2019-02-02T15:58:59-04:00

This is an installment of a series of replies (see the Introduction and Master List) to much of Book IV (Of the Holy Catholic Church) of Institutes of the Christian Religion, by early Protestant leader John Calvin (1509-1564). I utilize the public domain translation of Henry Beveridge, dated 1845, from the 1559 edition in Latin; available online. Calvin’s words will be in blue. All biblical citations (in my portions) will be from RSV unless otherwise noted.

Related reading from yours truly:

Biblical Catholic Answers for John Calvin (2010 book: 388 pages)

A Biblical Critique of Calvinism (2012 book: 178 pages)

Biblical Catholic Salvation: “Faith Working Through Love” (2010 book: 187 pages; includes biblical critiques of all five points of “TULIP”)

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IV, 17:24-28

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Book IV

CHAPTER 17

OF THE LORD’S SUPPER, AND THE BENEFITS CONFERRED BY IT.

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24. Other objections answered. No question here as to the omnipotence of God.

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This infamous falsehood cannot be completely wiped away without disposing of another charge. They give out that we are so wedded to human reason, that we attribute nothing more to the power of God than the order of nature admits, and common sense dictates. 

That is what Calvin’s logic regarding the Eucharist amounts to, yes. He is caught up into a limited rationalistic worldview without seeming to realize that he is. He’s a prisoner of his own false presuppositions. He lacks the perspective of Christian mystery, paradox, and miracle.

From these wicked calumnies, I appeal to the doctrine which I have delivered,—a doctrine which makes it sufficiently clear that I by no means measure this mystery by the capacity of human reason, or subject it to the laws of nature. 

What else can one call a view that wants to limit God by saying that Jesus’ Body can only be in heaven and not eucharistically present as well?

I ask, whether it is from physics we have learned that Christ feeds our souls from heaven with his flesh, just as our bodies are nourished by bread and wine? 

And I ask whether it is from logic and Christianity, this notion that we can eat the flesh of Jesus but not do so at the same time, because it is in heaven only?

How has flesh this virtue of giving life to our souls? 

The same way that the crucifixion and Jesus’ blood gave life to our souls.

All will say, that it is not done naturally. Not more agreeable is it to human reason to hold that the flesh of Christ penetrates to us, so as to be our food. In short, every one who may have tasted our doctrine, will be carried away with admiration of the secret power of God. But these worthy zealots fabricate for themselves a miracle, and think that without it God himself and his power vanish away. 

The Catholic view (and Orthodox and Lutheran and traditional Anglican), is simply taking Jesus’ words at face value and accepting them in faith. We’re not trying to rationalize them away.

I would again admonish the reader carefully to consider the nature of our doctrine, whether it depends on common apprehension, or whether, after having surmounted the world on the wings of faith, it rises to heaven. We say that Christ descends to us, as well by the external symbol as by his Spirit, that he may truly quicken our souls by the substance of his flesh and blood. 

The substance of flesh is actually physical flesh: but Calvin denies that, so his view is metaphysically (as well as theologically) nonsensical.

He who feels not that in these few words are many miracles, is more than stupid; since nothing is more contrary to nature than to derive the spiritual and heavenly life of the soul from flesh, which received its origin from the earth, and was subjected to death, 

This mentality would take out the incarnation and crucifixion and redemption and resurrection, too.

nothing more incredible than that things separated by the whole space between heaven and earth should, notwithstanding of the long distance, not only be connected, but united, so that souls receive aliment from the flesh of Christ. 

But we’re not limited by Calvin’s arbitrary restrictions of time and place. God is bigger than all that.

Let preposterous men, then, cease to assail us with the vile calumny, that we malignantly restrict the boundless power of God. They either foolishly err, or wickedly lie. 

Neither. Calvin is wrong, as shown by the Bible, Church history, and reason alike.

The question here is not, What could God do? but, What has he been pleased to do? We affirm that he has done what pleased him, and it pleased him that Christ should be in all respects like his brethren, “yet without sin” (Heb. 4:15). What is our flesh? Is it not that which consists of certain dimensions? is confined within a certain place? is touched and seen? 

Jesus has shown that His Body has elements that go beyond dimension and the usual restrictions. The Resurrection, Ascension, post-Resurrection appearances, and the Second Coming are not ordinary physical events. Neither is the Eucharist. Calvin unnecessarily restricts his vision.

And why, say they, may not God make the same flesh occupy several different places, so as not to be confined to any particular place, and so as to have neither measure nor species? Fool! why do you require the power of God to make a thing to be at the same time flesh and not flesh? It is just as if you were to insist on his making light to be at the same time light and darkness. 

We don’t do that. We believe that it is His Body and Blood, but in a unique eucharistic fashion. It is Calvin’s word games and metaphysical hodge-podge that introduce contradictions and nonsense into the question.

He wills light to be light, darkness to be darkness, flesh to be flesh. True, when he so chooses, he will convert darkness into light, and light into darkness: but when you insist that there shall be no difference between light and darkness, what do you but pervert the order of the divine wisdom? 

None of this applies to the Catholic view . . .

Flesh must therefore be flesh, and spirit spirit; each under the law and condition on which God has created them. 

But Jesus’ flesh is a special case: He being God and having taken on a human body in the Incarnation.

Now, the condition of flesh is, that it should have one certain place, its own dimensions, its own form. On that condition, Christ assumed the flesh, to which, as Augustine declares (Ep. ad Dardan.), he gave incorruption and glory, but without destroying its nature and reality.

We will all have glorified bodies one day, so it isn’t implausible at all that Jesus Christ should manifest the extraordinary capabilities of a glorified body Himself: especially since He is God as well as Man. There is nothing in the slightest bit strange or contradictory or implausible in that. Calvin is straining at gnats.

25. Other objections answered.
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They object that they have the word by which the will of God has been openly manifested; that is if we permit them to banish from the Church the gift of interpretation, which should throw light upon the word. 

Interpretation has to be from within an existing Christian tradition: not the arbitrary ramblings of a revolutionary, who wishes to depart from all that and ignore what has been received and make his own opinions the unquestioned truth.

I admit that they have the word, but just as the Anthropomorphites of old had it, when they made God corporeal; just as Marcion and the Manichees had it when they made the body of Christ celestial or phantastical. 

And just as Calvin the semi-Nestorian had it when he tried to limit the glorified Body of Christ based on the restrictions of natural science and the omnipotence of God, and a lack of faith in the parameters of the miraculous.

They quoted the passages, “The first man is of the earth, earthy; the second man is the Lord from heaven” (1 Cor. 15:47): Christ “made himself of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a servant, and was made in the likeness of men” (Phil. 2:7). But these vain boasters think that there is no power of God unless they fabricate a monster in their own brains, by which the whole order of nature is subverted. 

How melodramatic . . .

This rather is to circumscribe the power of God, to attempt to try, by our fictions, what he can do. 

A perfect instance of Calvin projecting his own faults onto others . . .

From this word, they have assumed that the body of Christ is visible in heaven, and yet lurks invisible on the earth under innumerable bits of bread. 

That is no more implausible or impossible than an omnipresent Spirit-God making Himself somehow specially present in fire and clouds and burning bushes, or present in human form before the Incarnation, or in each Christian (the indwelling). If God can do that, He can also be present eucharistically. It is simply a further extension of the incarnation.

They will say that this is rendered necessary, in order that the body of Christ may be given in the Supper. In other words, because they have been pleased to extract a carnal eating from the words of Christ, carried away by their own prejudice, 

No; it is Calvin who assumes a carnal, cannibalistic, simplistic understanding of the whole thing, not us. He is like the ancient pagan Romans. He just doesn’t get it, and so he has to mock what he doesn’t have faith enough to understand.

they have found it necessary to coin this subtlety, which is wholly repugnant to Scripture. 

Calvin has been providing precious little Scripture throughout, to back up his heretical eucharistic theology, whereas I have been providing dozens and dozens of passages, and incorporating the overall biblical worldview all along.

That we detract, in any respect, from the power of God, is so far from being true, that our doctrine is the loudest in extolling it. 

One can say any phrase, but the concepts and beliefs have to also be behind the words and part of the worldview being offered.

