St. John Henry Cardinal Newman on Apologetics

St. John Henry Cardinal Newman on Apologetics November 19, 2020

From my book, Cardinal Newman: Q & A in Theology, Church History, and Conversion (May 2015, 367p): Chapter One (pp. 25-39). Only the words in blue below are my own (for the purposes of organization of material). You can purchase it for as low as $2.99 in various e-book formats. See the previous link. See also my other two collections of Newman quotations:

The Quotable Newman, Vol. II (Aug. 2013, 290p)


What Are Some Basic Guidelines in Defending Our Faith?

I think theology, even when introduced, should always be in undress, and should address itself to common sense, reason, received maxims, etc ere not to authority or technical dicta. Of course the hidden basis of a discussion must be the voice of tradition, the consent of the schools, the definitions of the Church; but, as I do believe that the whole of revelation may be made more or less palatable to English common sense, (for e.g. tho’ so sacred a doctrine as the Holy Trinity is necessarily above reason, yet it is common sense to say that from the nature Of the case it must be) so think that to go beyond the line of English common sense, (e.g. to continue my instance to prove the doctrine of the Holy Trinity as St Augustine does by the memory, intellect, and will) would be a great mistake in a Magazine. (v. 21; To Henry James Coleridge, 16 June 1865)

The first duty of charity is to try to enter into the mind and feelings of others. This is what I love so much in you, my dear Keble; but I much desiderate it in this new book of Pusey’s – and I deplore the absence of it there . . . (v. 22; To John Keble, 8 Oct. 1865)

Objections are for the most part like blots or disfigurements on a picture; we understand that the picture represents a definite scene, and what that scene is, in spite of such drawbacks. (v. 25; To an Unknown Correspondent, 19 June 1870)

Every one has his own difficulties and his own way of solving them. Others can but give him suggestions from time to time, and on particular points. (v. 25; To William Dunn Gainsford, 10 Nov. 1870)

It is simply impossible I can to any good purpose answer your difficulties, unless we agree in principles . . . (v. 26; To Henry Tenlon, 23 March 1873)

My view has ever been to answer, not to suppress, what is erroneous – merely as a matter of expedience for the cause of truth, at least at this day. It seems to me a bad policy to suppress. Truth has a power of its own, which makes its way – it is stronger than error – according to the Proverb. (v. 26; To W. J. Copeland, 20 April 1873)

Is Apologetics Only for Non-Catholics or Non-Christians?

[T]here are two reasons for writing quite distinct from conversion, and, considering all things, I prefer them to any other reason – the one is to edify Catholics. Catholics are so often raw. Many do not know their religion – many do not know the reasons for it. And there is in a day like this, a vast deal of semi-doubting. There are those who only wish to convert, and then leave the poor converts to shift for themselves, as far as knowledge of their religion goes. The other end which is so important, is what I call levelling up. If we are to convert souls savingly they must have the due preparation of heart, and if England is to be converted, there must be a great move of the national mind to a better sort of religious sentiment. (v. 25; To Sister Mary Gabriel du Boulay, 2 Jan. 1870)

Should Laymen Have a Working Knowledge of Apologetics?

