Polkinghorne on Natural Theology and Moral Law (RJS)

I agree with dopderbeck (#1):
The failure to align with a universal moral standard does not nullify the standard. “Consistent with universal moral law and sin”.
What’s that Vikings book Dave? Sounds interesting.

I’m also not entirely sure that examples of child sacrifice are a defeater of moral law. In some sense, it seems to me, that fact that it is a sacrifice speaks to the idea that it is not normative, i.e. there has to be a reason beyond normal every-day morality for a person to sacrifice a child. I guess if there was a culture for which the murder of a child within the family was entirely common and ordinary, it would be a problem for a universal moral law.

I also wonder if it matters how specific we think the universal moral law is. If you look at human morality around the globe there’s an awful lot that is common and there are many many common themes, even though the implementation details vary.

I have a difficult time finding moral law, beauty and just about all discussed in this article as having any inherent support to god.

Moral law clearly is not the same, at least the instances are not. I would concede that it is inherent in humans to develop moral laws, but I don’t see any moral law that is universal. People consider suicide the best morality, murder the best (sacrifice said above), etc etc.

And beauty, I grew up going to the symphony every week that they were in town. We were season ticket holders. Whereas I could see how some people would like it, I did not. Likewise, I remember listening to the band Rush when I was very young and thinking that is horrible ugly stuff. Now, I think they have some quite beautiful music. BTW, I am a bit of a concert music fan again in my old age, but I did take a couple classes on that type of music to increase my appreciation. Soct talked about the Teaching Company in another thread and I admit I am an addict of their craft, the musical courses are awesome as are the philosophy, history etc.

Continuing, I am a big fan of the show RadioLab and they did a show on morality back in 2007. These people are quite good and it is worth and entertaining listen.

http://www.radiolab.org/2007/aug/13/

Wading in where the water is probably too deep for me, but here goes…

The writings of contemporary Greek theologian Christos Yannaras were recommended to me by a trusted Orthodox friend, and have been important in helping me understand how the Eastern church approaches things. I’m reading a third book by him now. Y. keeps coming back to the reality that we know and function in terms of Personal relationships – that is, the relationships of distinct hypostases (distinct existential realities who are centers of willing action) on the basis of love and freedom. In this view, morality is the behavior that arises from the “state” of loving relationship between Persons. It doesn’t come to us from any “objective” or “outside” source, including holy scripture or even “what God is” (which is forever beyond our knowledge); it is something that arises internally as we maintain the tension of the freedom and otherness of the other while at the same time participating in the life of the other with freely-given self-giving love.

If we move away from a concept of legality, “moral law”, then we can see why sin is always relational. This explanation leaves room for evolution, and for how Christianity lived out on this basis can respect cultures and nonetheless change cultures from within, instead of “colonizing” and imposing “law” from without. It accounts for why cultures have some heinous values and how we can argue against them. The difficulties to which rjs’ questions point disappear – so it seems to me.

Of course, there is much more than can be said in a blog comment, and I’m still chewing on Y’s ideas and making connections. But there is another way of thinking about “morality” and human behavior than the philo/theo constructs to which this series, esp this post, has pointed.

Dana

Dopderbeck (9),

I disagree with much of what you said in your reply, but do not have available time right now to provide you with a detailed response.

Dana (#12) — yes, but I’d see this relational approach as complementary to what Polkinghorne is saying. The universe itself is created out of the relational love of the Trinity. It is no surprise, then, that creation is imbued with a moral law grounded in relationship.

Here is place where, as much as I appreciate Barth, I think I depart from Barth. For Barth, with his aversion to any kind of natural theology, ethics are grounded in the divine command. But this seems to leave two unappealing options: law based in an arbitrary divine command or law based in a scholastic / medieval sense of justice as primarily an affront to the sovereign’s glory. The Eastern tradition provides a very helpful third way: law flowing from the perichoretic fellowship of the Trinity.