But as they continue to charge us with robbing God of his honour, in rejecting what, according to common apprehension, it is difficult to believe, 

Lots of Christian beliefs are difficult to believe (and go far beyond mere reason). The curiosity with Calvin is: why does he accept many mysteries, yet balk at accepting the Real Presence in the Eucharist? Why does he draw the line here?

though it had been promised by the mouth of Christ; I answer, as I lately did, that in the mysteries of faith we do not consult common apprehension, but, with the placid docility and spirit of meekness which James recommends (James 1:21), receive the doctrine which has come from heaven. 

That’s correct. Would that Calvin would follow his own advice.

Wherein they perniciously err, I am confident that we follow a proper moderation. On hearing the words of Christ, this is my body, they imagine a miracle most remote from his intention; and when, from this fiction, the grossest absurdities arise, having already, by their precipitate haste, entangled themselves with snares, they plunge themselves into the abyss of the divine omnipotence, that, in this way, they may extinguish the light of truth. Hence the supercilious moroseness. We have no wish to know how Christ is hid under the bread: we are satisfied with his own words, “This is my body.” We again study, with no less obedience than care, to obtain a sound understanding of this passage, as of the whole of Scripture. We do not, with preposterous fervour, rashly, and without choice, lay hold on whatever first presents itself to our minds; but, after careful meditation, embrace the meaning which the Spirit of God suggests. 

Such reasoning has to be grounded in a biblical worldview. Mostly we observe Calvin pontificating out of his own head, under the influence of false philosophies and traditions of men. He talks a lot about Scripture, but doesn’t cite or interpret it much. This is obvious throughout this entire chapter.

Trusting to him, we look down, as from a height, on whatever opposition may be offered by earthly wisdom. Nay, we hold our minds captive, not allowing one word of murmur, and humble them, that they may not presume to gainsay. In this way, we have arrived at that exposition of the words of Christ, which all who are moderately versant in Scripture know to be perpetually used with regard to the sacraments. Still, in a matter of difficulty, we deem it not unlawful to inquire, after the example of the blessed Virgin, “How shall this be?” (Luke 1:34).

More words out of his head, that do nothing to further his case . . .

26. The orthodox view further confirmed. I. By a consideration of the reality of Christ’s body. II. From our Saviour’s declaration that he would always be in the world. This confirmed by the exposition of Augustine.
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But as nothing will be more effectual to confirm the faith of the pious than to show them that the doctrine which we have laid down is taken from the pure word of God, and rests on its authority, I will make this plain with as much brevity as I can. 

So after 25 sections, Calvin finally at length decides to go to the Bible to prove his case. Cool! Let’s see what he can come up with.

The body with which Christ rose is declared, not by Aristotle, but by the Holy Spirit, to be finite, and to be contained in heaven until the last day.

Where does it claim this? I’m unfamiliar with any such passage (perhaps that is why he hasn’t produced one).

I am not unaware how confidently our opponents evade the passages which are quoted to this effect. Whenever Christ says that he will leave the world and go away (John 14:2, 28), they reply, that that departure was nothing more than a change of mortal state. Were this so, Christ would not substitute the Holy Spirit, to supply, as they express it, the defect of his absence, since he does not succeed in place of him, 

Now Calvin shows his astonishing biblical ignorance, since it is not only the Holy Spirit Who indwells us, but Christ as well, and this is particularly seen in the very same chapter that Calvin cites. The Holy Spirit is not a “substitute.” It’s yet another “both/and” scenario; not “either/or”:

John 14:18 I will not leave you desolate; I will come to you. (cf. 14:16-17)

John 14:20 In that day you will know that I am in my Father, and you in me, and I in you.

John 14:23 Jesus answered him, “If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our home with him.”

John 15:4 Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit by itself, unless it abides in the vine, neither can you, unless you abide in me.

John 17:23 I in them and thou in me, that they may become perfectly one, so that the world may know that thou hast sent me and hast loved them even as thou hast loved me.

Romans 8:9-10 But you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if in fact the Spirit of God dwells in you. Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him. [10] But if Christ is in you, although your bodies are dead because of sin, your spirits are alive because of righteousness.

1 Peter 1:11 they inquired what person or time was indicated by the Spirit of Christ within them when predicting the sufferings of Christ and the subsequent glory.

Moreover, God the Father indwells us as well (Jn 14:23; 1 Jn 3:24; 4:12-16). Scripture says many things about indwelling beyond just the Holy Spirit indwelling us: it refers to Jesus and the Father doing so (Jn 14:23), and the Father and the Holy Spirit (1 Jn 3:24; 4:12-16), and also “God” without specification as to Divine Persons (2 Cor 6:16).

St. Augustine makes the same argument in his Tractate 75 on John 14:18-21:

After the promise of the Holy Spirit, lest any should suppose that the Lord was to give Him, as it were, in place of Himself, in any such way as that He Himself would not likewise be with them, He added the words: I will not leave you orphans; I will come to you.Orphani [Greek] are pupilli [parent-less children] in Latin. The one is the Greek, the other the Latin name of the same thing: for in the psalm where we read, You are the helper of the fatherless [in the Latin version, pupillo], the Greek has orphano. (1)

This is precisely the opposite of Calvin’s position. Calvin thinks that Christ wanted to “substitute the Holy Spirit,” but Augustine argues against “lest any should suppose that the Lord was to give Him, as it were, in place of Himself, in any such way as that He Himself would not likewise be with them”. St. Augustine incorporates all of the relevant biblical data, but Calvin sees only what he wants to see, to bolster his preconceived notions. This is classic, picture-perfect eisegesis, or “reading into Scripture what is not there.”

Furthermore, Calvin neglects or doesn’t comprehend an important and dogmatically accepted aspect of trinitarianism and Christology: what is known as the perichoresis (Greek) or circumincession (Latin). Fr. John A. Hardon. S.J., in his Modern Catholic Dictionary (Doubleday, 1980) precisely defines it, under the first Greek term and then the Latin word:

The penetration and indwelling of the three persons reciprocally in one another. In the Greek conception of the Trinity there is an emphasis on the mutual penetration of the three persons, thus bringing out the unity of the divine essence. In the Latin idea . . . the stress is more on the internal processions of the three divine persons. In both traditions, however, the fundamental basis of the Trinitarian perichoresis is the one essence of the three persons in God.

The mutual immanence of the three distinct persons of the Holy Trinity. The Father is entirely in the Son, likewise in the Holy Spirit; and so is the Son in the Father and the Holy Spirit; and the Holy Spirit in the Father and the Son. Circuminsession also identifies the mutual immanence of the two distinct natures in the one Person of Jesus Christ.

For more on perichoresis, see my paper on that topic.

nor, on the other hand, does Christ himself descend from the heavenly glory to assume the condition of a mortal life. 

Eucharistic presence is hardly an instance of that, so this is a non sequitur.

Certainly the advent of the Spirit and the ascension of Christ are set against each other, and hence it necessarily follows that Christ dwells with us according to the flesh, in the same way as that in which he sends his Spirit. 

No; He dwells in us spiritually in the same way as the Spirit, but this doesn’t rule out a physical presence as well (“both/and” again), because it was Jesus, after all, Who took on human flesh; the Holy Spirit didn’t do that. Nor are the ascension and the indwelling set against each other, as I have just shown. The ascension makes the indwelling of all Christians possible (there is a chronological progression here), but it is not in the sense that Jesus is not also present within us.

Moreover, he distinctly says that he would not always be in the world with his disciples (Mt. 26:11). 

That is, in the sense of walking the earth as a man, just as we do . . . Hence his reference to His burial in the next verse.

This saving, also, they think they admirably dispose of, as if it were a denial by Christ that he would always be poor and mean, or liable to the necessities of a fading life. But this is plainly repugnant to the context, since reference is made not to poverty and want, or the wretched condition of an earthly life, but to worship and honour. 

To the contrary, the context is all about anointing Him for His burial (26:7-10, 12-13): it is about the ending of His earthly sojourn as a man, in the natural sense. It is in that sense that Jesus was not to be with them always. Jesus returned to His disciples in His post-Resurrection appearances, and these were physical. Hence, it makes sense that He would also return in the eucharistic sense, to maintain His physical presence with men (as He stressed in most graphic terms at the Last Supper and John 6 discourse). It’s a beautiful thing.