It is to be considered, that our students are to go out into the world, and a world not of professed Catholics, but of inveterate, often bitter, commonly contemptuous Protestants; nay, of Protestants who, so far as they come from Protestant Universities and public schools, do know their own system, do know, in proportion to their general attainments, the doctrines and arguments of Protestantism. I should desire, then, to encourage in our students an intelligent apprehension of the relations, as I may call them, between the Church and society at large; for instance, the difference between the Church and a religious sect; between the Church and civil power; what the Church claims of necessity, what it cannot dispense with, what it can; what it can grant, what it cannot. A Catholic hears the celibacy of the clergy discussed; is that usage of faith, or is it not of faith? He hears the Pope accused of interfering with the prerogatives of her Majesty, because he appoints an hierarchy. What is he to answer? What principle is to guide him in the remarks which he cannot escape from the necessity of making? He fills a station of importance, and he is addressed by some friend who has political reasons for wishing to know what is the difference between Canon and Civil Law, whether the Council of Trent has been received in France, whether a priest cannot in certain cases absolve prospectively, what is meant by his intention, what by the opus operatum; whether, and in what sense, we consider Protestants to be heretics; whether any one can be saved without sacramental confession; whether we deny the reality of natural virtue, and what worth we assign to it. Questions may be multiplied without limit, which occur in conversation between friends in social intercourse, or in the business of life, where no argument is needed, no subtle and delicate disquisition, but a few direct words stating the fact. Half the controversies which go on in the world arise from ignorance of the facts of the case; half the prejudices against Catholicity lie in the misinformation of the prejudiced parties. Candid persons are set right, and enemies silenced, by the mere statement of what it is that we believe. It will not answer the purpose for a Catholic to say, “I leave it to theologians,” “I will ask my priest;” but it will commonly give him a triumph, as easy as it is complete, if he can then and there lay down the law. I say, “lay down the law;” for remarkable it is, that even those who speak against Catholicism like to hear about it, and will excuse its advocate from alleging arguments, if he can gratify their curiosity by giving them information. Generally speaking, however, as I have said, such mere information will really be an argument also. I recollect some twenty-five years ago three friends of my own, as they then were, clergymen of the Establishment, making a tour through Ireland. In the West or South they had occasion to become pedestrians for the day; and they took a boy of thirteen to be their guide. They amused themselves with putting questions to him on the subject of his religion; and one of them confessed to me on his return that that poor child put them all to silence. How? Not of course by any train of argument or refined theological disquisition, but merely by knowing and understanding the answers in his catechism. Nor will argument itself be out of place in the hands of laymen mixing with the world. As secular power, honour, and resources are never more suitably placed than when they are in the hands of Catholics; so secular knowledge and secular gifts are then best employed when they minister to Divine Revelation. Theologians inculcate the matter and determine the details of that revelation; they view it from within; philosophers view it from without; and this external view may be called the Philosophy of Religion, and the office of delineating it externally is most gracefully performed by laymen. In the first age laymen were most commonly the apologists. Such were Justin, Tatian, Athenagoras, Aristides, Hermias [sic], Minucius Felix, Arnobius, and Lactantius. In like manner, in this age some of the most prominent defences of the Church are from laymen; as De Maistre, Chateaubriand, Nicolas, Montalembert, and others. If laymen may write, lay-students may read; they surely may read what their fathers may have written. They might surely study other works too, ancient and modern, whether by ecclesiastics or laymen, . . . (v. 19; “Lay Students in Theology,” The Rambler, May 1859) 

How is Faith Related to Apologetic Inquiry? 

The advantage of subscription (to my mind) is its witnessing to the principle that religion is to be approached with a submission of the understanding. Nothing is so common, as you must know, as for young men to approach serious subjects, as judges – to study them, as mere sciences. Aristotle and Butler are treated as teachers of a system, not as if there was more truth in them than in Jeremy Bentham. The study of the Evidences now popular (such as Paley’s) encourages this evil frame of mind – the learner is supposed external to the system – our Lord is ’a young Galilean peasant’ – His Apostles, ’honest men, trustworthy witnesses’ and the like. . . . In all these cases the student is supposed to look upon the system from without, and to have to choose it by an act of reason before he submits to it – whereas the great lesson of the Gospel is faith, an obeying prior to reason, and proving its reasonableness by making experiment of it – a casting of heart and mind into the system, and investigating the truth by practice. (v. 5; To Arthur Philip Perceval, 11 Jan. 1836)

No truth, no conclusion about what is true, is without its difficulties. You must give up faith, if you will not believe till all objections are first solved. (v. 10; To an Unknown Correspondent, August [?] 1845)

As to the divine foundation of the certitude of faith being not historical but from the grace of God, this is quite true, but irrelevant. It only means you cannot make an act of faith by your own strength, and that, when you make a saving act of faith, you believe in God, not in man, though you come to believe in Him through history, through argument. Private judgment must be your guide, till you are in the Church. You do not begin with faith, but with reason, and you end with faith. How are you to get into the way of faith, but by history or some other equivalent method of inquiry? You must have some ground of becoming a Catholic, . . . (v. 24; To Mrs. Helbert, 10 Sep. 1869)

If there is any definite question that I can answer you, I will do so – but I can’t give the gift of faith. (v. 25; To Mrs. Wilson, 8 Jan. 1870)

How is Grace Related to Apologetics and Rational Argument? 

