In a column on the Supreme Court agreeing to hear a case involving a California law requiring that political donor lists be made public, George Will describes a curious legal distinction between โfundamentalโ rights that cannot be abridged and lesser โnonfundamentalโ rights that can be abridged if there is a โrational basis.โย This current case, according to Will, would take the dangerous step of applying the โrational basisโ criterion to a fundamental right.
From George Will, The Supreme Courtโs opportunity to tackle sinister trends โ The Washington Post:
For almost eight decades, courts, without justification from the Constitutionโs text or history, have distinguished between โfundamentalโ rights, such as speech and association, and supposedly lesser rights involving economic activity, property and contracts. When judging government infringements of these secondary rights, courts have adopted the extremely permissive โrational basisโ test: Any government regulation is permissible if the government asserts, or a court can imagine, a rational basis for the regulation.
Now, Californiaโs attorney general implicitly wants the rational basis test extended to governmentโs infringement of rights to which courts have ascribed โfundamentalโ status โ speech and association. This demonstrates three converging dangers.
One is that of relegating some rights to inferior status. A second is that of making those supposedly nonfundamental rights vulnerable to the nonprotection of the rational basis test. A third is that of allowing government, when it claims to be acting to prevent corruption or the appearance thereof, to merely assert a rational basis for regulating advocacy concerning public affairs.
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