Several people have asked me to clarify what I mean when I say that an act may be “justifiable” but not “just.” The background is my post about the killing of bin Laden which I suggested might be justifiable but not just. Someone said that it is okay to celebrate bin Laden’s death (something I denied) so long as one is celebrating the justice in it and not the killing per se. I cannot bring myself to celebrate something that is less than just. Hence the question.
I agree with theologians such as Reinhold Niebuhr who argue that true justice is inseparable from love even if, in our sinful world, it is often at best an approximation of love. And in this sense, “love” is being defined by Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount and 1 Corinthians 13 (etc.) as selfless benevolence to the other.
In Christian tradition, going back at least to Augustine, love and justice are the twin and inseparable Christian ethical principles. Well, that raises the question, what about when there is a conflict between them? Ultimately, they cannot conflict in reality because they are both rooted in God’s character (from a realist, not a nominalist, perspective). However, from our finite and fallen perspective there does sometimes seem to be tension between them.
Niebuhr helpfully distinguished between “perfect justice,” which would be love in action (e.g., tough love) and “proximate justice” which is love compromised in the face of the reality principle. For example, in this fallen world there is such a thing as the “lesser of two evils” that must be done–at least by governments. (A difference between Niebuhr and Yoder is whether Christians can rightly participate in this practice. Niebuhr said so and Yoder said no.)
When I say that something can be “justifiable” but not “just” I mean in Niebuhr’s terms. A war can be justifiable but is never truly just in the highest and best sense of just. The highest and best sense of justice must be restorative and not retributive–if it is indeed inextricably linked to love. War is rarely restorative. Restoration may come after ware (e.g., the Marshall Plan), but during the bombing one can hardly call it restorative.
I simply wish to preserve the distinction between true, perfect justice, which is, for example, tough love, and proximate justice which is something less than perfect love. It is love accommodated and may even be love approximated but not achieved.
I cannot call a killing “just” because when I think of something being or not being “just” I think of love as the norm. However, in this sinful, fallen world some killing may be justified–e.g., when it is absolutely necessary to preserve innocent life.
I cannot celebrate any killing or death. I can’t even celebrate the justifiable nature of it because that is, at best, a necessary evil. I can only celebrate true justice which I see achieved, for example, in rehabilitation of a criminal or restoration of a broken relationship.
I can think of one possible exception, but I’m not sure it’s really an exception to my rule. That is when someone lays down his or her life to be killed to save someone else’s life. But then it is not so much the actual killing I celebrate but the act of selfless love that was involved in it. So, for example, I celebrate the cross of Jesus Christ as the Son of God’s selfless sacrifice for us, but I don’t celebrate the act of the executioners. I realize that’s a fine distinction. Some will no doubt call it a distinction without a difference, but it makes sense to me. Even Jesus prayed for his executioners’ forgiveness, so he must not have thought their act was a good thing in every sense.
Now, having said all of that, the theologian in me kicks in and I have to say something that is not obvious but may be necessary: that there is really only one ultimate ethical norm and that is love. Since perfect justice is normed by love, it is not really a separate ethical norm. Love is God’s nature. Scripture says (in 1 John) “God is love.” It does not say “God is justice.” Justice, then, is always at best some manifestation of love. I conclude that restorative justice is love in action in the social realm whereas retributive justice is a necessary evil because of the fallenness of the world. Christians should always aim at restorative justice because of Jesus. When they have to participate in retributive justice (e.g., in the violent defense of a weak neighbor under attack), assuming that is every the case, repentance rather than celebration is called for because of the “new law” Jesus delivered of indiscriminate, selfless love that includes non-resistance.
Where I find myself caught is between Niebuhr, who argued that Christians must not always avoid compromise of the law of love (because that would require withdrawal from society) and Yoder who argued that Christians ought always to keep the law of love even if it means a certain withdrawal from society (not geographic or physical withdrawal but social non-engagement). Yoder seems right ideally while Niebuhr seems right realistically. So far, anyway, the only way I can see to mediate this difference is to advocate and practice repentance when involved in doing the lesser of two evils to avoid withdrawal from social responsibility.
The case study is, of course, Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer himself, apparently, did not think killing Hitler was a righteous thing to do. He saw it more as a necessary evil and was conflicted about it. I cannot imagine him celebrating Hitler’s death if the conspiracy had been successful. I can only imagine him repenting while at the same time experiencing a certain satisfaction that a terrible evil had been removed.
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