Philosophy: contextualizing Kant

My Kant paper (previously due last Thursday, now the Monday after Thanksgiving) will be an evaluation of Kant as an advocate for a radical and perhaps unreasonable liberalism (liberalism here in the sense of simple human freedom).

Just how free are we ever? This question has vexed philosophers at least as far back as the rise of Christianity in philosophical circles. We must be free to accept Christ. But then doesn’t an omniscient God already know what we are going to do, thus rendering us determined? The Calvinists are the only major branch of Christianity to concede something like total determinism, while others have sided with freedom in the face of (some sort of) omnipotent God.

Kant showed why he is the greatest Western philosopher when he said that we just can’t know one way or the other. Similarly we cannot know whether the universe is limited in size or not, if the constituents of reality are infititely divisible or not (string theory), or whether there is an absolute being (God). We just cant know, we are finite beings and such things may only be known by something beyond our finite selves. These are reminiscent of the imponderable questions asked of the Buddha, who famously answered in silence no matter how often asked (according to tradition he would answer other questions if asked three times).

Yet Kant did still advocate for freedom as an idea in practical (moral) matters. We ought to live as if we are free. In fact we cannot live otherwise. Kant characterized most of human history as a struggle between freedom (or reason or morality) and desires (heteronomy, rule from without). Less-free people are led around by their desires, easily manipulated by others. Reason impels one toward choosing what is right for oneself, questioning what the state, the church and the TV comercials may suggest we ought to do.

Kant thought we have the power to question anything and everything if we employ reason, including the traditions that are responsible for our being rational. Thus it seems that we are incredibly free – insofar as we are rational. Theoriests have come down hard on this notion of rationality over and above our desires, and for the most part Kant has stood as a straw-man to all those who recognize the inseparability of reason and desires.

Those who criticize Kant as a supporter of radical freedom go too far, however. For Kant, again, only expounded the notion of freedom as a practical idea. We must act as if we are free, knowing that it is just as likely that we are not free. As moral beings though we must accept freedom if we are to accept responsibility and respect for one another. Or rather, as Kant argues in the first section of the Groundwork, because we do have a sense of morality (later spelled out in terms of responsibility and respect), we must concieve of ourselves as free. Of course we will be under the sway of desires much of the time, but we are not slaves to them! The separation between desire and reason arises at that moment when we are attracted to something (or someone) but say, “no, I shouldn’t.” (Of course it could always be argued that this reason is employed by a ‘higher-order’ desire, such as the desire to be a good person, but Kant recognized this and held that the only actions of moral worth are those that are done completely irregardless of consequences, completely and only from a sense of duty or morality.)

Our community is of immense importance for the Kantian. It is only in society that we are taught to use our reason in the first place. But this does not mean we are reducible to our society: we do not say an African villager’s morality is ultimately distinct from our own. We attribute the same rights upon them, we feel the same respect toward them, and we confer the same basic responsibilities upon them. We may give allowances for their lack of fully realized morality, just as we would a child or an adult in the U.S. who was subject to abuse early in life, but we do not deny that they are fully capable of morality as we know it.

To sum up:

Through our education, our family, and our community we are trained to employ our reason.
Because we are capable of reason, we are capable of freedom.
Acting freely (which means by reason alone) means acting morally.
Morality, freedom, rationality are virtually interchangeable terms.
Morality requires shedding the ego-centric stance and seeing others with respect.
Respect for others means acting under moral dictates we would wish all people to uphold.
Concern for all people means concern for community.
We cannot be realize our capacity for reason without a proper community.
All beings have this capacity.
All beings should be respected as such.
We ought to help all beings realize their capacity for morality, freedom, rationality.