Dana – I suspect that dichotomy between “law” and “love” depends too much on something like Luther’s stark contrast between “law” and “grace.” As I see it, “law” at its most basic is the product of “love.” It’s of course true that there is a kind of “law” occasioned by sin, but I think that is only derivative of the higher law of love.

So to me it would be a mistake to say that “relationship” makes law “unnecessary” or that “law” is always and only a tool of power relations / colonization. A form of law, the law of love, makes relationships possible, because it allows the “other” to be truly “other.” Without this even the Trinity is not the Trinity, for then there is only one substance and not three persons.

Toldya it was scandalous.

As I understand things, the eastern church never needed to deal with contrasting “law” with “grace”, and so that way of thinking does not exist there.

It’s not simply “relationship” as a category; it’s that the relationship *is* love (the mutual self-giving of distinctive hypostases in freedom, realized in communion), and this relationship of love actually constitutes life.

Y. says it better and more precisely.

Dana

Tim — no, I don’t think the sociobiological explanation is adequate at all. Maybe part of our disagreement is in defining what we mean by “the sociobiological explanation.” I take this in its strong sense — all human behaviors are ultimately reducible to biology. This strong sense does, in fact, elide any notion of “mind.” “Mind” is epiphenomenal, a illusion. There is no downward causation.

If by “the sociobiological explanation” we mean theories that include “mind” as an emergent property that can exert downward causation, then I think your claims are stronger. But this weaker version of sociobiology isn’t really a consistent sociobiological theory because now we’re including something (“mind”) for which biology ultimately can’t account. And once that door is opened, it isn’t at all clear why other doors should be closed.

Dopderbeck,

I think you are trying to extend sociobiolobical models past where I am willing to go in my argument. I am merely noting that those aspects of sociobiological explanations that infer universal human morality as a consequent of universal human heritage of pro-social dispositions are adequate. If we all have the same sociobiological evolutionary heritage, then small wonder we all share some universal commonality in the way of core moral sentiments.

Concerning theory of mind, I am not getting into that. That is not part of my argument. Yes, I am aware of emergent theories of mind and what not, but that is just way too metaphysically speculative for me. The bottom line is no one knows the mysteries behind conscious thought, so let’s not pretend that we do. It’s an unpioneered area rife with spiritual speculation, as well as naturalistic speculation. I have no interest in it.

“First, if sociobiological reductionism is true, we have no “rational faculties.” These are merely epiphenomena of the drive to pass on our genes.”

I don’t follow your logic on this one. If rational engagement with our environment provides an adaptive advantage in passing on our genes, and I believe it does (for reasons I mentioned in my earlier post), then that certainly is a strong reason to expect that our evolved mental capacities can be practically relied on.

“Second, our perceptual capabilities would be evolved only for survivability, not for self-reflective truth.”

I think the argument here would be that the capacity for self-reflection:

(1) might actually have a practical utility in facilitating planning, management of resources, more effective social functioning, and greater innovative capacity. Even the ability to integrate symbolism in one’s thinking has practical advantages in increasing fitness for the individual and community.

(2) in those instances where the practical advantage is lacking exist as a byproduct of highly advanced cognitive problem solving abilities (including the ability to abstractly reason through said problems).

Again Dopderbeck, I don’t see the logic in your argument. Perhaps you could break it down into a syllogism and walk me through it if I’m missing something here.

RJS,

I understand that as a naturalistic explanation of human cognitive functioning, purely sociobiological models at their most fundamental level would involve a naturalistic theory of mind.

However, couldn’t the same be said of evolution? That at it’s most fundamental level, it would involve a theory of Abiogenesis? Now, how frustrating would it be if every time you wanted to talk about Evolution, someone kept insisting that you HAD to talk about Abiogenesis?

This is what Dopderbeck is doing. I am making an argument about those aspects of sociobiology that explain universal human morality, and Dopderbeck wants to bring in the sociobiological equivalent of abiogenesis – the theory of mind – into the equation.