The disciples were displeased with the anointing by Mary, because they thought it a superfluous and useless expenditure, akin to luxury, and would therefore have preferred that the price which they thought wasted should have been expended on the poor. Christ answers, that he will not be always with them to receive such honour. No different exposition is given by Augustine, whose words are by no means ambiguous. When Christ says, “Me ye have not always,” he spoke of his bodily presence. 

Yes, but in the tangible fashion of walking about as we do: the natural sense. This doesn’t exclude the Eucharist. Calvin only thinks it does, because he is a prisoner of his own arbitrary restrictions on God.

In regard to his majesty, in regard to his providence, in regard to his ineffable and invisible grace, is fulfilled what he said: “Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world” (Mt. 28:20); but in regard to the flesh which the Word assumed—in regard to that which was born of the Virgin—in regard to that which was apprehended by the Jews, nailed to the tree, suspended on the cross, wrapt in linen clothes, laid in the tomb, and manifested in the resurrection,—“Me ye have not always.” 

“Me ye have not always” is not the same as “once I go you will never have Me physically again.”

Why? Since he conversed with his disciples in bodily presence for forty days, and, going out with them, ascended, while they saw but followed not. He is not here, for he sits there, at the right hand of the Father. And yet he is here: for the presence of his majesty is not withdrawn. Otherwise, as regards the presence of his majesty, we have Christ always; while, in regard to his bodily presence, it was rightly said, “Me ye have not always.” In respect of bodily presence, the Church had him for a few days: now she holds him by faith, but sees him not with the eye (August. Tract. in Joann. 50). 

Calvin cites St. Augustine on this point, yet St. Augustine believed in the Real; Physical presence of Jesus in the Eucharist, and eucharistic adoration, and the sacrifice of the Mass; so he is hardly a support for Calvin’s view. Once again it is the illusory appearance of support where there actually is none.

Here (that I may briefly note this) he makes him present with us in three ways—in majesty, providence, and ineffable grace; under which I comprehend that wondrous communion of his body and blood, provided we understand that it is effected by the power of the Holy Spirit, and not by that fictitious enclosing of his body under the element, since our Lord declared that he had flesh and bones which could be handled and seen.

Yes, in that earthly, natural sense. This doesn’t logically exclude further eucharistic appearances, anymore than God the father being a spirit only excluded His appearances before the incarnation as a man, and in physical things (clouds, fire, burning bush, or in conjunction with the ark of the covenant).

Going away, and ascending, intimate, not that he had the appearance of one going away and ascending, but that he truly did what the words express. Some one will ask, Are we then to assign a certain region of heaven to Christ? I answer with Augustine, that this is a curious and superfluous question, provided we believe that he is in heaven.

Calvin is not thinking according to a biblical worldview and biblical categories. His vision is arbitrarily restricted by unnecessary rationalistic elements.

27. Refutation of the sophisms of the Ubiquitists. The evasion of visible and invisible presence refuted.

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What? Does not the very name of ascension, so often repeated, intimate removal from one place to another? 

Yes. But this proves nothing one way or the other for the issue under dispute.

This they deny, because by height, according to them, the majesty of empire only is denoted. But what was the very mode of ascending? Was he not carried up while the disciples looked on? Do not the Evangelists clearly relate that he was carried into heaven? 

Yes, but the argument is much ado about nothing. It doesn’t exclude the Eucharist. Calvin falsely assumes that it does, and so he thinks he has a good argument.

These acute Sophists reply, that a cloud intervened, and took him out of their sight, to teach the disciples that he would not afterwards be visible in the world. As if he ought not rather to have vanished in a moment, to make them believe in his invisible presence, or the cloud to have gathered around him before he moved a step. When he is carried aloft into the air, and the interposing cloud shows that he is no more to be sought on earth, we safely infer that his dwelling now is in the heavens, as Paul also asserts, bidding us look for him from thence (Phil. 3:20). For this reason, the angels remind the disciples that it is vain to keep gazing up into heaven, because Jesus, who was taken up, would come in like manner as they had seen him ascend. Here the adversaries of sound doctrine escape, as they think, by the ingenious quibble, that he will come in visible form, though he never departed from the earth, but remained invisible among his people. 

He did remain invisibly or spiritually, as we saw above in the Indwelling passages. He also says:

Matthew 18:20 For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am I in the midst of them.

Matthew 28:20 . . . I am with you always, to the close of the age.

And the Apostle Paul says about Jesus:

Colossians 3:11 . . . Christ is all, and in all.

As if the angels had insinuated a two-fold presence, and not simply made the disciples eye-witnesses of the ascent, that no doubt might remain. 

The angels didn’t have to do that, since Jesus already had done so.

It was just as if they had said, By ascending to heaven, while you looked on, he has asserted his heavenly power: it remains for you to wait patiently until he again arrive to judge the world. He has not entered into heaven to occupy it alone, but to gather you and all the pious along with him.

We do await His Second Coming. No disagreement there.

28. The authority of Fathers not in favour of these errors as to Christ’s presence. Augustine opposed to them.

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Since the advocates of this spurious dogma are not ashamed to honour it with the suffrages of the ancients, and especially of Augustine, how perverse they are in the attempt I will briefly explain. 

Calvin attempts all the time to “co-opt” St. Augustine for his heretical novelties, and fails every time. The present instance is no exception.

Pious and learned men have collected the passages, and therefore I am unwilling to plead a concluded cause: any one who wishes may consult their writings. I will not even collect from Augustine what might be pertinent to the matter, but will be contented to show briefly, that without all controversy he is wholly ours. 

That’s a convenient evasion . . .

The pretence of our opponents, when they would wrest him from us, 

The Calvinists never “had” St. Augustine to begin with, so how could we Catholics “wrest” him away?! This is a very clever use of a presumed truth that has not even been established, and is, in fact, a falsehood. I have documented the great father’s belief in the real physical presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In the next chapter it will be even more plain that St. Augustine also believed in eucharistic adoration and the Sacrifice of the Mass: things considerably more repugnant to Calvin than the Real Presence and transubstantiation.

that throughout his works the flesh and blood of Christ are said to be dispensed in the Supper—namely, the victim once offered on the cross, is frivolous, seeing he, at the same time, calls it either the eucharist or sacrament of the body. But it is unnecessary to go far to find the sense in which he uses the terms flesh and blood, since he himself explains, saying (Ep. 23, ad Bonif.) that the sacraments receive names from their similarity to the things which they designate; and that, therefore, the sacrament of the body is after a certain manner the body. With this agrees another well-know passage, “The Lord hesitated not to say, This is my body, when he gave the sign” (Cont. Adimant. Manich. cap. 12). 

I have shown in a past installment that for Augustine, sign and reality are not antithetical, as they are for Calvin. I gave not only my opinion, but that of Protestant historians discussing Augustine’s views.

They again object that Augustine says distinctly that the body of Christ falls upon the earth, and enters the mouth. But this is in the same sense in which he affirms that it is consumed, for he conjoins both at the same time. There is nothing repugnant to this in his saying that the bread is consumed after the mystery is performed: for he had said a little before, “As these things are known to men, when they are done by men they may receive honour as being religious, but not as being wonderful” (De Trinit. Lib. 3 c. 10). 

Calvin cites the following sentence from chapter 10, section 20:

But because these things are known to men, in that they are done by men, they may well meet with reverence as being holy things, but they cannot cause wonder as being miracles.

But in the next section (Book III, chapter 10, section 21), Augustine draws the same analogy to God appearing in physical things, that I have used in this respect:

What man, again, knows how the angels made or took those clouds and fires in order to signify the message they were bearing, even if we supposed that the Lordor the Holy Spirit was manifested in those corporeal forms? Just as infants do not know of that which is placed upon the altar and consumed after the performance of the holy celebration, whence or in what manner it is made, or whence it is taken for religious use. And if they were never to learn from their own experience or that of others, and never to see that species of thing except during the celebration of the sacrament, when it is being offered and given; and if it were told them by the most weighty authority whose body and blood it is; they will believe nothing else, except that the Lord absolutely appeared in this form to the eyes of mortals, and that that liquid actually flowed from the piercing of a side which resembled this.

