American Buddhist Perspectives
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by S.G.M. WeerasinghOne of the first things that drew me both to Kantian and Buddhist ethics was the notion of a morality that is at once transcendent and imminent. This means that there is a sense in which morality lies beyond our normal conceptions of the world and yet it is accessible to us always. In Buddhism it is beyond our normal conceptions because of egoic ignorance, fed by our clinging to pleasures and pushing away of negative feelings. Insofar as we are unenlightened, we all do this. Moments of awareness help break the habit-cycle.
In Kant’s works we are dominated by heteronomy – other (hetero) laws (nomos). To be ruled by heteronomy is to be subservient, subservient to our desires for power, addictions, and even moral and political rules set down by others. It is by employment of reason that we begin to untangle ourselves from these laws – choosing those we follow instead of blindly following.
But hitherto I have seen little or no mention of the Pāli term papañca (Skt. prapañca), explained by Weerasinghe here in relation to Kant’s use of ‘phenomena’:
The Kantian concept of phenomena immediately reminds us at the doctrine olpapa4ca in early Buddhism The word papañca (Skt. prapañca) derived from pra+√pañc, to spread out, conveys the sense of expansion, diffuseness and manifoldness (cf: PTS., Dic. q.v.). In doctrinal use it signifies expansion, diffuseness or manifoldness of the world we perceive with our senses. It may also refer to the ‘phenomenal world’ in general, and to the ‘mental attitude of worldliness.’ (p.48)
Keown’s Oxford Dictionary of Buddhism (Danny Fisher informed me in January that “there’s an App for that” – you can download the whole thing to your iPhone/iPod) has no entry for papañca but does have prapañca on page 220: “Term meaning ‘proliferation’, in the sense of the multiplication of erroneous concepts, ideas, and ideologies which obscure the true nature of reality….” NYANATILOKA MAHATHERA’s great Buddhist Dictionary has a more detailed explanation, including references here:
Dhp. 254: “Mankind delights in the diffuseness of the world, the Perfect Ones are free from such diffuseness”(papañcābhiratā pajā, nippapañca tathāgatā). – The 8th of the ‘thoughts of a great man’ (mahā-purisa-vitakka; A. VIII, 30) has: “This Dhamma is for one who delights in non-diffuseness (the unworldly, Nibbāna); it is not for him who delights in worldliness (papañca).
So in Buddhism papañca appears to have a clearly negative flavor not found in Kant’s understanding of phenomena, which in Caygill’s Kant Dictionary is given a much more nuanced treatment than either Weerasinghe or I have presented. But they are similar in suggesting a ‘this-world’ (understanding) and a transcendent understanding – one which is fully in the flow/flux of reality free from conceptual proliferation.
The opening assertion that the:
Buddhist revolution in ethics consists of the discovery that “one is responsible for ones deeds (kamma)”. That is that one is the cause of ones predicament. Hence one is the creator of oneself. So the solution to the problem of suffering is within oneself and not in the hands of a supposed creator-God. (p.58)
Thus we may notice that the Kantian view of ethics is not consistent and systematic in comparison to the moral philosophy of early Buddhism which is consistent, systematic and founded on an ethico-psychological basis. (p.61)
In fact most modern scholars would say the opposite, that Kant is systematic and Early Buddhism is somewhat lacking in clarity (though clearly filled with various ‘moral’ teachings). Back to Early Buddhism, we find:
(i) Morality needs no religion to support it. (ii) This idea is well established in EB. which maintains that dhamma or morality is something independent and is discovered by the Buddhas from epoch to epoch. (iii) Morality in EB. [is] atheistic to the core has nothing to do with any divine being. (p.62)
And likewise in both Kant and Buddhism is found a teaching of morality as a discovery (not an invention, social norm, revelation, etc.). “According to Buddhism morality means, inter alia, to live in accordance with what is implicit in the nature of things” (p.64).
While Weerasinghe goes on to be overly harsh on Kant (and outright wrong in too many places to address) and praising of early Buddhism, his criticism that Kant is missing the applied aspect of ethics seems fair (cf. p.70). Kant was at the same time perhaps too confident in humanities ability to use reason to evaluate motivations and break free from superstition and manipulation, as well as pessimistic that one could ever truly do this in this lifetime.
But beyond this, Weerasinghe’s accusations and confusions only continue – for instance lambasting Kant for his thoughts on human evil (suggesting that Kant painted a “pathetic picture of man”(p.65)), and praising him for his philosophy of the Good will, which is by it’s own nature good as “a great teaching apparently unknown to, and unheard of in the then Western philosophy” (p. 77). One assertion, which would be merely amusing if it weren’t in a supposedly academic text is that those aspects of Kant that are good and useful are “not European, but Indian in spirit” (pp. 85-86 emphasis in original). Sigh.
As I suggested in my last post, it’s a hard book to recommend. The book didn’t make any real splash in the Western academic world, so even academics seem to have ignored it. It has a fair number of typos, is not terribly easy to get ahold of, and sadly hacks up Kantian philosophy. Between the last comment I quoted and the one starting the book in my last post, “Early Buddhist philosophy is a royal highway…” you should have a pretty good idea of what to expect.
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