In any event, having control or not per Cashmore’s argument – essentially asking the question of free will – is not something I am arguing with Dopderbeck. I am simply arguing, as he introduced it into the conversation, that we have every expectation that our cognitive faculties are rational within an evolutionary framework. Whether or not we have ultimate free will is another question entirely, and one I did not discuss.

“I don’t find the mere existence of a moral law a conclusive, or even completely persuasive argument, for God because science can provide a plausible alternative that accounts for similarities and even for the differences. I think this is what you are arguing.”

Yes, this is what I am arguing and I think we agree here

“But there is still a something beyond…”

Certainly. I know for me aesthetic experiences are “pointers” to God. But let’s be honest here, these are deeply subjective arguments.

RJS,

I profoundly disagree. My background as you know is in psychology, and sociobiological explanations for evolutionarily adaptive cogntive behavior have as much to do with the theory of mind as abiogenesis has to do with evolution.

Sociobiological models have as their starting point the facts that we evolved, that we are thinking creatures with advanced cognitive ability (incl., capacity for rational thought, engagement with environment, emotional processing, conscious self awareness, etc.), that we function in social units, and that adaptive social functioning is essential to our evolutionary fitness as a species.

To bring in theory of mind simply drills down on that one point of our cognitive cababilities that is ALREADY assumed in the sociobiological model.

This is directly equivalent to drilling down on how cellular life first evolved within evolution. It is a question of digging so deep into the foundation of a model, where our insight is profoundly lacking, and then using the fact that we don’t have answers at such a fundamental level as a mechanism to discredit the larger theory for which we do have some really good emperical support.

Again, I see no reason why referencing sobioliological models requires one to get involved with the deeply metaphysical theories of minds. Sociobiologists themselves don’t really focus on theory of the mind, though given the number of scientists in that field I don’t doubt some do. But theory of mind is more a pursuit for philosophers. Sociobiologists take as a given that we are conscious creatures. Theory of Mind philosophers try to develpop specualitive models that explain how this might be possible. Again, I fail to see how Theory of Mind is more relevant to discussions of evolutionary sociobiology than abiogenesis is to discussions of evolution.

RJS,

First off, humans aren’t the only consciuous creatuers. Elephants, Chimpanzees, Whales, etc. pass the mark-in-the-mirror test that pretty strongly implies a certain level of self-awareness. BTW, this evidence falls within the field of sociobiology, and I believe the vast majority of sociobiologists accept these results and their implications concerning conscious experience of other animal species.

So, given that most sociobiologists affirm conscious experience for not just humans, but other high-functioning mammals as well, who are you then asserting is trying to deny conscious experience?

Also, out of curiousity, if we’re going to be about the business of poking holes in sociobiological explanations of human functioning, what is the theistic explanation for why animals such as elephants, whales, and chimpanzees have self-awareness? Is this an instance of the pot calling the kettle black?

RJS,

I am not giving you or Dopderbeck a purely naturalistic explanation of human existence and human experience across the board. I simply introduced sociobiological explanations for why core moral sentiments are universal across our species. That is all. I don’t know why this ever needed to go to Theory of Mind at all. Do you?

And BTW, RJS, the moral argument, as I understand it, is not a “proof” of God. As someone like Polkinghorne presents it, it is one among several reasons why belief in God is coherent and makes sense of the world. To respond properly to this argument, it isn’t enough to show that “science” can also offer explanations for behaviors we call “moral.” Unless those scientific arguments elide levels of causation beyond mechanism, they haven’t really responded to what Polkinghorne is saying. And again, this is why this conversation is inevitably tied to theories of free will and mind.

Tim (#24) said: If rational engagement with our environment provides an adaptive advantage in passing on our genes, and I believe it does (for reasons I mentioned in my earlier post), then that certainly is a strong reason to expect that our evolved mental capacities can be practically relied on.

In Tim’s prior post, he offered this scenario: …problem solving, social functioning, and awareness of one’s environment. Certainly an argument can be made that as problem solving became more abstract to meet the challenges of more complex problems needing, well, solving, coupled with a practically adequate awareness of our environment, that the foundation for our modern rational engagement and high-level thinking relating to the external world was laid.