St. Augustine — contra Calvin — casually assumes that it is the Body and Blood of Christ.

His meaning is not different in the passage which our opponents too rashly appropriate to themselves—viz. that Christ in a manner carried himself in his own hands, when he held out the mystical bread to his disciples. For by interposing the expression, in a manner, he declares that he was not really or truly included under the bread. 

Calvin seizes upon one word, to supposedly turn the issue in his favor . . . In this exposition on Psalm 34, St. Augustine makes it clear many times that he literally believes in the physical presence of Christ. He refers to the Sacrifice of the Mass:

Because there was there a sacrifice after the order of Aaron, and afterwards He of His Own Body and Blood appointed a sacrifice after the order of Melchizedek . . . (1)

He assumes throughout a striking literal eucharistic realism:

For very humility taught our Lord in His Own Body and Blood: because when He commends His Own Body and Blood, He commends His Humility . . . (3)

Or rather some spiritual Christian invites us to approach to our Lord Jesus Christ Himself. But let us approach to Him and be lightened; not as the Jews approached to Him, that they might be darkened; for they approached to Him that they might crucify Him: let us approach to Him that we may receive His Body and Blood. They by Him crucified were darkened; we by eating and drinking TheCrucified are lightened. (9)

Now will He speak openly of the same Sacrament, whereby He was carried in His Own Hands. O taste and see that the Lord is goodPsalm 33:8. Does not the Psalm now open itself, and show you that seeming insanity and constant madness, the same insanity and sober inebriety of that David, who in a figure showed I know not what, when in the person of king Achis they said to him, How is it? When the Lord said, Except a man eat My Flesh and drink My Blood, he shall have no life in himJohn 6:53 And they in whom reigned Achis, that is, error and ignorance, said; what said they? How can this man give us his flesh to eat?John 6:52 If you are ignorant, Taste and see that the Lord is good: but if you understand not, you are king Achis: David shall change His Countenance and shall depart from you, and shall quit you, and shall depart. (11; complete)

All this; yet Calvin (like all good sophists) seizes on one word and pretends that it proves his case over against Catholicism and the thoroughly Catholic St. Augustine. This is a classic example; Calvin constantly does this. It’s dishonest scholarship and deceptive toward his readers, to continually present highly selective facts to the exclusion of other equally relevant facts in context.

Nor is it strange, since he elsewhere plainly contends, that bodies could not be without particular localities, and being nowhere, would have no existence. 

That is no argument against eucharistic local presence. It’s an argument against no presence at all for a body; thus it is yet another non sequitur.

It is a paltry cavil that he is not there treating of the Supper, in which God exerts a special power. The question had been raised as to the flesh of Christ, and the holy man professedly replying, says, “Christ gave immortality to his flesh, but did not destroy its nature. In regard to this form, we are not to suppose that it is everywhere diffused: for we must beware not to rear up the divinity of the man, so as to take away the reality of the body. It does not follow that that which is in God is everywhere as God” (Ep. ad Dardan.). He immediately subjoins the reason, “One person is God and man, and both one Christ, everywhere, inasmuch as he is God, and in heaven, inasmuch as he is man.” How careless would it have been not to except the mystery of the Supper, a matter so grave and serious, if it was in any respect adverse to the doctrine which he was handling? 

Unfortunately, I can’t locate this letter online, so as to show how Calvin has distorted its meaning (as he always seems to do with the fathers, and as we saw again not far above).

And yet, if any one will attentively read what follows shortly after, he will find that under that general doctrine the Supper also is comprehended, that Christ, the only-begotten Son of God, and also Son of man, is everywhere wholly present as God, in the temple of God, that is, in the Church, as an inhabiting God, and in some place in heaven, because of the dimensions of his real body. 

Jesus is omnipresent in His Divine Nature. And He is locally physically present in the Eucharist.

We see how, in order to unite Christ with the Church, he does not bring his body out of heaven. This he certainly would have done had the body of Christ not been truly our food, unless when included under the bread. 

Calvin here merely assumes what he fails to prove.

Elsewhere, explaining how believers now possess Christ, he says, “You have him by the sign of the cross, by the sacrament of baptism, by the meat and drink of the altar” (Tract. in Joann. 50). How rightly he enumerates a superstitious rite, among the symbols of Christ’s presence, I dispute not; but in comparing the presence of the flesh to the sign of the cross, he sufficiently shows that he has no idea of a twofold body of Christ, one lurking concealed under the bread, and another sitting visible in heaven. 

This doesn’t follow at all; it is merely Calvin reading his own false belief into St. Augustine. The mention of “altar” in this section 12 of Tractate 50 on John 11 and 12 is without question a reference to the Sacrifice of the Mass. Altars always have to do with sacrifice:

If you are good, if you belong to the body represented by Peter, you have Christ both now and hereafter: now by faith, by sign, by the sacrament of baptism, by the bread and wine of the altar. You have Christ now, but you will have Him always; for when you have gone hence, you will come to Him who said to the robber, Today shall you be with me in paradise.Luke 23:43 But if you live wickedly, you may seem to have Christ now, because you enter the Church, signest yourself with the sign of Christ, art baptized with the baptism of Christ, minglest yourself with the members of Christ, and approachest His altar: now you have Christ, but by living wickedly you will not have Him always.

If there is any need of explanation, it is immediately added, “In respect of the presence of his majesty, we have Christ always: in respect of the presence of his flesh, it is rightly said, ‘Me ye have not always.’” They object that he also adds, “In respect of ineffable and invisible grace is fulfilled what was said by him, ‘I am with you always, even to the end of the world.’” But this is nothing in their favour. For it is at length restricted to his majesty, which is always opposed to body, while the flesh is expressly distinguished from grace and virtue. 

This is more Nestorian heresy from Calvin. St. Augustine points out elsewhere in the same larger work, in Tractate 27 on John 6:60-72 that “son of Man” (Jesus’ usual reference to His human Nature or the incarnational aspect) is referred to as in heaven, according to His unity of one Divine Person with two Natures:

And He said, It is the Spirit that quickens; the flesh profits nothing. Before we expound this, as the Lord grants us, that other must not be negligently passed over, where He says, Then what if you shall see the Son of man ascending where He was before? For Christ is the Son of man, of the Virgin Mary. Therefore Son of man He began to be here on earth, where He took flesh from the earth. For which cause it was said prophetically, Truth is sprung from the earth. Then what does He mean when He says, When you shall see the Son of man ascending where He was before? . . . Christ, both God and man, is one person, not two persons, lest our faith be not a trinity, but a quaternity? Christ, therefore, is one; the Word, soul and flesh, one Christ; the Son of God and Son of man, one Christ; Son of God always, Son of man in time, yet one Christ in regard to unity of person. . . . He was Son of man in heaven in that manner in which He was Son of God on earth; Son of God on earth in the flesh which He took, Son of man in heaven in the unity of person. (4)

The same antithesis elsewhere occurs, when he says that “Christ left the disciples in bodily presence, that he might be with them in spiritual presence.” Here it is clear that the essence of the flesh is distinguished from the virtue of the Spirit, which conjoins us with Christ, when, in respect of space, we are at a great distance from him. 

