When dealing with morality, it is one thing to talk about moral obligations in the ideal sense, where we have nothing standing in our way from choosing the greatest objective good, while it is another to deal with the actual situation which we find ourselves in, where the greatest objective good might not be possible. Objective discussions without actually dealing with concrete situations end up being pure abstractions. They are not worthless, but they do not comprehend the whole of a given situation. Objectivity without subjectivity ignores the constraints which are put upon us and our actions, but when making a moral decision, those constraints must be considered and factored in if we want to make the best decision possible. Most of the actual choices which lie before us are imperfect, and so, though in objective sense, they would be considered to be faulty, subjectively a person might make the best possible choice possible and so have little to no culpability despite the imperfection of the action. When trying to determine that culpability, subjective factors are just as important as objective ones, and indeed, those subjective factors can sometimes show why objective discussions on morality can lead us astray as they will lead us to having no possible action we can take.
We must act with prudence, realizing that no matter what choice we make, there might be some objective issue with it, that there will be situations in which all possible actions will require us to do something that an idealized objective morality would not allow us to do. The solution to such a quandary is not inaction, for that is, in reality, is also the result of a moral decision, and such inaction will also produce its own effects, its own consequences, some of which can be worse than any potential action we could take. That is, failing to do what we can do can or should do can also lead to sin. And so, when we find ourselves in such a particular situation where no matter what choice we make, we will find all choices, including inaction, objectively engaging some sort of evil, prudence tells us to pick the course of action which brings about the greatest good while producing the least amount of objective evil. This can and does apply to those actions which are called intrinsic evils. Something is deemed an intrinsic evil, not because it is absolutely evil, for every evil choice has us embrace and abuse some sort of good in order to engage it, nor because it is necessarily a grave evil, but because some actions always contain some objective fault, some evil, within them, and that evil must never be ignored or discounted. But knowing this does not tell us how to act in particular situations. If we find ourselves having to make a choice where a particular act is deemed an intrinsic evil, but the gravity of the evil is extremely minor, where the other choices end up being gravely evil, though the particular action in consideration might in other contexts not be seemed evil, we must choose the course of action which leads to the least amount of evil, and that means, the intrinsic evil. In saying this, this does not mean the evil should be chosen because of the evil involved, but rather, in spite of it; the evil remains and evil, and should still be denounced, with the recognition that there might need to be some restitution made for it (however, that might also depend upon the situation). It is in this light that an anonymous desert father pointed out why sometimes lying, which is an intrinsic evil, might be preferable to not-lying:
A brother was living in hesychia and the demons wanted to lead him astray, masquerading as angels. They got him up for synaxis and showed him some lights. He visited some elder and said to him: “Abba, angels come with light and get me up for synaxis.” “Do not listen to them, my son,” the elder said, “for they are demons. When they come to waken you, say to them: ‘I will get up when I want to; I am not listening to you.’” The brother took the elder’s advice to heart and went back to his cell. The following night demons came to him again as usual and got him up. But he retorted as he had been told by the elder, saying to them: “I will get up when I want to; I am not listening to you.” “That wicked, deceitful old man has led you astray,” they said to him. “A brother came to him wanting to borrow some money and although he had some, he lied to him saying ‘I haven’t got any’ and did not give him [any]. Learn from this that he is deceitful.” The brother rose early, went to the elder and reported these things to him. “I admit that I had some money,” the elder said; “the brother did some seeking [some] and I did not give him [any], knowing that if I gave him any we would come to spiritual undoing; I chose to transgress one commandment and not to transgress ten and come to affliction. For your part, pay no heed to the demons who wish to lead you astray.” He went off to his cell much strengthened by the elder. [1]
While lying is wrong, and so is said to be an intrinsic evil because, by nature, it fights against some element of the truth, we might find ourselves in a situation where it is better to lie, and humbly accept whatever consequence we might have to face due to such a lie, if any, than to speak factually and let some greater evil be done:
When some grave danger is connected with speaking the truth, therefore, the refuge of lying must be resorted to, yet in such a way that we are bitten by the healthful guilt of a humbled conscience. But when no circumstance of great urgency presses, every precaution must be taken to avoid lying as if it were something deadly. It is like the potion of a hellebore that we were speaking of, which is healthful if indeed it is only taken when an unavoidable and deadly sickness is imminent. But if it is taken when the body is enjoying complete and undisturbed health, its destructive force immediately seeks out and possesses the vitals. [2]