There are multiple problems with this line of argument.

First, it is empirically underdetermined and non-verifiable. It is not really a “scientific” explanation, but rather is a speculative just-so story. It is not at all clear what adaptive advantage was afforded by “abstract” reflective reasoning beyond pragmatic “problem solving”. And it’s not at all clear when or how or why this adaptation arose in the course of human evolution.

Most physical anthropologists agree that there was a cultural explosion 40-100kya that was truly remarkable. Why? Why was so much energy diverted to things like art and religion? It has to go beyond the resources required for hunting and gathering, which after all had been going in in proto-human populations for millions of years. All anyone can offer are vague mumblings about some vaporous yet-to-be-discovered adaptive advantage. Or, like Dawkins’ we could suggest that most of this was a “brain virus,” a hostile “meme”. Psuedo-scientific naturalism-of-the-gaps rubbish — or at best, not nearly as compelling as the rich philosophical and religious explanations that have occupied the best human minds for thousands of years.

Second, even if otherwise empirically supportable, it fails utterly to support the notion that our evolved cognitive capabilities could be trusted to give us true theory-of-everything knowledge that fully explains all aspects of reality. At best evolution could be expected to provide us with what is needed to survive in the physical world. Anything else would be a waste of energy. The best you can get out of evolutionary explanations is pragmatic survival knowledge.

But if the best reductionistic evolutionary explanations can offer is pragmatic survival knowledge in the physical world, then there is no reason to expect that any claims about transcendent realities — including whether there are any transcendent realities — are accurate. A consistent materialist must simply remain silent as to such matters. This means “atheism,” the affirmative claim that there is no God, is off the table. This is not something we should expect evolution to equip us to know one way or the other if evolutionary adaptations are all about surviving and passing on selfish genes in the physical world. And materialism itself, then, is merely an assertion of faith, not an empirically based belief.

The alternative to this is a non-reductive evolutionary explanation for self-aware rational reflection — i.e, an emergent theory of “mind.” If you want to claim that human beings are capable of true knowledge of the way things are, you can’t escape addressing the problem of mind.

Question: Is this begging the question?
“Why can’t morality simply be an expression of evolionarily [sic] inherited adaptive pro-social dispositions?”

Steve K — exactly.

It’s begging the question whether we have free will, Tim. The question you said you want to avoid.

…and I disagree that this is an accepted definion of morality:

“morality by definition is about choices made with some degree of freedom to choose between right and wrong.”

Try this one instead:

“Morality is a sense of behavioral conduct that differentiates intentions, decisions, and actions between those that are good (or right) and bad (or wrong).”

The metric here for “good” could easily be pro-social, and for “bad” it could easily be anti-social. Where does free will required here?

Tim, as I’ve said a couple of times now, the definition of “morality” involves choices made between right and wrong, the good and the evil. If you instead are taking about deterministic actions, then you are simply no longer talking about “morality.” This isn’t mere assertion, its what human beings have understood “morality” to mean for thousands of years. For empirical support, start reading Plato, and then continue on through all the great philosophers, playwrights and poets up until about Nietzsche.

I think what you really mean is, why can’t human society be constructed without what I am describing as “morality” — i.e., without positing free choices between some supposedly objective notions of “good” or “evil”? Would that be a fair way to frame it? I think that’s a different, and more fair, question.

The most immediate response to that question is that there is then no basis for choosing between rival conceptions of how exactly human society ought to be constructed, all of which involve assertions of power. In short, you do end up with Nietzsche.

Tim — c’mon, a movie with the wife or blog conversation with me? And you chose the wife?

Dopderbeck,

I know, priorities right

I’ll be posting around a half-hour/hour approx., I’m actually trying to pull together some material for you, while taking care of some chores this morning.

