IRAQ FUTURE NOTES: Last night I went to a roundtable on postwar Iraq, put on by the America’s Future Foundation (a.k.a. “Free Food and Beer for the Right!”). John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation debated Charles Pena of Cato (although in the chunk that I saw, they were mostly agreeing). I missed Pena’s opening presentation, sorry… Here are my notes; make of ’em what you will. Stuff in quotes, they said; stuff not in quotes is generally my paraphrasing of them unless I indicate differently:

[Hulsman:] “If you elect a stooge, you have to stay forever. Because that person has no credibility.” Thus do not put in Iraqi exiles. They’ll be hated/killed and we’ll have to either abandon or go back–anarchy or empire–and either one of those options helps Al Qaeda recruit.

Is Iraq different from Clinton-era foreign policy adventures? It’s economically viable (not like Haiti). It should end up with a confederation. “What Clinton did in every one of those cases where the state fell apart… is reinstate [impose?] a strong central government…” i.e. try the thing that just failed.

We should offer the Kurds a share in oil revenue for the first time, and a share in government for the first time. In return, they don’t secede or otherwise make a nuisance of themselves.

We offer the Shi’a a share of their even greater oil revenue for the first time, plus share in government, and in return they don’t let Iran make trouble, and guard the oil.

The Sunni are the most pro-Saddam. We offer them the rebuilding of Baghdad (i.e. we will do it, but it will benefit them most), a good chunk of the oil revenue, the promise that we will leave them alone after successful de-Ba’athization, and–I quote–“We will prevent the [Iraqis] you oppressed from eviscerating you.” That’s a pretty good deal considering what they’ve been doing for the past few decades.

[Pena, in response to questions:] “Iran next” is a very bad move–an attempt at “just add water” liberalization–by trying to liberalize (they both used “democratize” but it sounded like “liberalize” was more accurate) too fast you end up with nothing. Invading Iran would destroy the nascent freedom movement there.

[Hulsman:] Saddam is not insane. He has normal, rational geopolitical aim: regional dominance. That’s why he fought the Iran/Iraq War, that’s why he invaded Kuwait. He has not been wrong… until now. Yeah, he lost insofar as he didn’t win, but he didn’t lose anything he couldn’t afford to lose. Lots of lives; bupkes to him as long as he never took the big dive. Lots of money; shrug, he owns the whole country. So he kept trying to get into a position where Iraq would be the biggest player in OPEC, so he could pressure the Saudis. So now we imagine that he gets a nuke. He invades Kuwait again. The price of oil triples. The European economy tanks. The U.S. economy plummets. Chaos. And what happens if we threaten him with–anything? Invasion? Nuclear war? Oh right, sure. How many allies would we have in such a threat? Nobody. We had a hard enough time rounding ’em up now, there’s no way we could have gotten them with another Hiroshima at stake. So, Saddam had been playing one game for two decades, and despite all the defeats he was inching closer to winning.

(Eve adds: So the argument here is that Saddam Hussein was not deterrable, not because he’s nuts, but because he wouldn’t believe we would hit him–we didn’t do it before.)

Hulsman: “The most important thing is to be as transparent as we can about the oil.”

You must reward (with a role in the redevelopment) people in the coalition who stuck their necks out–Aznar, Poland, Romania. (Eve adds: Presumably Blair also.) If you don’t reward them, what incentive structure are you setting up? Next time no one will help you. And if you give France or Germany a role, what incentive structure are you setting up? Next time everyone will be against you, because you will have led them to expect that there will be no penalties for crossing you. Don’t let France, Germany get away with opposing the war and then profiting from it.

Pena: The role of the United Nations isn’t significantly different now from what it was two years ago, except that now it’s obvious that the UN is “convenient when it’s convenient, and …ignored when it’s not.” (Eve adds: But that obviousness, the on-the-table-ness of it, does strike me as a significant difference. Acknowledging something like UN impotence/irrelevance reinforces it. That’s OK by me, see my previous statement about the UN as the United Governments and sometimes the United Dictators.)

Pena had opposed the war beforehand but is now basically trying to wring some good effects out of what he still believes was a bad decision. He argues that North Korea learned the lesson of Iraq: Get nukes ASAP in order to prevent regime change.

(Eve: Both of ’em beat “neocons” like red-headed stepchildren. Neocons couldn’t find a friend at that table.) Hulsman: “The problem with neocons is that they’re like a drunken gambler at Las Vegas–every time they win, they double down. And eventually they’re going to lose. And when they lose, we lose.”

Eve: The main mood of the event: cautiously hopeful, emphasis on cautious. Lots and lots of talk about the US’s track record of losing the peace. Photos of sweet Iraqi girls waving American flags were passed around, but the general atmosphere was resolutely sober.