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Seeing red (Photo: Miguel Carminati)
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This week’s deadly blast in the Turkish capital of Ankara may or may not have been related to the recent tensions between Army-backed secularists and the government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his “mildly Islamist” Justice and Development Party (AKP), but you’d never know it. The country has been rocked by mass protests of up to 1 million in recent weeks, sparked by a decision by Erdogan to nominate his Foreign Minister, Abdullah Gul, for the post of President. Among the reasons implied – his wife wears a hijab (“My scarf covers my head, not my brain,” she says).
Gul backed down after the Turkish army – responsible for four coups, ostensibly to protect secularism – issued a thinly-veiled threat by e-mail on April 27th warning that further action could be taken. After opposition parties boycotted a parliamentary vote for Gul (who said he would uphold secularism), Erdogan responded by bringing forth the November general election to July 22nd, where Gul may still be a candidate and the secularists will have their knives out.
For a military that prides itself on preserving contemporary Turkish founder Kemal Ataturk’s secularism and modernity, the sight of a democratically elected government is challenging it openly with more democracy is both ironic and dangerous. “This will be the most important election we’ve had for decades,” said one observer in Ankara. “And it is taking place in a very polarizing situation.” When it comes to Islam, Turkey is experiencing the democratic paradox feared by the US and others: more Islam voted into a government by democratic means.
Theoretically, those who push for more democracy in the current crop of autocratic Muslim countries should have no trouble with it. But as the electoral victories of Hamas (in Palestine) and the resurging of the Muslim Brotherhood (in Egypt) show, the political and socio-economic complexities often promote a “religious” party more than religion itself. Like Hamas, the AKP was voted in (though with only 34% of the vote) as a response to corruption in the ruling secular parties. But under pressure from the secular elite, the AKP has always been forced to wear their Islam lightly.
As a result, the new political conflict is a war of subtleties. Although many in the AKP are pious Muslims supported by provincial Turks, they have been keen to demonstrate their modernity through a surging economy, good relations with the US, an absence of sharia-based initiatives, and patient negotiations with the EU on potential membership (something the military finds itself against). Even though elements of Islam have increasingly found their way into public life, there is scant evidence that the new prosperous middle class as a whole wants to substitute expression for coercion.
Ultimately, Turkey’s fate lies with the willingness of the military to carry out its threat, something even its many supporters are reconsidering. The AKP and its supporters have a chance to demonstrate an Islamically oriented government that respects secularism, religion (er… all religions) and power-sharing with its adversaries. But there isn’t much time to persuade a tense and divided electorate.
Zahed Amanullah is associate editor of altmuslim.com. He is based in London, England.