(continued)

Now, with respect to the semantic argument of how we use the term morality today:

In dealing with language, we are dealing with symbols. We are working with man-made systems of visual markings and phonetic utterances to represent concepts that are communal in nature.

However, these concepts are not always fixed, and can express some variability – over time, across cultures, across persons, across usages, etc. It’s a messy business.

Let’s take an example. What is faith? Ask ten different people, and you can get ten different answers. The answers most will give will have some commonality in that they will center on some concept of trust or confidence in someone, something, or some concept. But the fullness of the meaning will vary depending on person. the culture, and the historical time wherein one would ask the question. For instance, the concept that Kierkegaard used the term “faith” to convey is at considerable variance, as well as some commonality of course, to the concept Paul of Tarsus used the Greek word “pistis” to convey. This of course is just one example, I could give many more.

But, specifically because of these semantic difficulties, we rely, not completely of course, but as a useful tool, on dictionaries. Now, dictionaries are more descriptive than prescriptive. The track the use of language and comment on it. The look at instances of past usage and try to categorize various meanings for our written symbols we call words. So, let’s refer to one of the most highly regarded dictionaries we have at our disposal, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED). Here are the relevant definitions of morality, ethics, and virtue that I pulled from my own personal copy copy of the OED. Let’s see what we can gather concerning the OED’s description of these symbols’ usages:

Moral:

1) Of or pertaining to character or disposition, considered as good or bad, virtuous or vicious; of or pertaining to the distinction between right and wrong, or good and evil, in relation to the actions, volitions, or character of responsible beings; ethical

2) Of knowledge, opinions, judgments, etc. relating to the nature and application of the distinction between right and wrong.

3) Moral sense: The power of apprehending the difference between right and wrong.

4) Of feelings: Arising from the contemplation of an action, character, etc., as good or bad.

5) Treating of or concerned with virtue and vice, or the rules of right conduct, as a subject of study.

6) Moral law: The body of requirements in conformity to which right or virtuous action consists.

7) Of actions pertaining to the moral law; having the property of being right or wrong.

Morality:

1) The doctrine or system concerned with conduct and duty; moral science.

2) Points of ethics, moral principles or rules

3) Conformity to the moral law; moral goodness or rightness.

4) Moral conduct usually, good moral conduct behavior conformed to the moral law; moral virtue.

Virtue:

1) Conformity of life and conduct with the principles of morality; voluntary observance of the recognized moral laws or standards of right conduct; abstention on moral grounds from any form of wrong-doing or vice.

2) A particular moral excellence; a special manifestation of the influence of moral principles in life or conduct.

Virtuous:

1) Possessing or showing virtue in life and conduct; acting with moral rectitude or in conformity with moral laws; free from vice, immorality, or wickedness, good, just, righteous.

2) Of acts, life, manners, etc.: Characterized by, of the nature of, virtue; according with, or conforming to, moral law or principles; morally good or justifiable.
Ethics:

1) The moral principles by which a person is guided

2) The rules of conduct recognized in certain associations or departments of human life

Now, let’s look these over. A continuous theme of actions, behavior, and character corresponding to right conduct and right principles seems to arise. In just a couple instances is the concept of volition introduced, among all the definitions, but it is hardly prominent.

So, my previous usage of “morality” with respect to a sociobiological model that stress behavior in accoradance with humanity’s shared/inherited pro-social dispositions, though being either free will agnostic or free will denying, seems perfectly appropriated given not just the above classification of usage of the term by the OED, but also by referring historically to Aristotle’s own treatment of the subject.

But perhaps you would still object. Perhaps none of this has done anything to convince you. If this is the case, could you then provide terms you deem more appropriate for my usage when discussing every aspect of moral behavior minus the philosophical presupposition of free will. What would be a good replacement term for “moral sense.” Or “moral behavior.” Or “moral dispositions.” Or “shared moral values.” Perhaps we could substitute with pro-social, but naturalistic discussions of morality, as I noted above, can extend beyond only pro-social behaviors to healthy and actualized living as well (i.e., taking care of yourself, avoiding harmful drugs and alcohol, respecting your body, actualizing rather than wasting your potential, appreciating life, etc.). So, what term would you have me use David if not morality?

