The new moralism of the Supreme Court

The new moralism of the Supreme Court

Stanley Fish is a postmodernist scholar of the highest rank, but his conclusions are not always what his fellow academics expect.  A professor both of literature and of law, Fish explains how, in previous rulings about homosexuality, the Supreme Court arrived at the principle that just because something is immoral, that doesn’t mean it should necessarily be illegal.  But in the Obergefell ruling that legalized gay marriage, the court went back to a moral standard–the new morality of tolerance, affirmation of all, personal autonomy, etc.–with hardly any reference to law.

From Stanley Fish, Scalia Gets It Pretty Much Right:

Obergefell is the culmination of a series of opinions that began with the dissents in Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), a case that upheld Georgia’s anti-sodomy law. Seventeen years later in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the dissenters became the majority and the majority became the dissenters, a reversal confirmed and strengthened in United States v. Windsor (2013) and now again in Obergefell. The sequence marks the passage from a view of law in which the legal status of an act (like homosexual sex) followed from an entrenched moral code to a view in which moral disapproval of a practice is not “a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting it” (Justice Stevens, dissenting in Bowers). The passage was pretty much complete when Justice Kennedy declared in Lawrence that “profound and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles do not answer the question before us”; do not, that is, answer a legal question. Law and morality, while obviously joined at some general level, are in practice two different things.

Scalia’s complaint against the Obergefell majority — although he doesn’t put it this way — is that once again a moral perspective has been allowed to displace the process of patient legal analysis. This time the morality is different; not the stern old testament morality that ruled in Bowers and was overruled in Lawrence, but the morality of love, identity, intimacy, spirituality, aspiration, dignity, self-expression and respect — all words Kennedy uses and words that bear the mark of the vaguely new age sensibility Scalia derides when he refers to the “opinion’s showy profundities” that are, in fact, “profoundly incoherent.” What exactly, he asks, is the legal import of intimacy and spirituality, and “who ever thought” that they were “freedoms” of a kind that merited constitutional protection? How can this claim be traced by a legal analysis to clauses in the Constitution? How can the court justify the creation of “‘liberties’ that the Constitution and its Amendments neglect to mention?”

There may be answers to these questions, but, Scalia insists, the court doesn’t really answer them. It instead proclaims the virtues of the moral perspective it “really likes” while heaping scorn on the moral perspective it “really dislikes.”

[Keep reading. . .]

Prof. Fish goes on with an interesting discussion of the origins of the anti-polygamy laws and how this new moralistic approach to the law will inevitably overturn them.

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