SHE LOOKS LIKE AN ANGEL… BUT I GOT WISE/SHE’S THE DEVIL IN DISGUISE!: Some exceptionally scattered thoughts on tradition and conservatism. These are propositions for discussion, not settled beliefs of mine. [I’ll add links to older posts later, and remove this parenthesis.]

1. There’s a difference in kind between a stereotype and a role. Actually, this one I’m fairly sure of; I’m just not sure how to cash out what that difference in kind really looks like. I’ve been using gender stereotypes vs. gender roles as a possible way into this question.

One possibility is that stereotypes are abstractions, character descriptions, whereas roles are characters. The Hysterical Woman is a cruel and insipid caricature; Eddie Monsoon is a wonderful monster. (Similarly for The Prude vs. Saffy Monsoon.)

I’m not sure that’s quite accurate. I do think a preexisting personal representation of the role being somehow approached by our actions is part of the difference. That’s what the saints are for. They break the conventions in keeping the Commandments, in Chesterton’s very nice phrase, and thereby expand the possibilities for the rest of us. They show us new roles. Joan of Arc, Teresa of Avila, these aren’t stereotypes.

This of course doesn’t help you when you can’t find precedent for what you perceive as your vocation. And since I believe very strongly that vocation isn’t a choice, I am still searching for other, more illuminating ways to cash out the difference between stereotype and role.

2. One way to tell that something is a tradition is if it can’t be defended by reason alone. I’ve already written that tradition’s primary purpose is to create a persona–to simultaneously give a place or institution an ethos, and give it a personality, making it a possible object of love. (Specifically, at least in the contexts where I’ve encountered traditional institutions, the institution becomes a fictive woman. It would be shockingly cheap [and cheaply shocking] to wonder if Germany’s problem wasn’t the idea of the Fatherland–but is there anything to be salvaged from this idea that fictive womanhood is better for us than fictive manhood?)

Anyway, putting gender questions aside, this definition of tradition should immediately show you the many points on which it is vulnerable.

a) Fictive womanhood is fictive. (Long cat is loooooooong!) There is no actual, individual, percept-rich “America” or “Marianne” or “Israel” or “Church.” Reason-alone will always sever the cords of language and longing which held together shadow and substance… making it impossible for us to argue that the imperceptible (the persona) should be considered the substance, not the shadow.

b) Fictive womanhood is a fantastic alibi! This is why Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France is simultaneously so central to my understanding of tradition’s role, and so troubling. If we agree that tradition makes France an ethos and a beloved, must we agree that Marie Antoinette is the personification of that persona? Or to bring this down to the twentieth century: If tradition, then figurehead–whether monarch or dictator?

This is the darker side (the back!) of my post about how tradition gives grace to our necessary subordinations and submissions: Tradition, of course, can give graceful cover to our unnecessary subordinations as well.

c) Cultures lack an architecture. There is no science–and precious little art!–by which we can tell which elements of tradition are load-bearing. In any particular case, I can argue rationally that this element can be removed without destroying the iconic resonance, the persona, of our tradition. And in fact, I can always point to many, many cases in which prior rejections of traditional elements did not fatally damage what we now consider to be the nature of that tradition. This is both a strength of tradition–its ability to adapt, to recreate a cultural persona as adeptly as you and I recreate our own public faces when we undergo severe personal change, remaining recognizable to our friends despite the massive internal damage and recovery–and, in a rationalist age, a weakness. No individual fort can be defended, even though the attackers insist they’re on our side.

d) Finally… how can you prove that your beloved should be loved? This is one of the very few questions where I can’t think of a medieval Christian philosopher who has really provided a hard-and-fast, cash-value answer… which is a point in favor of medieval Christian philosophers. Never use an argument when a stained-glass window would suffice.