It’s not just semantic Tim. All of the definitions you provided assume volition, even those that don’t expressly mention it. They all have to do with consciously understanding a choice between some objective standard of right and wrong and choosing one or the other, and this is how moral philosophers of every stripe have always and still do understand what “morality” means.

Here is how Michael Ruse sums up the sociobiological perspective: “Ethics is a collective illusion of the genes, put in place to make us good cooperators. Nothing more and nothing less.” (Ruse, “Evolutionary Ethics Past and Present” in Clayton and Schloss, eds. Evolution and Ethics).

Here we have not a semantic difference, but a complete redefinition of a term that has been used otherwise for millennia.

…”and this is how moral philosophers of every stripe have always and still do understand what “morality” means.”

Also, did you read my post #51? Did you have any specific comments with respect to my argument concerning Aristotle’s treatment of ethics?

David – I just got home from work, and will comment this evening.

Dopderbeck,

Sorry, but I won’t be able to get you that response tonight. If you’re still interested in continuing the conversation, I will do my best to respond tomorrow evening. In the meantime, if you want to take a stab at elaborating on those two points in #58, that would help make sure my reply is more useful.

Hey Tim. Aristotle’s philosophy emphasized different levels of causation — material, formal, efficient and final. For Aristotle, you couldn’t explain something with reference to only one level of causation, and you couldn’t reduce something to only one level of causation. From this he argued that everything has a purpose — a telos — grounded in a first cause. And Aristotle’s ethics were informed by his notions of causation, such that acting virtuously was to act in harmony with one’s purpose.

All of this deeply informed Thomas Aquinas’ theological account of causation and virtue. For Thomas, of course, the “first mover” or first cause was God.

It’s a complete misreading of Aristotle (and Thomas) to suggest that this is anything at all like the mechanistic selfish gene idea promoted by Ruse, et al.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a good article on Aristotle and causality: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-causality/

Tim — absent any sort of free will, we are talking about determinism. Is “morality” possible if determinism is true? No, because it’s impossible to say any action was “right” or “wrong.” It just is what it is. It happened because it happened. Hitler exterminated the Jews because [fate][the gods][the devil][his genes] made him do it, and that’s that.

I understand, I think, what you want to argue. “Virtue” or “morality” is acting in accordance with evolutionary programming that has been successful in establishing stable human societies. That’s an interesting claim, but it requires some degree of free will — a freedom to chose some set of adaptive behaviors and not some other set — to choose a stable human society of one sort rather than another. But this now is no longer really sociobiology. It’s at least an emergent property of mind exercising downward causation.

…OK, I have a little more time to write this morning.

Continuing on the subject of free will, to summarize your first argument, you claimed that morality would not be possible without free will. Now, is this the same argument you made before or a slightly different one?

Earlier you had argued that philosophers had always considered free will, the ability to freely chose from “right” and “wrong”, an essential element of morality from a definitional point of view. I endeavored to demonstrate by referring to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics that the freedom of choice between “right” and “wrong” doesn’t have to be central. It certainly wasn’t the focus of Aristotle’s work on the subject, but incidental at best. Rather, he focused on virtue as a life lived in accordance with one’s highest functions, and his treatment was highly practical in that he noted that the whims of fate could leave a man with little opportunity for living such a life of virtue. However, you then replied that Aristotle’s ethical model highlighted teleology toward some transcendent end. In this we agreed, but I noted that your argument wasn’t that morality had to be transcendent from a definitional point of view, but rather had to involve free will. That took us to where we are now in the conversation.

Now it seems you are claiming that free will has to be necessary for morality to even work at all. So I am trying to work through what you mean by that. Is that a semantic argument.

Are you saying that for us to use the term morality appropriately when discussing how to live a virtuous life, somewhat akin to what Aristotle argued in terms of embracing and living in accordance with one’s ultimate functions, that one has to incorporate the concept of free will – else a different term ought to be used? If this is the case, then I wonder what your specific objection was to my argument in referring to Aristotle’s usage.

