Between pp. 944 and 966 we get as clear a short exposition of Tomâs views on âjustificationâ as one is likely to find, certainly more focused and succinct than in his book on Justification, and it merits a couple of blog posts of discussion. He will make seven points about his âseventhâ point in the sequence of Pauline thought that leads to Paulâs treatment of justification.
Firstly, it is Tomâs view that present justification is a declarative thing, God declaring a person âin the rightâ or âwithin the covenantâ all those who hear, believe, and obey the Gospel of Jesus Christ (on obedience see Rom. 10.16; 2 Thess. 1.8). In his view the future verdict, often called final justification, is brought forward into the present. Unless one concludes that the phrase âthe obedience of faithâ means faith as a form of obedience, then Tom is saying something rather different here than the traditional âjustification by grace through faithâ (plus nothing, including no deeds or works) idea. He would also be at odds with John Wesley who argued that âinitialâ justification is not simply final justification brought forward into the present, not least because final justification according to 2 Cor. 5.10 and other texts involves an evaluation of the believerâs works, and not just a matter of justification by faith. This being the case âinitial justificationâ is not the final verdict brought forward in time, from Wesleyâs point of view. You will not be surprised to hear that I think Wesley is closer to the mark than Tom on this point.
I do however agree with Tom that one of the elements of initial justification is the declaration of âno condemnationâ or put Tomâs way, that this person is now âin the rightâ. I would prefer the phrase âset rightâ rather than âin the rightâ because that is what God does in the act of faithâ he sets us right, not merely declares us to be in the right. In other words, initial justification is not just a matter of a legal declaration. The reason âset rightâ is a better English equivalent is because previously the person in question was indeed âin the wrongâ and was under condemnation. It is not merely a matter of a court finding in favor a person who was wrongly accused of something. This is precisely why I think that the forensic approach can be pushed too far. I would stress again that the language of âreckoningâ is not law court but rather business language, the language of credits and debits. In fact âreckonedâ could just as well be translated âcreditedâ.
Secondly, when a judge declares a person ânot guiltyâ or at least ânot condemnedâ (which has a different nuance than ânot guiltyâ) he is not at the same time declaring a person to be either âin the rightâ or ârighteousâ. That positive evaluation is another matter. I canât say Iâve ever heard of a judge saying that a person was âdikaiosâ when what he meant was that his guilt was not proved or that there would be no condemnation of whatever he did do. Nor do I know of any Greco-Roman or Jewish judge or court that talked like that. So for example when Paul speaks of pardon and of sins being covered the judge in that case is certainly not declaring a person ârighteousâ or âin the rightâ in any normal sense of those words. What he means is, despite what he has done, his sins have been paid for, and so he is not condemnedâ he is pardoned for his crimes, knowing quite well that he committed those sins and he has not himself paid for them.
What the declaration âno condemnationâ does do is âset rightâ the accused, and gives him legal âright standingâ. Thatâs all, and it has nothing to do with obedience. On p. 945 however Tom is right to say that the speech act of the judge, declaring âno condemnationâ does create a new status for the personâ they have right standing before the law.
The further point made on p. 946 is spot onâ that since the âset rightâ or âright standingâ of the accused is declarative it has nothing to do with the ârighteousnessâ of the judge himself (or the transfer of the judgeâs righteousness to the accused). Exactly right, which means such a declaration has nothing to do with the idea of âimputed righteousnessâ in the usual sense of that phrase, nothing to do with the imputing of Christâs righteousness to the believer. Here in n. 479 I think Tom has a point in critiquing both Gorman and McCormackâ a legal declaration transforms only the status of the person in question, it does not transform their character. That is quite another matter. Justification only has to do with the formerâ the giving of someone right standing before the judge or law. It is however true that justification and the new birth are coincident in time so that the effective transformation of character, the real âsetting rightâ (internally) of the person transpires at the same juncture with the legal declaration of âno condemnationâ or âin right standingâ with the law. The critique in n. 480 of the traditional Reformed ways of framing this discussion and the muddling up of Godâs righteousness with Christâs and indeed with the believers right standing is well done here. He is right that Is. 61.10 does not refer to the righteousness of God, but to the ârighteousâ status given as a gift by God to his people.
Is God thereby acquitting the guilty, or even saying they were in the right all along? On p. 948 Tom says, yesâŠand no, to such questions. More to the point Tom in good Reformed fashion wants to say that the declaration of the judge is permanent, not temporary. He says âthe status of dikaiosune is not temporary. It truly anticipates the verdict which will be issued on the last day.â But since we have been using the analogy with human judicial processes all along, I will say that here is where he is wrong. The fact is that a person after such a legal judgment can go on to violate the law again, âeven if he got off scott free the first timeâ and will be judged again. And nothing about Paulâs discussion of final judgment suggests it is identical with the initial judgment, or is even done on entirely the same basis. Final judgment alone involves an evaluation of the believerâs works including a ministerâs works, resulting in either rewards or âescaping as through fireâ. While it is true that salvation is not on the BASIS of works, if one commits apostasy, one is disqualified from final salvation and final justification. And furthermore, there are rewards in the kingdom based on good behavior as well, though salvation itself is not a reward. While this issue is complex, it is definitely over simplifying what Paul actually says about justification to suggest it is simply final justification retrojected back in time, and it further muddles things up to say that the initial verdict is permanent (and precludes a different final verdict). This was neither Jesus nor Paulâs view, and for that matter, you will not find it elsewhere in early Judaism either, so far as I know. This is the view of Reformed theology, slipped into Paulâs narrative Jewish thought world.
On p. 949 Tom makes the correct point (his second sub-point) that this declaration of right standing is entirely dependent upon Christâs death on the cross. The finished work of Christ opens up the new world of forgiveness, as Tom puts it.
On p. 950 we have the third sub pointâ namely the people declared to be âin the rightâ (Tomâs language, not mine) are incorporated into the Messiah (not quiteâ they are incorporated into the body of Christ which is connected to the head who is Christ. This is what it means to be âin Christââ see 1 Cor. 12). Tom equates the declaration of âSon of God with powerâ by means of the resurrection (Rom. 1.3-4) with the declaration of believers as âadopted sons and daughters of Godâ). The problem is that this is probably not what Rom. 1.3-4 meansâ Jesus was appointed Son of God in power, not merely declared to be something. In other words, what happened to Jesus at the resurrection has nothing to do with a legal judgment, thought certainly the event vindicated his prior claims. But that is not the point in Rom. 1.3-4. Paul believes he had already been the Son of God before his resurrection, but that at the resurrection he went from being Son of God in weakness to Son of God in power. This was no mere legal declaration, it was a transformation of his very nature, now having a resurrection body, and so enabled to be Son of God in powerâ immune to disease, decay, and death. This is hardly analogous to the declaration of sinners as pardoned.
Tom is however right that what happened at the resurrection does not amount to Christ having a right standing which then could be imputed to believers who are âin himâ. Tom is absolutely correct (p. 951) that Paul never speaks of Christ as âhaving righteousnessâ. He thinks not even 1 Cor. 1.30 says this (and I agree). What that says is Christ is Godâs wisdom, and we become or receive those other things through him.