Thus, if we were hiding Jews from Nazis and we were asked where the Jews were, it would have been better for us to lie and save lives than it would be to reveal where the Jews were and have them tortured and killed. Prudence certainly leads us to this conclusion, while someone who only looks to what is ideal, to mere objectivity, would say that as lying is always a sin, it would be better to speak factually and tell the Nazis where the Jews were than to lie to them. Prudence reminds us that we would end up culpable for the harm which comes to the Jews if we told the Nazis where to find them because we didn’t do all that we could to protect them. Now, some might say that we have to accept that responsibility because lying is an intrinsic evil and telling the truth isn’t. But, as lying in this case would be extremely venial, at worst, while supporting the deaths of innocents is not so venial, it is best to do what is deemed a lesser evil, that is to lie, and then hope on God’s mercy, that God is not so legalistic and would offer us mercy and compassion for doing the best we could in such a situation. Others might suggest that there is another way to examine the situation, to point out that by being asked by the Nazi we are being threatened by them, and the Nazi would be help culpable for the lying, just as if we were tortured and forced to say something we did not agree with under torture, we would likely not be held accountable for that statement. Of course, while it would be best for us to lie in such a situation, we must not use such a determination to reject the objective moral declaration that says lying is an intrinsic evil. It remains objectively wrong. What we learn, however, is that there are times in which something that is objectively wrong, like lying, can still be the only subjective choice available to us, that is, it is what leads to the least amount of objective evil (or sin) and the greatest amount of good:
Tell me, then, I ask you, what you would have done if in a similar situation had arisen for you who now live under the Gospel. Would you have chosen to conceal them by a similar lie, saying in the same way, ‘They went on after having drunk a little water,’ thus fulfilling what is commanded: ‘Spare not to save those who are being led to death and to redeem those who are being slain?’ Or by speaking the truth would you have given over those who were hidden to those who were going to kill them? What, then, of the Apostle’s words? ‘Let no one seek what is his own but rather what is another’s’ And: ‘Love does not seek what is its own but rather what belongs to others.’ And what he says about himself: ‘I do not seek what is beneficial to me but what is beneficial to the many, so that they may be saved.’ For if we seek what is ours and wish to hold obstinately to what is beneficial to us, we shall have to speak the truth even in difficulties of this sort, and we shall become guilty of another’s death. But if we fulfill the apostolic command by placing what is helpful to others ahead of our own well-being, without a doubt the necessity of lying will be imposed upon us. [3]
This is why abstract discussions concerning intrinsic evil, where certain actions are designated as always being sinful, can lead to the wrong conclusion. Many abuse the category of intrinsic evil to suggest we cannot do a certain action, one which is not grave, because it is an intrinsic evil, even if the other choice which lies before us is an action which in and of itself is not an intrinsic evil but which produces in the situation a greater evil than the intrinsic evil. This is one way evil works to pervert the good, for it has us misunderstand the objective analysis of evil and what it means in relation to our subjective action in the world. We must avoid the greatest evil, and we must do what we can to produce the greatest possible good. That is what we should do. Different situations will lead to different conclusions as to which actions we should take. Of course, we must take the objective element into consideration, but the objective element will also take into consideration not only whether or not something is inherently wrong, but the gravity of the evil involved. Lying represents a key example of this, for we can see how many saints have shown why we can and should lie, despite the evil involved with lying; they have pointed out how many have even been applauded for the good which they did as a result of such lying, such as we see happened with Rahab in Scripture. This is not to say that lying, or any other intrinsic evil, is good, and so approved, in and of itself. But we can approve the choice being made when there was no perfectly good choice available and so someone made a choice to do the greatest good possible (and indeed, often without the intention to do the evil which they must do). This is how just wars are justified. While the direct killing of another human is always wrong, there might be a situation where not stopping a would-be conquering army would, in the end, produce much more death and destruction, much more evil in its wake, than if someone takes up arms to stop them.
Now, it must be said, even if our actions are justified, such as happens in a just war, or justified lying, this does not take away from the fact that some sort of evil is involved in our actions. Even if we are deemed not to be culpable for them, that they were forced upon us, we should still realize that our actions will impact us and our spiritual (and mental) health. We will need help to deal with that impact, and spiritually, that help comes to us from grace, for grace perfects nature by healing the world from the evil which is done in it and to it. Thus, even if we are not culpable, or our culpability is deemed to minor, we can and should still seek spiritual healing for the evil, for if we do not, then the evil can and will spread, and perhaps come to influence us in such a way we begin to act not out of prudence, but out of acceptance of such evil.
[1] John Wortley, trans., The Anonymous Sayings Of The Desert Fathers: A Select Edition And Complete English Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 159-61 [N224/10.138].
[2] John Cassian, The Conferences. Trans. Boniface Ramsey, OP (New York: Newman Press, 1997), 595 [Seventeenth Conference; Abba Joseph].
[3] John Cassian, The Conferences, 598-9 [Seventeenth Conference; Abba Joseph].
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