Or, are you arguing that for morality, even if more broadly defined than what you had been arguing for up to this point, one still has to have free will to make it work at all, or to make any kind of sense internally?

If this is the case, then I would argue the following:

Morality could ultimately serve as descriptive statement, as well as a prescriptive statement, concerning engaging in right or wrong behavior. So, it could say something like “Fred helping Sally cross the street was “good” (i.e., moral)” It could also say, “Sally ought to help Fred cross the street, as this is the “right” thing to do (i.e., moral)” Now, are you arguing that for descriptions and prescriptions of “right” or “wrong” to make sense, one HAS to have free will? I don’t see why this would be the case.

Take the example of Hitler, as you introduced it. We as a society could certainly, according to a sociobiological model, make a strong claim that he was acting in violation of the pro-social dispositions of our species, of which he is a member. In essence then, we could say he was acting “inhuman.” Now, certainly there are other very “human” tendencies that he did express when acting so monstrously, as our pro-social dispositions aren’t all of who we are as a species. But our sociobiological moral model clearly takes at its starting point our pro-social tendencies. One could claim this is arbitrary, but a sociobiologist could respond that what we describe as our “moral sense” or “conscience” is very much real, as in we really do experience that, and that it is evidently aligned with our pro-social tendencies far more so than any other aspect of humanity’s inherited dispositions.

So, a sociobiolical model of morality would say that Hitler acted in conflict with his pro-social inheritance shared with every human being, and as such what he did was descriptively “wrong.” Now, prescriptively a sociobiological model could say that if one chooses to embrace that underlying human inheritance from which our sense of “conscience”/”moral sense” manifests, then we “ought” to engage in pro-social behavior and refrain from engaging in anti-social behavior. Now, certainly someone could say, “I see no reason to embrace this aspect of human inheritance we commonly associate with conscience and moral sense, instead I intend to blatantly act with disregard toward them.” Now to this the sociobiologist could say, “certainly you can, but as a member of the human species that identifies with and embraces our species’ pro-social dispositions underlying our shared “moral sense”, I could fairly then describe your future actions and life as immoral.”

So, you can see that there is some relativity here. It would be universal across our species, but relative only to our species.

But I think I have strayed from discussing free will at this point, so I should return to that.

To sum up the above, I would argue that one could certainly say, from a sociobiological point of view, that Hitler was functioning/acting/behaving immorally. You could also likely infer that Hitler had beliefs, attitudes, and judgments underlying those behaviors that would also likely conflict with a view of pro-social morality provided by socibiological models. So, according to “wisdom”, “skill”, “learning”, etc. and living according to one’s prescribed function, according to Aristotle’s view, Hitler could appropriately be described as “immoral.”

I think what you are saying is that Hitler couldn’t have been held accountable for his actions without free will. But we certainly could hold him accountable from a certain point of view. Even if one is lacking in free will according to implications you might draw from some sociobiological models, one still functions mostly autonomously. Humans have the capacity for self-reflection, judgment, and learning. Even if you can make the argument that a sociobiological model would negate free will, thus precluding some existential control by the individual over any their own self-reflections, judgments, and learning, all these processes certainly take place in the individual. So, it wasn’t something external to Hitler that was at fault, it was Hitler. Hitler was faulty, if only from a functional point of view. So as a practical matter, whether we perceive that Hitler had existential control or none, how we act toward him is the same. We condemn him and his actions as violations against our moral norms, particularly those norms universal and biologically inherited in our species.

I’d like to get your thoughts David concerning these arguments, and benefit from any feedback you might provide.

*As I’ve made some effort to be precise in how we are using our terms, I wanted to note that when I use the term you initially introduced, sociobiology, I’m using it, as I believe you understood it, as an umbrella term to include all evolutionarily-based approaches to human behavior and expression, including evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology.