Part III Part IV
Part V Part VI
Part VII
Lombard next turns to perjury, the swearing of false oaths, and he finds here many new questions which must be raised, such as: how are we to understand it when someone swears that they will do something, intending to do it, but ends up not doing so? How are we to understand those who are forced to swear an oath which they do not agree to? Would it be perjurious to say something is false if one believes it to be true? How are we to understand someone who, intending to lie under oath, inadvertently speaks the truth? One who swears an oath adds obligations to what they should or should not say, and so the moral issue is a more serious concern that what has been brought up so far.
Making sure the reader understands that perjury happens when one lies under oath, Lombard opens up with the question, would it be perjurious to say something under oath, believing what one says is correct, but in all actuality, it is not? That is, does the fact that the statement itself ends up being untrue make it perjury, since the word perjury means to “make a false oath”? The Master of the Sentences suggests that some, following what Jerome wrote, think this would be the case. Jerome indicated three things as necessary for a proper oath: “truth, judgment and justice.”[1] With such a definition, since what is said is not true, even if the person did not intend to lie, what they said would still be classified as perjury.
Other authorities reason out the issue differently. Indeed, it is possible that some form of equivocation is going on, because of the multiple meanings implied by the word, periuro. Thus, Lombard brings in what others have said to this question. They suggest that as long as a person makes an oath, says what they believe it to be true, or what will be true (when discussing the future), the oath was not taken under false pretenses and therefore should not be seen as perjurious. For them, this would explain, for example, the words of St Paul, where he said he intended to visit Corinth, but did not do so.[2] What he said was not a lie; he said what he thought and hoped he was going to do at the time of writing his letter. St Paul was deceiving no one. It would also not have been perjury if he had said it under oath, for, “if he had added an oath, he would have sworn the truth insofar as it was in him, even if it turned out otherwise than he said.“[3] According to these authorities, the falsehood associated with perjury is associated with the false presentation of one’s views, not, however, whether or not what they say about things is actually correct.
And so the question which has been raised by these approaches is this: when is an oath a “false oath”? Is it a false oath because the words are not true, or is it a false oath because the one who says it intends to deceive someone else by saying it? The first, of course, would open up many other questions, such as, if one intends to deceive, but says what is correct, is it perjury? Nonetheless, we must see that what is shown here is the possibility that lying and perjury are not necessarily related. So we must ask, can one commit perjury without lying, and lie without committing perjury?
After stating the position of others, Lombard gives us his own take on the matter: perjury occurs when one swears, knowing what is true, and says what is false, or when they swear something to be true when they believe it to be false, or when they say something is false when they are not certain as to what it actually is. Lombard makes it known that for him the issue is with the presentation of what one knows, or believes, to be the case; but, as we shall see, this does not mean that he thinks the issue of justice is unimportant, nor that this is all that matters (he has brought in the issue of truth, since it relates to the way one states their knowledge, and he has brought in the issue of judgment, because he has stated that one can be perjurious when describing their opinions, or lack of them).[4] The last possibility Lombard admits is somewhat confusing: if a person says something is not the case, without having any firm belief on the matter, they are not exactly saying something which contradicts their belief, since they have no belief to contradict. However, because they are swearing something to be the case which they do not know or believe to be so, it would still be sworn falsely, and so Lombard indicates it would be perjurious, even if not a lie. “And so not every perjury is a lie, nor does every perjurer lie; but everyone who lies under oath is a perjurer, and everyone who swears a falsehood, whether or not he lies, commits perjury.”[5] Yet it would seem, contra Lombard, one could say they are lying, because, under oath, they could say they are not certain, and hold no belief, and if they do not present this, then they act as if they do have a belief, and that would be where the deception lies.[6]
Having suggested one could end up being perjurious without lying, Lombard raises the other side of the relationship between lies and perjury, can one lie under oath without committing perjury? If someone, under oath, says what is true, even if they do not believe it to be, would they be committing perjury? Here he is bringing out how odd it appears to say that someone swore falsely, if what they said were true. Nonetheless, that is exactly the case. This response has already been prepared for: one is to say under oath what they believe or know to be the case; if they lie, even if what is said turns out to be correct, because of the intent of the words was to deceive, they would have intended to misrepresent themselves and what they think, and so they would be committing perjury. Lombard stands firm with his belief that “to lie under oath is perjury.”[7]
But then, Lombard returns a previous question: what then are we to make of the one who swears to do something, intends to do what they swear, but ends up not doing it? Here, Lombard says that, until the time in which the action is said to be done, is not done, no perjury can be predicated to the one who made such an oath. On the other hand, once that time has come and they have not done as they said they would, or a time comes when they decide not to do as they swore they would, the oath is broken, and perjury has been committed. If one takes this back to the question of St Paul, where he stated he would visit Corinth, the fact that he intended to but did not, makes it not a lie; but if he had sworn he would come, and did not, then he would have sworn a false oath, and committed perjury. From this, Lombard wants his read to see that, “not everyone who swears what is false is a perjurer from the moment he swears,” because, until the time comes in which an oath can be tried, it cannot be said to be false.[8]
Footnotes
[1] St Jerome, In Ieremiam 4, 2, quoted in Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c2.
[2] Cf. 1 Cor. 16:5 and 2 Cor 1:15 -24.
[3] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c2. He states that this is “the opinion of some on this matter” but does not state who these people are.
[4] The authority which Lombard uses to bring this out is, without surprise, Augustine, and he uses Sermo 180 as a central text for this thesis.
[5] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c3.
[6] Granted, my presentation here is an attempt to understand Lombard’s three-fold distinction, incorporating the fact that Lombard thinks the third case does not appear to be a lie; there is some unstated thought guiding Lombard’s presentation, and I’ve tried my best to ascertain what it is, using the context surrounding his definition to present that definition itself, but frankly, Lombard is quite obscure on this point.
[7] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c3.
[8] Peter Lombard, Sentences. Book III, dist XXXIX, c3.
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