Grace alone surely can guide our argumentative power into truth, and grace is not attained in such anxious and difficult enquiries as those which are in question between us without fasting and prayer. (v. 7; To W. C. A. MacLaurin, 8 and 16 Oct. 1840)

I would gladly help you in your difficulties of faith, if I could – but, as you know well, you must wait upon God, and He will hear you and not forsake you. If you ask Him to teach you the truth, He will do so, slowly perhaps, but surely. (v. 25; To S. S. Shiel, 25 Jan. 1870) 

Is Logical Demonstration All There is to Apologetics?

You say that ’the dry external argument is inadequate as a demonstration of Christianity’ etc I most entirely agree with you, . . .  I have been for some years preaching University Sermons, as I have had opportunity, on this one subject, that men judge in religion, and are meant to judge by antecedent probability much more than by external evidences, and that their view of antecedent probability depends upon their particular state of mind) I consider with you that ’the alleged historical proof of miracles is unsatisfactory’, separate from the knowledge of the moral character of the doctrine. (v. 7; To [brother] Francis W. Newman, 10 Nov. 1840)

How Are Faith and Reason Related?

The Catholic doctrine concerning Faith and Reason is this – that Reason proves that Catholicism ought to be believed, and that in that form it comes before the Will, which accepts it or rejects it, as moved by grace or not. Reason does not prove that Catholicism’ is true, as it proves mathematical propositions are true; but it proves that there is a case for it so strong that we see we ought to accept it. There may be many difficulties, which we cannot answer, but still we see on the whole that the grounds are sufficient for conviction. This is not the same thing as conviction. If conviction were unavoidable, we might be said to be forced to believe, as we are forced to confess that two sides of a triangle are greater than the third; but, while there is enough evidence for conviction, whether we will be convinced or not, rests with ourselves. (v. 31; To Catherine Ward, 12 Oct. 1848)

Surely, enough has been written – all the writing in the world would not destroy the necessity of faith – if all were made clear to reason, where would be the exercise of faith? The simple question is whether enough has been done to reduce the difficulties so far as to hinder them absolutely blocking up the way, or excluding those direct and large arguments on which the reasonableness of faith is built. (v. 14; To James Hope, 20 Nov. 1850)

Theology tells us that faith is more certain than demonstration – this is a theological truth – it must be true- but it is not deduced from experiment, from testimony, from feeling. A man’s consciousness does not attest it. (v. 14; To J. Spencer Northcote, 25 March 1851)

[C]an a more fatal suicidal act be committed on the part of our controversialists, than to imply an opposition between reason and faith, or at least to encourage the notion that the intellect of the world is naturally and properly on the side of infidelity [?]. (v. 15; To Edward Healy Thompson, 7 Oct. 1853)

God will be sure to prosper, guide, and reward so strong and pure a resolve. The self command you go on to speak about, by which the mind rules itself to believe, I consider in the highest degree meritorious, and sure of a reward – but I don’t word it as you do. It is not, that faith is an act of the will – but the will obliges the reason to believe. Nor is there a want of faith and of acts of faith in the reason, in the case you put- but a languor of the imagination. For I consider the ’realization’ you speak of is to be as distinct from faith, as emotion is. It is a state of the imagination. (v. 18; To Catherine Anne Bathurst, 22 March 1858)

[T]here is scarce a subject in Theology which can be fully demonstrated to the conviction of the world, by reason, or by antiquity, or by Scripture – that most doctrines admit of proof up to a certain point – but that, whereas to receive them savingly, we must receive them on the authority of the Church, so for receiving them with certainty we are thrown upon her enunciation, not on our own individual investigations and conclusions. After all our reasonings, something must be ever left to faith. (v. 20; To William Robert Brownlow, 16 Oct. 1863)