This is again in direct opposition to St. Augustine, whom he claims is on his side. The latter doesn’t make flesh and spirit antithetical, but joins them together:

What is it, then, that He adds? It is the Spirit that quickens; the flesh profits nothing. Let us say to Him (for He permits us, not contradicting Him, but desiring to know), O Lord, good Master, in what way does the flesh profit nothing, while You have said, Except a man eat my flesh, and drink my blood, he shall not have life in him? Or does life profit nothing? And why are we what we are, but that we may have eternal life, which Thou dost promise by Your flesh? Then what means the flesh profits nothing? It profits nothing, but only in the manner in which they understood it. They indeed understood the flesh, just as when cut to pieces in a carcass, or sold in the shambles; not as when it is quickened by the Spirit. Wherefore it is said that the flesh profits nothing, in the same manner as it is said that knowledge puffs up. Then, ought we at once to hate knowledge? Far from it! And what means Knowledge puffs up? Knowledge alone, without charity. Therefore he added, but charity edifies.1 Corinthians 8:1 Therefore add to knowledge charity, and knowledge will be profitable, not by itself, but through charity. So also here, the flesh profits nothing, only when alone. Let the Spirit be added to the flesh, as charity is added to knowledge, and it profits very much. For if the flesh profited nothing, the Word would not be made flesh to dwell among us. If through the flesh Christ has greatly profited us, does the flesh profit nothing? But it is by the flesh that the Spirit has done somewhat for our salvation. Flesh was a vessel; consider what it held, not what it was. The apostles were sent forth; did their flesh profit us nothing? If the apostles’ flesh profited us, could it be that the Lord’s flesh should have profited us nothing? For how should the sound of the Word come to us except by the voice of the flesh? Whence should writing come to us? All these are operations of the flesh, but only when the spirit moves it, as if it were its organ. Therefore it is the Spirit that quickens; the flesh profits nothing, as they understood the flesh, but not so do I give my flesh to be eaten. (Ibid., section 5: complete)

Protestants (following Calvin’s convoluted reasoning), unfortunately influenced by the heresies of Docetism and Nestorianism, typically misinterpret the flesh that is opposed to spirit in this portion of John 6 as proving that the Eucharist is not physically real. But Jesus is opposing a carnal understanding of flesh as dichotomized from spirit: the same thing that Calvin is asserting. Both Jesus and St. Augustine contradict Calvin’s understanding.

He repeatedly uses the same mode of expression, as when he says, “He is to come to the quick and the dead in bodily presence, according to the rule of faith and sound doctrine: for in spiritual presence he was to come to them, and to be with the whole Church in the world until its consummation. Therefore, this discourse is directed to believers, whom he had begun already to save by corporeal presence, and whom he was to leave in corporeal absence, that by spiritual presence he might preserve them with the Father.” 

In the sense of walking the earth, He is not with us. But again, this doesn’t logically exclude an additional sense of eucharistic physical presence.

By corporeal to understand visible is mere trifling, since he both opposes his body to his divine power, and by adding, that he might “preserve them with the Father,” clearly expresses that he sends his grace to us from heaven by means of the Spirit.

Scripture doesn’t completely dichotomize (as Calvin does) the Human Nature of Jesus and His power as a Divine Person, as well as majesty. It is true that He is not omnipotent in His human nature, or omnipotent, etc. (the Lutheran error of ubiquity), but on the other hand, there is no huge divide between His Human Nature, including His Body, and His power and majesty. We see this in the use of “Son of Man,” which clearly refers to His Human Nature, in conjunction with both heaven and power:

Matthew 13:41 The Son of man will send his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all causes of sin and all evildoers,

Matthew 16:27 For the Son of man is to come with his angels in the glory of his Father, and then he will repay every man for what he has done.

Matthew 19:28 . . . in the new world, when the Son of man shall sit on his glorious throne . . .

Matthew 24:30 then will appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven, and then all the tribes of the earth will mourn, and they will see the Son of man coming on the clouds of heaven with power and great glory; (cf. 24:37, 39, 44)

Matthew 25:31 When the Son of man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne.

Matthew 26:64 Jesus said to him, “You have said so. But I tell you, hereafter you will see the Son of man seated at the right hand of Power, and coming on the clouds of heaven.

Mark 2:28 so the Son of man is lord even of the sabbath. (cf. Lk 6:5)

Mark 13:26 And then they will see the Son of man coming in clouds with great power and glory. (cf. 8:38)

Mark 14:62 And Jesus said, “I am; and you will see the Son of man seated at the right hand of Power, and coming with the clouds of heaven.”

Luke 21:27 And then they will see the Son of man coming in a cloud with power and great glory. (cf. 9:26; 12:40; 17:30; 18:8)

Luke 22:69 “But from now on the Son of man shall be seated at the right hand of the power of God.”

John 1:51 And he said to him, “Truly, truly, I say to you, you will see heaven opened, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man.”

John 3:13 No one has ascended into heaven but he who descended from heaven, the Son of man. (cf. 6:62)

John 5:27 and has given him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of man.

Acts 7:56 and he said, “Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of man standing at the right hand of God.”

Revelation 1:13 and in the midst of the lampstands one like a son of man, clothed with a long robe and with a golden girdle round his breast;

Revelation 14:14 Then I looked, and lo, a white cloud, and seated on the cloud one like a son of man, with a golden crown on his head, and a sharp sickle in his hand.

All of this teaches the unity of person in Jesus: the Chalcedonian Christology, over against Nestorianism and Calvin’s quasi-Nestorianism and Docetic tendencies.

Jesus even refers to Himself as the “Son of man” giving us His flesh to eat:

John 6:27 Do not labor for the food which perishes, but for the food which endures to eternal life, which the Son of man will give to you; for on him has God the Father set his seal.

John 6:53 So Jesus said to them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you;”

Jesus is even “glorified” as the “Son of man” as well:

John 12:23 And Jesus answered them, “The hour has come for the Son of man to be glorified.

John 13:31 When he had gone out, Jesus said, “Now is the Son of man glorified, and in him God is glorified;

Moreover, Jesus is repeatedly referred to as the “Lamb” in heaven (Rev 5:6, 8, 12; 6:1; 7:14; 8:1; 12:11; 13:8; 14:1, 4; 19:7, 9; 21:9, 14, 22-23, 27), even in the context of sitting on His throne and being honored there with all majesty and glory (Rev 5:13; 7:9-10, 17; 22:1, 3), and judging sinners at His Second Coming and Last Judgment (Rev 6:16; 7:9; 14:10; 17:14).

Nothing refers more to His body and Human Nature than the reference as “Lamb” (of God). That is the Human Nature, the crucifixion, and the Sacrifice of the Mass. Calvin would like to have everything in a neat little package, with Jesus glorified in heaven, and all the messy, incarnational, Human Nature stuff now over with, but Scripture is not nearly that simple or dichotomous.
*

This same “Son of man” who comes again in glory, Who is glorified by God the Father, Who judges, sits on God’s throne, has great power even during His earthly life, who is Lord of the Sabbath, Who has power over life and death (He raised Himself: John 2:18-22; 10:18), and raised others from the dead), gives us His Body and Blood to eat for eternal life (Jn 6:27, 53). There is no big dichotomy between His body and heaven, and glory and majesty there, and His Body on earth, both during the Incarnation, and during His physical presence in the Holy Eucharist.

Lastly, Calvin referred to, above, Jesus’ “majesty, which is always opposed to body, while the flesh is expressly distinguished from grace and virtue.” Again, Scripture (which he has hardly brought to the table at all in this entire dispute) contradicts Calvin. It does not dichotomize Christ’s majesty from His role as Son of Man and Sacrificial Lamb and High Priest, or from His Human Nature and body:

Hebrews 1:3 He reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp of his nature, upholding the universe by his word of power. When he had made purification for sins, he sat down at the right hand of the Majesty on high,

2 Peter 1:16-18 For we did not follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty. [17] For when he received honor and glory from God the Father and the voice was borne to him by the Majestic Glory, “This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased,” [18] we heard this voice borne from heaven, for we were with him on the holy mountain.

Scripture even asserts that Jesus is a priest for us specifically because He is in heaven (Heb 8:4). A priest offers sacrifice, and the sacrifice that Jesus offers is Himself, as the Lamb of God (and He does so because He is a Man, with flesh):

Hebrews 8:1-4 Now the point in what we are saying is this: we have such a high priest, one who is seated at the right hand of the throne of the Majesty in heaven, [2] a minister in the sanctuary and the true tent which is set up not by man but by the Lord. [3] For every high priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices; hence it is necessary for this priest also to have something to offer. [4] Now if he were on earth, he would not be a priest at all, since there are priests who offer gifts according to the law.
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(originally 11-30-09)

Photo credit: Historical mixed media figure of John Calvin produced by artist/historian George S. Stuart and photographed by Peter d’Aprix: from the George S. Stuart Gallery of Historical Figures archive [Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license]

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2019-02-01T18:22:31-04:00

This is an installment of a series of replies (see the Introduction and Master List) to much of Book IV (Of the Holy Catholic Church) of Institutes of the Christian Religion, by early Protestant leader John Calvin (1509-1564). I utilize the public domain translation of Henry Beveridge, dated 1845, from the 1559 edition in Latin; available online. Calvin’s words will be in blue. All biblical citations (in my portions) will be from RSV unless otherwise noted.

Related reading from yours truly:

Biblical Catholic Answers for John Calvin (2010 book: 388 pages)

A Biblical Critique of Calvinism (2012 book: 178 pages)

Biblical Catholic Salvation: “Faith Working Through Love” (2010 book: 187 pages; includes biblical critiques of all five points of “TULIP”)

*****

IV, 17:12-15

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Book IV

CHAPTER 17

OF THE LORD’S SUPPER, AND THE BENEFITS CONFERRED BY IT.

12. Second part of the chapter, reduced to nine heads. The transubstantiation of the Papists considered and refuted. Its origin and absurdity. Why it should be exploded.
*

I now come to the hyperbolical mixtures which superstition has introduced. 

It’s quite comical for Calvin to rail against “superstition” — given all the fictional and illogical, incoherent innovations he himself has introduced . . .

Here Satan has employed all his wiles, withdrawing the minds of men from heaven, and imbuing them with the perverse error that Christ is annexed to the element of bread. 

That is, the biblical, apostolic, patristic, and historic Catholic “error” . . . (we must place things in their proper perspective).

And, first, we are not to dream of such a presence of Christ in the sacrament as the artificers of the Romish court have imagined, as if the body of Christ, locally present, were to be taken into the hand, and chewed by the teeth, and swallowed by the throat. 

As the fathers pretty much unanimously believed: so even Protestant historians freely concede. It has nothing particularly to do with “Romish” and everything to do with apostolic and patristic.

This was the form of Palinode, which Pope Nicholas dictated to Berengarius, in token of his repentance, a form expressed in terms so monstrous, that the author of the Gloss exclaims, that there is danger, if the reader is not particularly cautious, that he will be led by it into a worse heresy than was that of Berengarius (Distinct. 2 c. Ego Berengarius). 

Berengarius was one of the few men of any note in the entire patristic and early medieval period who questioned the Real Presence and transubstantiation; hence we see Calvin immediately gravitating to him, even before he engages in his usual pretense that St. Augustine supposedly agrees with his novel position. In the article on Berengarius in the Catholic Encyclopedia, we can see from whence Calvin got some of his heretical notions of the Eucharist:

In the Eucharistic controversy of the ninth century, Radbert Paschasius, afterwards abbot of Corbie, in his De Corpore et Sanguine Domini (831), had maintained the doctrine that in the Holy Eucharist the bread is converted into the real body of Christ, into the very body which was born of Mary and crucified. Ratramnus, a monk of the same abbey, defended the opinion that in the Holy Eucharist there is no conversion of the bread; that the body of Christ is, nevertheless, present, but in a spiritual way; that it is not therefore the same as that born of Mary and crucified. John Scotus Erigena had supported the view that the sacraments of the altar are figures of the body of Christ; that they are a memorial of the true body and blood of Christ. (P. Batiffol, Etudes d’histoire et de théologie positive, 2d series, Paris, 1905.)

Unlike Calvin, who was firm in his error, Berengarius waffled and vacillated, but like Calvin, he went his own way over against Rome:

At the Council of Tours (1055), presided over by the papal legate Hildebrand, Berengarius signed a profession of faith wherein he confessed that after consecration the bread and wine are truly the body and blood of Christ. At another council held in Rome in 1059, Berengarius was present, retracted his opinions, and signed a formula of faith, drawn up by Cardinal Humbert, affirming the real and sensible presence of the true body of Christ in the Holy Eucharist. (Mansi, XIX, 900.) On his return, however, Berengarius attacked this formula. Eusebius Bruno abandoned him, and the Count of Anjou, Geoffrey the Bearded, vigorously opposed him. Berengarius appealed to Pope Alexander II, who, though he intervened in his behalf, asked him to renounce his erroneous opinions. This Berengarius contemptuously refused to do. . . . in 1078, by order of Pope Gregory VII, he came to Rome, and in a council held in St. John Lateran signed a profession of faith affirming the conversion of the bread into the body of Christ, born of the Virgin Mary. The following year, in a council held in the same place Berengarius signed a formula affirming the same doctrine in a more explicit way. Gregory VII then recommended him to the bishops of Tours and Angers, forbidding that any penalty should be inflicted on him or that anyone should call him a heretic. Berengarius, on his return, again attacked the formula he had signed, but as a consequence of the Council of Bordeaux (1080) he made a final retraction. He then retired into solitude on the island of St. Cosme, where he died, in union with the Church.

As the article proceeds in its analysis, we see again the similarities of the false premises of both Berengarius’ and Calvin’s heretical errors: particularly the notion of merely “spiritual presence”:

In order to understand his opinion, we must observe that, in philosophy, Berengarius had rationalistic tendencies and was a nominalist. Even in the study of the question of faith, he held that reason is the best guide. Reason, however, is dependent upon and is limited by sense-perception. Authority, therefore, is not conclusive; we must reason according to the data of our senses. There is no doubt that Berengarius denied transubstantiation (we mean the substantial conversion expressed by the word; the word itself was used for the first time by Hildebert of Lavardin); it is not absolutely certain that he denied the Real Presence, though he certainly held false views regarding it. Is the body of Christ present in the Eucharist, and in what manner? On this question the authorities appealed to by Berengarius are, besides Scotus Erigena, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine. These fathers taught that the Sacrament of the Altar is the figure, the sign, the token of the body and blood of the Lord. These terms, in their mind, apply directly to what is external and sensible in the Holy Eucharist and do not, in any way, imply the negation of the real presence of the true body of Christ. (St. Aug. Serm. 143, n.3; Gerbert, Libellus De Corp. et Sang. Domini. n. 4, P.L., CXXXIX, 177.) For Berengarius the body and blood of Christ are really present in the Holy Eucharist; but this presence is an intellectual or spiritual presence. The substance of the bread and the substance of the wine remain unchanged in their nature, but by consecration they become spiritually the very body and blood of Christ. This spiritual body and blood of Christ is the res sacramenti; the bread and the wine are the figure, the sign, the token, sacramentum. . . .

He maintained that the bread and wine, without any change in their nature, become by consecration the sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, a memorial of the body crucified and of the blood shed on the cross. It is not, however, the body of Christ as it is in heaven; for how could the body of Christ which is now in heaven, necessarily limited by space, be in another place, on several altars, and in numerous hosts? Yet the bread and the wine are the sign of the actual and real presence of the body and blood of Christ.

Calvin, too, had pronounced rationalistic and nominalistic tendencies. And so we see some of the intellectual background of his heresies in this regard.

Peter Lombard, though he labours much to excuse the absurdity, rather inclines to a different opinion. As we cannot at all doubt that it is bounded according to the invariable rule in the human body, and is contained in heaven, where it was once received, and will remain till it return to judgment, so we deem it altogether unlawful to bring it back under these corruptible elements, or to imagine it everywhere present. 

Jesus’ body is not “everywhere present.” It is sacramentally present in the consecrated bread and wine at Mass. In fact, the very notion of consecration proves that transubstantiation does not involve a “bodily omnipresence” since what was once bread and wine miraculously becomes the Body and Blood of Christ. Therefore, if they were not that before consecration, then this proves that Jesus’ body is not omnipresent itself, but becomes present locally during Mass.

Absurdities abound here, but in Calvin’s view, not the Catholic position. Jesus could walk through walls after His Resurrection (Jn 20:26), and even a mere man, Philip, could be “caught away” and transported to another place by God (Acts 8:39-40). So some Protestants think that God “couldn’t” or “wouldn’t” have performed the miracle of the Eucharist? One shouldn’t attempt to “tie” God’s hands by such arguments of alleged implausibility.

The fact remains that God clearly can perform any miracle He so chooses, and this particular one entails no suspension of the principles of the Incarnation, once the doctrine of Two Natures is correctly understood. Jesus can be both incarnate and present in many places in the Eucharist, just as He can be incarnate and be present spiritually everywhere (something which all Protestants believe). Neither scenario is contradictory or impossible for God. They are both miraculous and supernatural.

