The Crucified God (1974) is the second of Moltmann’s three ‘programmatic’ works. It is mind-bendingly good. Moltmann does his best to dismantle several modern theological missteps, including radical monotheism, christomonism (the over-emphasis on Christ (over against the other two members of the Trinity)), and the radical doctrine of the two natures. For instance, he argues that the Early Church developed the doctrine of the two natures so as to protect their Platonic ideal that God cannot suffer; thus they emphasized that Jesus’ humanity suffered on the cross, but the logos’ divinity did not. This is docetism.
Instead, Moltmann argues that the crucifixion is the identity of all Christian theology. In the event of the cross, God bound himself to time, to this planet, and to humanity. God chose this instead of protecting his timelessness, his immutability, his absolute perfection. By binding himself to time, God also takes the crucifixion into himself, and the crucifixion becomes an event within the Trinity: the Son experiences godforsakenness (God experiences godforsakenness!), and the Father experiences the grief of his Son’s death. In this, all of us in our godforsakennes find new life within the Trinity as the Spirit brings forth resurrection and healing.
Here is a quote:
“A shattering expression of the theologia crucis [theology of the cross] which is suggested in the rabbinic theology of God’s humiliation of himself is to be found in Night, a book written by E. Wiesel, a survivor of Auschwitz:
“The SS hanged two Jewish men and a youth in front of the whole camp. The men died quickly, but the death throes of the youth lasted for half an hour. ‘Where is God? Where is he?’ someone asked behind me. As the youth still hung in torment in the noose after a long time, I heard the man call again, ‘Where is God now?’ And I heard a voice in myself answer: ‘Where is he? He is here. He is hanging there on the gallows…’
“Any other answer would be blasphemy. There cannot be any other Christian answer to the question of this torment. To speak here of a God who could not suffer would make God a demon. To speak here of an absolute God would make God an annihilating nothingness. To speak here of an indifferent God would make condemn men to indifference”(273-74).