[Y]ou argue as follows: That which is a conclusion in reason cannot also be an object of faith; since then the being of a God is an object of faith, it is not a conclusion of the reason. Now here a great deal might be said, did my paper admit of it, on the difference between a conclusion and an object; but I will only say this, that the same truth may at once be proved by reason and held by faith. For instance, the truth of the Newtonian system is a conclusion in reason; yet by the mass of the community it is held, not as a conclusion which they have proved, but as a truth received on faith in scientific men, . . . Or, (what is more simple,) the fact that, contrary to the evidence of sight, the earth turns on its axis, some conclude on grounds of reason, most men only believe ’because every one says so, because men of science say so.’ Nay, the very same person may hold the same fact at once upon faith and upon reason. 1. I may have satisfactorily proved to myself by pure reason that the nebular theory is true; and then, on turning to Scripture, may find that light was created before the sun. Here faith confirms reason, or I hold a fact first by reason, and then in addition by faith. 2. I may receive on faith that the whole human race descends from Adam, and at some future time may be able to prove it from philology, ethnology, geology, and archeology. Here reason confirms faith, or I hold a fact, first by faith, and then in addition by reason. 1. I do not cease to conclude because I believe. 2. I do not cease to believe because I conclude. (v. 21; To an Unknown Correspondent, 23 Sep. 1864)

It is an odd sort of faith, which only believes what the reason understands, what the reason approves of. (v. 26; To Lady Chatterton, 13 June 1873)

What I have written about Rationalism requires to be expanded. If you will let me be short and abrupt, I would contrast it with faith. Faith cometh by hearing, by the Word of God. Rationalists are those who are content with conclusions to which they have been brought by reason, but ’we are saved by faith,’ and even in cases and persons where true conclusions can be arrived at those conclusions must be believed on the ground that ’God has spoken.’ A man may be a true and exact theist and yet not have faith. What he lacks in order to faith is the grace of God, which is given in answer to prayer. (v. 31; To Richard A. Armstrong, 23 March 1887)

Is Apologetics the Same as Proselytyzing?

I willingly talk to young men on Church subjects . . . they are most elevating and striking and therefore from their novelty most exciting subjects . . . and they will excite when preached just in proportion to the degree in which they have beforehand been neglected. . . . I never have tried to proselyte – but when persons are perplexed and come to me for information, then I am induced to write Lectures to meet that existing perplexity. (v. 6; To Thomas Henderson, 2 August 1838)

I did not make his state of mind: I found it. I could not change it, even if I had been called to do so. I did not intrude my advice upon him; he asked it. . . . It has never been my way . . . ’to make a proselyte to my communion.’ But when a man comes to me and asks me plain questions, how can I answer it to God, if I conceal from him what I believe God has taught me? (v. 24; To James Skinner, 13 May 1868)

I can quite understand a man being in good faith a member of the Anglican Church – and I feel the greatest difficulty of attempting in that case to stir him from his position – for I might merely unsettle him, and lead him to give up the truth which he already has instead of embracing what is fuller truth. (v. 24; To H. A. Woodgate, 30 Dec. 1868)

Is “Controversy” in Apologetics a Good Thing?

You caught at that Lutheran’s saying that Dr. W. [Nicholas Wiseman] was an unscrupulous controversialist. I dare say he is. But who is not? Is Jeremy Taylor, or Laud, or Stillingfleet? I declare I think it is as rare a thing, candour in controversy, as to be a Saint. (v. 8; To Frederic Rogers, 10 Jan. 1841)

The one thing I feared and deprecated years ago, when we began the Tracts for the Times, was utter neglect of us on the part of the Church. I was not afraid of being misrepresented, censured or illtreated – and certainly hitherto it has done no harm. Every attack hitherto has turned to good, or at least is dying a natural death. But Controversy does but delay the sure victory of truth by making people angry. When they find out they are wrong of themselves, a generous feeling rises in their minds towards the persons and things they have abused and resisted. Much of this reaction has already taken place. Controversy too is a waste of time – one has other things to do. Truth can fight its own battle. It has a reality in it, which shivers to pieces swords of earth. As far as we are not on the side of truth, we shall shiver to bits, and I am willing it should be so. (v. 8; To Robert Delaney, 25 Jan. 1841)

Everyone knows how commonly it happens in life, that you cannot defend yourself without attacking your opponent, little as you wish to do so. One or other must be bad. Now this is emphatically the case in the controversy with Rome – either the Holy See is tyrannical, or Protestants are rebels. (v. 13; To Frederick A. Faber, 22 Nov. 1849)

I don’t think I have written anything controversial for the last 14 years. Nor have I ever, as I think, replied to any controversial notice of what I have written. Certainly, I let pass without a word the various volumes which were written in answer to my Essay on Doctrinal Development, and that on the principle that truth defends itself, and falsehood refutes itself – and that, having said my say, time would decide for me, without any trouble, how far it was true, and how far not true. And I have quoted Crabbe’s line as to my purpose, (though I can’t quote correctly):-

Leaving the case to Time, who solves all doubt,

By bringing Truth, his glorious daughter, out.