*

And, indeed, there is no need of this, in order to our partaking of it, since the Lord by his Spirit bestows upon us the blessing of being one with him in soul, body, and spirit. The bond of that connection, therefore, is the Spirit of Christ, who unites us to him, and is a kind of channel by which everything that Christ has and is, is derived to us. For if we see that the sun, in sending forth its rays upon the earth, to generate, cherish, and invigorate its offspring, in a manner transfuses its substance into it, why should the radiance of the Spirit be less in conveying to us the communion of his flesh and blood? 

Calvin’s scenario is entirely possible, theoretically. The problem is that it denies the clear biblical warrant for eucharistic realism.

Wherefore the Scripture, when it speaks of our participation with Christ, refers its whole efficacy to the Spirit. Instead of many, one passage will suffice. Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans (Rom. 8:9-11), shows that the only way in which Christ dwells in us is by his Spirit. By this, however, he does not take away that communion of flesh and blood of which we now speak, but shows that it is owing to the Spirit alone that we possess Christ wholly, and have him abiding in us.

The indwelling itself is spiritual, and it is said that Jesus dwells inside of us, as well as the Holy Spirit, and indeed God the Father. But the same Scripture uses realistic language in describing the Body of Christ. Calvin himself alluded to this in passing not long before in his book. The clearest, most graphic example of that is in conjunction with St. Paul’s conversion:

Acts 9:3-4 And he fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to him, “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?” [5] And he said, “Who are you, Lord?” And he said, “I am Jesus, whom you are persecuting;

Acts 22:7-8 And I fell to the ground and heard a voice saying to me, `Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me?’ [8] And I answered, `Who are you, Lord?’ And he said to me, `I am Jesus of Nazareth whom you are persecuting.’

Acts 26:14-15 And when we had all fallen to the ground, I heard a voice saying to me in the Hebrew language, `Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? It hurts you to kick against the goads.’ [15] And I said, `Who are you, Lord?’ And the Lord said, `I am Jesus whom you are persecuting.

Paul wasn’t literally persecuting Jesus in the flesh. He was warring against the Body of Christ. Jesus assumes here that the “Body of Christ” or the Church is literally identified with Him, in some very real sense. It’s the typically pungent, literal, graphic language and categories of the Bible. Paul was persecuting the Church:

Acts 9:1-2 But Saul, still breathing threats and murder against the disciples of the Lord, went to the high priest [2] and asked him for letters to the synagogues at Damascus, so that if he found any belonging to the Way, men or women, he might bring them bound to Jerusalem.

Acts 22:4-5 I persecuted this Way to the death, binding and delivering to prison both men and women, [5] as the high priest and the whole council of elders bear me witness. From them I received letters to the brethren, and I journeyed to Damascus to take those also who were there and bring them in bonds to Jerusalem to be punished.

Acts 26:10-11 I not only shut up many of the saints in prison, by authority from the chief priests, but when they were put to death I cast my vote against them. [11] And I punished them often in all the synagogues and tried to make them blaspheme; and in raging fury against them, I persecuted them even to foreign cities.

1 Corinthians 15:9 For I am the least of the apostles, unfit to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God.

Galatians 1:23 For you have heard of my former life in Judaism, how I persecuted the church of God violently and tried to destroy it; (cf. 1:23)

But Jesus told him that he was persecuting Him. This graphic one-to-one equation is seen elsewhere:

Ephesians 1:22-23 and he has put all things under his feet and has made him the head over all things for the church, [23] which is his body, the fulness of him who fills all in all.

Ephesians 5:23 . . . Christ is the head of the church, his body, and is himself its Savior.

Ephesians 5:28-32 Even so husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself. [29] For no man ever hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the church, [30] because we are members of his body. [31] “For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.” [32] This mystery is a profound one, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church;

Paul also reiterates the equation of persecution of the Church being the same as persecuting Jesus Himself:

1 Timothy 1:12-13 I thank him who has given me strength for this, Christ Jesus our Lord, because he judged me faithful by appointing me to his service, [13] though I formerly blasphemed and persecuted and insulted him; but I received mercy because I had acted ignorantly in unbelief,

Elsewhere we see in the Apostle Paul not only very strong eucharistic realism (1 Cor 10:16; 11:27-30) but also an identification with the very suffering of Christ, in a startlingly realistic manner:

Colossians 1:24 Now I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I complete what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions for the sake of his body, that is, the church, (cf. 2 Cor 4:10; Gal 6:17; Phil 3:10)

Calvin can’t spiritualize away Paul’s bodily sufferings, as if they weren’t physical in nature. Likewise, he can’t spiritualize away the Holy Eucharist. Scripture is consistently realistic in tone, tenor, and language with regard to all these matters.

13. Transubstantiation as feigned by the Schoolmen. Refutation. The many superstitions introduced by their error.
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The Schoolmen, horrified at this barbarous impiety, 

What impiety?

speak more modestly, though they do nothing more than amuse themselves with more subtle delusions. 

Quite an underhanded compliment . . .

They admit that Christ is not contained in the sacrament circumscriptively, or in a bodily manner, but they afterwards devise a method which they themselves do not understand, and cannot explain to others. 

Sounds rather like Calvin’s own discombobulated eucharistic theology.

It, however, comes to this, that Christ may be sought in what they call the species of bread. What? When they say that the substance of bread is converted into Christ, do they not attach him to the white colour, which is all they leave of it? But they say, that though contained in the sacrament, he still remains in heaven, and has no other presence there than that of abode. 

On what grounds can Calvin or his followers argue that this is impossible? I don’t see at all that it is impossible for God or prohibited by the Bible. Colossians 3:11 states that “Christ is all, and in all.” The Bible refers to God being “in” physical things, such as fire and clouds (so why not also under the appearances of bread and wine?). Exodus 33:9-10 even informs us that the ancient Israelites would worship God in the pillar of cloud and 2 Chronicles 7:3 states that they “bowed down with their faces to the earth on the pavement, and worshiped” before God in both the fire and the cloud. Moses and Aaron “fell on their faces” before the Shekinah glory cloud (Num 20:6). All of this is exactly analogous to eucharistic adoration of the host:

GOD IN FIRE
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Exodus 3:2-6 And the angel of the LORD appeared to him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush; and he looked, and lo, the bush was burning, yet it was not consumed. [3] And Moses said, “I will turn aside and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt.” [4] When the LORD saw that he turned aside to see, God called to him out of the bush, “Moses, Moses!” And he said, “Here am I.” [5] Then he said, “Do not come near; put off your shoes from your feet, for the place on which you are standing is holy ground.” [6] And he said, “I am the God of your father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” And Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look at God. (cf. Acts 7:30-33; Dt. 4:12, 15; 5:4-5; Mk 12:26; Lk 20:37)

Exodus 13:21 And the LORD went before them . . . by night in a pillar of fire to give them light, that they might travel by day and by night; (cf. 14:24)

Exodus 19:18 And Mount Sinai was wrapped in smoke, because the LORD descended upon it in fire; and the smoke of it went up like the smoke of a kiln, and the whole mountain quaked greatly. (cf. 24:17)

Exodus 40:38 For throughout all their journeys the cloud of the LORD was upon the tabernacle by day, and fire was in it by night, in the sight of all the house of Israel. (cf. Num 14:14; Dt 1:32-33; Neh 9:12, 19)

Deuteronomy 4:12 Then the LORD spoke to you out of the midst of the fire; you heard the sound of words, but saw no form; there was only a voice. (cf. 4:15)

Deuteronomy 5:22 These words the LORD spoke to all your assembly at the mountain out of the midst of the fire, . . . (cf. 9:10; 10:4)

GOD IN THE SHEKINAH CLOUD / “GLORY OF THE LORD”
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Exodus 13:21 And the LORD went before them by day in a pillar of cloud to lead them along the way, . . . (cf. 14:24; 16:10; Dt 1:33; 31:15)

Exodus 24:15-16 Then Moses went up on the mountain, and the cloud covered the mountain. [16] The glory of the LORD settled on Mount Sinai, and the cloud covered it six days; and on the seventh day he called to Moses out of the midst of the cloud.

