to be investigated as viable alternatives.

Solving The Problem Of Hiddenness

There are two ways to address the problem: biblically and philosophically. It must be admitted that a biblical response to the problem of divine hiddenness is somewhat circular, since the Bible presupposes God’s existence.

Still, the Bible does have things relevant to say about the nature of divine hiddenness. From a biblical perspective, God is not always “hidden.” The Book of Genesis describes God as walking in the Garden of Eden in the presence of human beings. This communion with God would be lost due to original sin.

Theologically, divine hiddenness is tied to God’s transcendence. An example of this appears in the writings of the prophet Elijah. “The Lord said: Go out and stand on the mountain before the Lord; the Lord will pass by. There was a strong and violent wind rending the mountains and crushing rocks before the Lord – but the Lord was not in the wind; after the wind, an earthquake – but the Lord was not in the earthquake; after the earthquake, fire – but the Lord was not in the fire; after the fire, a still small voice. [God]” (1 Kings 19:11-12).

God is not an object or being within the created universe. Nevertheless, the effects of God can be seen in what He has created. For this reason, Saint Paul writes, “Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived in what he has made. As a result, they (non-believers) have no excuse.”

Paul’s words echo natural theology and provide a segue to the philosophical counter-arguments against divine hiddenness.

The first argument involves the nature of human reason. Since there is nothing in the intellect that is not first acquired by the senses, God makes Himself known through signs implanted in creation. Examples include Thomas Aquinas’s Five Ways.

One understands the necessity of this manner of God making Himself known when one realizes that the finite human intellect cannot behold the infinite God without enjoying the beatific vision that can only be obtained in death. (Exodus 33:20).

A similar argument applies to free will; specifically, the concepts of sufficiency and compulsion. Since God respects human free will, he does not make faith compulsory. Rather, it is the teaching of the Catholic Church that God can be known with certainty through the “light of human reason” from created things, meaning He is “hidden” only to those who do not look.

Divine hiddenness allows for a genuine choice to love or reject God based on one’s internal disposition rather than raw fear of an omnipotent power. Faith compelled is no faith at all.

While God is seen through creation, he remains hidden to preserve human free will, foster virtue, and allow spiritual growth, rather than offering overwhelming, forced evidence. It can be argued, therefore, that divine hiddenness allows for free choice in loving God, rather than being compelled by undeniable evidence.

Nevertheless, it is evident from Scripture that knowledge, even certain knowledge, is not sufficient for human beings to acknowledge and accept God. The most obvious example of this is Judas Iscariot. Judas was one of the original disciples of Jesus. Judas knew who Jesus was, and yet Judas chose to betray Him.

So, while the problem of hiddenness is often framed as a failure of God’s revelation, the Judas example suggests it may be a failure of human disposition.

Finally, divine hiddenness makes virtue both possible and free. Catholic thinkers such as Saint Anselm and Blaise Pascal have argued that hiddenness is necessary for the development of true virtue.

If the rewards of faith were immediate and obvious, humans might act out of self-interest rather than a selfless love for God. Virtuous acts would be done not out of love for God and neighbor, but to secure one’s place in Heaven.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have endeavored to examine the problem of divine hiddenness. Why doesn’t an all-powerful God make Himself known to humanity?

I have offered several possibilities drawn from the biblical and Catholic philosophical tradition. The most that these explanations may ultimately offer is to throw light on the ineffability of God, the mystery of faith, and the mystery of human knowing in general.

Saint John of the Cross suggested that as we enter deeper intimacy with God, we concomitantly enter a “cloud of unknowing,” namely, a knowing so deep that it cannot be conceptualized.

Faith implies a paradoxical darkness; the closer we get to God in this life, the more God seems to disappear, because overpowering light can appear as darkness.