(v. 22; To Edward B. Pusey, 5 Sep. 1865)

Should a Person Exercise Faith if Still Plagued by Difficulties?

What Mrs H. [Houldsworth] requires is for one to write a book. Any one can ask questions and in no time, but it requires many words to answer any one of them. Some of her present questions she has asked me, and I have answered, already. You doubtless have answered others. She must take something on faith. The question is whether she has not enough evidence in order to make it her duty to put away questions she cannot answer to her satisfaction, as mere difficulties. If she inquired into the New Testament in the same minute way, she would not believe in the Bible – if into the proofs of a God, the bare existence of evil would hinder her from believing in Him. . . . Adverse arguments, must, when we have once made up our minds, be ignored entirely. If a jury find a man guilty, because ten credible witnesses have sworn against him, and one or two for him, they consider that the testimony of the ten annihilates that of the two.’ This is a law of the human mind – that is, the will of God. I am sure that it is for her good that I thus insist. Till she understands that she cannot have a proof devoid of difficulties, she will believe nothing. . . . She has written to me herself within the last month – and told me that, at the end of the time which I appointed her, she found herself so confused by contrary arguments that she did not know where she stood. On this I said to her – ’Well then – put aside all arguments on both sides – don’t read or think about them – don’t talk with anyone – But for two months give yourself simply to prayer and communing with God – and then see where you are at the end of the time –’ . . . (v. 25; To Catherine Froude, 24 July 1871)

Should we Avoid Ad Hominem Attacks in Argument?

I detested a certain peculiarity which he was apt to let his language run into, and that is, abuse – and on this certainly I ever have had a very strong opinion. By ’abuse’ I mean strong and violent expressions of opinion on persons and things as distinct from the expression of facts. I see nothing of this in his speeches in Parliament – they are measured in language, and profuse in facts; – the truest virtues in controversy and debate. (v. 15; To Mrs. William G. Ward, 17 March 1853)

Abuse is as great a mistake in controversy, as panegyric in biography. Of course a man must state strongly his opinion, but that is not personal vituperation. (v. 22; To Henry James Coleridge, 13 April 1866)

What is the Reward of Apologetics?

[O]f course it is a most welcome thing to be told that anything oneself has written has been made at all instrumental in impressing religious convictions on the mind of another . . . (v. 7; To Miss Mary Holmes, 29 May 1840)

Should we Know People Before Trying to Persuade Them?

I have a great dislike of controverting or the like with people I do not know. I do not think it answers. Very seldom have I been persuaded into the attempt – and never, I think, with success. I have hitherto succeeded in keeping people in our Church whose turn of mind, opinions etc I know – but I have failed whenever I have been asked to write to strangers. (v. 9; To Miss Mary Holmes, 24 March 1843)

Does Proclaiming Theological Truth Offend Some People?

It is a very difficult thing to speak the truth without giving offence. . . . I think my greatest friendliness will be shown in speaking out what I think to be christian truth; with God’s help I will ever do so, and I doubt not that, tho’ I may be misunderstood and thought harsh for a while, yet in the end I shall get honor for my honesty even from those who differ from me. (v. 4; To Mr. Jubber, 19 July 1834)

Are There Times When Trying to Argue with People is Futile?

As to Mr Askew’s Letter, it is at once angry and pompous, and it would be very easy to demolish his whole structure – but I do not think it is worthwhile. There is no call on you to answer everyone who chooses to make free with you – and I do not suppose it would do any kind of good for anyone else to get into controversy with persons who have prejudged the matter, and who think every refutation of their opinions only serves to make those opinions more irrefragable and more engaging. (v. 14; To Viscount Feilding, 15 Nov. 1850)

[I]t is hopeless for two men to talk when they more or less have different principles, or see the true [first principles] variously. (v. 15; To Robert Isaac Wilberforce, 27 Dec. 1853; Greek word used for the bracketed translation)

Does the “Argument from Longing” Suggest that Heaven Exists?

