Buddhist Ethics: Individual or societal? and virtuous anger?

As many of you know, my life’s work will likely come down to one simple thing: exposing the similarities between Buddhist and Kantian (yes, Kantian) ethics. Lately in the west, due in great part to the great Damien Keown in London, Buddhist ethics have come to be seen as ‘virtue ethics’. I agree with this – to a point.

At the same time, recent work on the reception and development of Kantian ethics have mistakenly pigeon-holed this great German philosopher as proclaiming solely an ethics of duty (generally explained in ways that are completely opposed to what he was actually talking about!).

Yet in fact Kant was a ‘virtue ethicist’ – to a point (coincidentally to just the same point that Buddhist ethics is virtue-based). This fact, and the rich nuances in Kant’s life and work, has only recently been clarified – mainly by the great Onora O’Neill of Cambridge and Allen W. Wood of Yale and Stanford.

Individual or societal?

That is all preface to this small point I came across today while re-reading bits of “Destructive Emotions“, a book based on dialogs between the Dalai Lama, psychologists, and scientists a few years back. Early on, on pages 62-63, a distinction is made between characteristically western virtue based thought on emotions and Buddhist thought. The difference is that western thought looks at emotions that would be/are conductive to social harmony, whereas Buddhism looks much more at “how we can perfect our inner nature” or inner harmony.

Virtuous anger?

They go on to discuss Kant, Mill, and Aristotle on Happiness. Later, in the chapter looking at mental afflictions, is the heading: “Can Anger be a Virtue?” The response is that “the very notion of ‘virtuous anger’ is an oxymoron in Buddhist thought.” (p.103) This is because in Buddhism emotions are determined by motivation, not action or the character of the person. Any anger, even if it results in helpful activity, is still an affliction, a destructive emotion. This goes back to the social/personal split between western and Buddhist thought. In the west we might praise an angry person who seems to be improving our situation, but in Buddhist thought we ought to see that the anger motivating this action is deeply corrosive and the improvements are thus on poor foundations.

On the other hand, seemingly wrathful behavior such as forcefully pushing someone can be compassionate and virtuous (if, say, they were in the path of an oncoming car).