I am very regular in my riding, . . . It is so great a gain to throw off Oxford for a few hours so completely as one does in dining out, that it is almost sure to do me good. The country too is beautiful – the fresh leaves, the scents, the varied landscape. Yet I never felt so intensely the transitory nature of this world as when most delighted with these country scenes – and in riding out today I have been impressed, more powerfully than I had before an idea was possible, with the two lines – ‘Chanting with a solemn voice, mind us of our better choice.’ I could hardly believe the lines were not my own and Keble had not taken them from me. I wish it were possible for words to put down those indefinite vague and withal subtle feelings which quite pierce the soul and make it sick. . . . What a veil and curtain this world of sense is! beautiful but still a veil . . . (v. 2; To [sister] Jemima Newman, 10 May 1828)

How Can we Communicate Catholic Truths to Protestants?

You have shown that a case may be made out for Catholics. You can’t expect to prove the truth of their religion, much less to convert the Protestants of Stafford by a letter, or twenty letters, in a Newspaper; but you can show them, and this you have done, that it is not so easy to show Catholicism is false, or that it is not as good as Protestantism, as some people think. (v. 21; To Michael O’Sullivan, 1 February 1864)

Of course your weak point is the cultus of our Lady – but so it will be, if you are bound to take St Alfonso’s words as de fide. I think they would, (taken in the lump,) startle, not to say shock, most Catholics of our latitude . . . They may be very well for the South. . . . What is beautiful as devotion, is harsh as dogma – St Alfonso is devotional – but if people do not spontaneously run with that devotionalness, then it looks to them like dogma and startles them. Subjectively received, it is pleasant – objectively contemplated, it is perplexing[.] (v. 21; To Michael O’Sullivan, 1 February 1864)


Drawn from The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman

[excluding volumes 11-12, 27-30, 32]

Vol. 1 Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; Ealing, Trinity, Oriel: February 1801 to December 1826 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).

Vol. 2 Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; Tutor of Oriel: January 1827 to December 1831 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Vol. 3 Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; New Bearings: January 1832 to June 1833 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979).

Vol. 4 Edited by Ian Ker and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; The Oxford Movement: July 1833 to December 1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

Vol. 5 Edited by Thomas Gornall, S.J.; Liberalism in Oxford: January 1835 to December 1836 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

Vol. 6 Edited by Gerard Tracey; The Via Media and Froude’s Remains: January 1837 to December 1838 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

Vol. 7 Edited by Gerard Tracey; Editing the British Critic: January 1839 – December 1840 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).

Vol. 8 Edited by Gerard Tracey; Tract 90 and the Jerusalem Bishopric: January 1841 – April 1842 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999).

Vol. 9 Edited by Francis J. McGrath, F.M.S. and Gerard Tracey; Littlemore and the Parting of Friends: May 1842-October 1843 (Oxford University Press, 2006).

Vol. 10 Edited by Francis J. McGrath, F.M.S.; The Final Step: 1 November 1843 – 6 October 1845 (Oxford University Press, 2006).

Vol. 13 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Birmingham and London: January 1849 to June 1850 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1963).

Vol. 14 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Vincent Ferrer Blehl, S.J.; Papal Aggression: July 1850 to December 1851 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1963).

Vol. 15 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Vincent Ferrer Blehl, S.J.; The Achilli Trial: January 1852 to December 1853 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1964).

Vol. 16 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Founding a University: January 1854 to September 1855 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1965).

Vol. 17 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Opposition in Dublin and London: October 1855 to March 1857 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1967).

Vol. 18 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; New Beginnings in England: April 1857 to December 1858 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1968).

Vol. 19 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Consulting the Laity: January 1859 to June 1861 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1969).

Vol. 20 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Standing Firm Amid Trials: July 1861 to December 1863 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1970).

Vol. 21 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Edward E. Kelly, S.J.; The Apologia: January 1864 to June 1865 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1971).

Vol. 22 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain; Between Pusey and the Extremists: July 1865 to December 1866 (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd, 1972).

Vol. 23 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; Defeat at Oxford. Defence at Rome: January to December 1867 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

Vol. 24 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; A Grammar of Assent: January 1868 to December 1869 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

Vol. 25 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; The Vatican Council: January 1870 to December 1871 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973).

Vol. 26 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; Aftermaths: January 1872 to December 1873 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974).

Vol. 31 Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas Gornall, S.J.; The Last Years: January 1885 to August 1890; With a Supplement of Addenda to Volumes XI – XXX (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).


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