Exodus 33:9-11 When Moses entered the tent, the pillar of cloud would descend and stand at the door of the tent, and the LORD would speak with Moses. [10] And when all the people saw the pillar of cloud standing at the door of the tent, all the people would rise up and worship, every man at his tent door. [11] Thus the LORD used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend. When Moses turned again into the camp, his servant Joshua the son of Nun, a young man, did not depart from the tent. . . . [14] And he said, “My presence will go with you, and I will give you rest.” (cf. Num 14:10, 14; 16:19, 42)

Exodus 34:5 And the LORD descended in the cloud and stood with him there, and proclaimed the name of the LORD.

Exodus 40:34-38 Then the cloud covered the tent of meeting, and the glory of the LORD filled the tabernacle. [35] And Moses was not able to enter the tent of meeting, because the cloud abode upon it, and the glory of the LORD filled the tabernacle. [36] Throughout all their journeys, whenever the cloud was taken up from over the tabernacle, the people of Israel would go onward; [37] but if the cloud was not taken up, then they did not go onward till the day that it was taken up. [38] For throughout all their journeys the cloud of the LORD was upon the tabernacle by day, . . . (cf. Lev 9:4-6, 23)

Leviticus 16:2 and the LORD said to Moses, . . . “I will appear in the cloud upon the mercy seat.” [ark of the covenant]

Numbers 11:25 Then the LORD came down in the cloud and spoke to him . . .

Numbers 20:6-7 Then Moses and Aaron went from the presence of the assembly to the door of the tent of meeting, and fell on their faces. And the glory of the LORD appeared to them, [7] and the LORD said to Moses,

Deuteronomy 5:22 These words the LORD spoke to all your assembly at the mountain out of the midst of . . . the cloud, and the thick darkness, with a loud voice . . .

1 Kings 8:11 so that the priests could not stand to minister because of the cloud; for the glory of the LORD filled the house of the LORD. (cf. 2 Chr 5:14)

2 Chronicles 7:1-3 When Solomon had ended his prayer, fire came down from heaven and consumed the burnt offering and the sacrifices, and the glory of the LORD filled the temple. [2] And the priests could not enter the house of the LORD, because the glory of the LORD filled the LORD’s house. [3] When all the children of Israel saw the fire come down and the glory of the LORD upon the temple, they bowed down with their faces to the earth on the pavement, and worshiped and gave thanks to the LORD, saying, “For he is good, for his steadfast love endures for ever.”

Psalm 99:7 He spoke to them in the pillar of cloud . . . (cf. Neh 9:12,19)

Ezekiel 10:4, 18 And the glory of the LORD went up from the cherubim to the threshold of the house; and the house was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightness of the glory of the LORD. . . . Then the glory of the LORD went forth from the threshold of the house, and stood over the cherubim.

Yet Calvin would have us believe that it is implausible or unbiblical or impossible that God (after the Incarnation) could choose to be physically present in the consecrated elements? He simply cannot do so. It is a mere false tradition of men that would dogmatically assert such a thing without biblical justification. As I’ve just shown, the Bible has many indications of a local presence of God in physical things, even apart from the Incarnation.

Now that God has taken on human flesh, it is not implausible that He can also choose to be present under the appearances of bread and wine, just as He did in pillars of cloud and fire and burning bushes. Why should one thing be actual and the other allegedly not even plausible or possible? Jesus told us “this is My body.” He emphasizes this in very strong terms in the discourse of John 6. St. Paul reiterates it. Why does Calvin, then, doubt it?

Eucharistic presence is scarcely any essentially different than all these manifestations of His special presence. God was so present in the ark of the covenant, that Uzzah was killed instantly simply because he innocently touched it, to keep it from falling over (2 Sam 6:3-7; 1 Chr 13:7-10). Seventy men of Bethshemesh were slain because they (also seemingly innocently) looked into it (1 Sam 6:19).

God was so present in the Holy of Holies (Ex 26:33; 1 Kgs 6:19), that contained the ark of the covenant (Ex 26:34; 40:21; 1 Kgs 8:6; 2 Chr 5:7), that the priests only went in there once a year, on the Day of Atonement, and anyone who did on any other day, or not according to the proper ceremony, might be killed (Lev 16:2, 13). The River Jordan stopped flowing when the ark was carried through it (Josh 3:8-17; 4:1-18).
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Joshua even bowed before the ark of the covenant on his face in a worshipful posture (Josh 7:6), and Levite priests thanked and praised God before it (1 Chr 16:4), just as Catholics genuflect and bow before the Holy Eucharist, and adore the Lord therein. King David “offered burnt offerings and peace offerings before the LORD” next to the ark (2 Sam 6:17), which is a precursor of the Sacrifice of the Mass. King Solomon did the same (1 Kgs 3:15; 2 Chr 5:6), and so did the Levites (1 Chr 16:1). Catholic practices are essentially nothing that hadn’t been done nearly 3000 years ago. They are made far more meaningful, however, after the incarnation and crucifixion and resurrection of our Lord Jesus Christ.

But, whatever be the terms in which they attempt to make a gloss, the sum of all is, that that which was formerly bread, by consecration becomes Christ: so that Christ thereafter lies hid under the colour of bread. 

That’s correct; as the fathers taught.

This they are not ashamed distinctly to express. 

Why should we be, since Jesus and Paul did?

For Lombard’s words are, “The body of Christ, which is visible in itself, lurks and lies covered after the act of consecration under the species of bread” (Lombard. Sent. Lib. 4 Dist. 12). Thus the figure of the bread is nothing but a mask which conceals the view of the flesh from our eye. But there is no need of many conjectures to detect the snare which they intended to lay by these words, since the thing itself speaks clearly. It is easy to see how great is the superstition under which not only the vulgar but the leaders also, have laboured for many ages, and still labour, in Popish Churches. 

If Calvin wishes to condemn the entirety of patristic eucharistic theology (and the explicit biblical rationale behind it), he is free to do so, but this also means that he can’t pretend to be “reforming” the Church back to her former state in this regard, since there never was a time when the Church believed as he does regarding the Eucharist. He can’t have his cake and eat it too (no pun intended).

If he wants to oppose the massive, unarguable historical evidence of early Church beliefs on the Eucharist, then he can’t at the same time maintain a pretense of supposedly going back to it and getting rid of “Popish” accretions and corruptions and inventions. He should honestly admit that his is no reform at all, but a novel revolution of thought.
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Little solicitous as to true faith (by which alone we attain to the fellowship of Christ, and become one with him), provided they have his carnal presence, which they have fabricated without authority from the word, they think he is sufficiently present. Hence we see, that all which they have gained by their ingenious subtlety is to make bread to be regarded as God.

Calvin does the latter, as I alluded to above, since he makes the bread remain bread, yet wants to talk as if God is specially, mystically, spiritually present in it. So if anyone is confusing bread and God, it is Calvin. He is mixing the two in an odd, illogical manner. Lutherans, on the other hand, make it clear that both bread and God are present, and distinguish the two, while Catholics explicitly hold to a change in substance from bread to God.

Therefore, neither Lutherans nor Catholics “make bread to be regarded as God.” Calvin is doing that. We have plenty of biblical warrant. Calvin, however, has to change Scripture in order to believe as he does. Scripture isn’t clear enough as it is. So it needs to be changed. Here, then, is the Revised Calvin Version (RCV) of the classic eucharistic texts:

Luke 22:19-20 (RCV) And he took bread, and when he had given thanks he broke it and gave it to them, saying, “This is represents my body which is given for you, as a sign and seal. Do this in remembrance of me.” [20] And likewise the cup after supper, saying, “This cup which is poured out for you represents the new covenant in my blood, as a sign and seal.”

1 Corinthians 10:16 (RCV) The cup of blessing which we bless, does it not represent and signify in a spiritual manner the blood of Christ, that we mystically participate in? The bread which we break, does it not represent and signify in a spiritual manner the body of Christ, that we mystically participate in?

1 Corinthians 11:27-29 (RCV) Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of profaning what represents and signifies as a spiritual sign the body and blood of the Lord. [28] Let a man examine himself, and so eat of the bread and drink of the cup. [29] For any one who eats and drinks without discerning what represents and signifies as a spiritual sign the body eats and drinks judgment upon himself.

14. The fiction of transubstantiation why invented contrary to Scripture, and the consent of antiquity. The term of transubstantiation never used in the early Church. Objection. Answer.
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Hence proceeded that fictitious transubstantiation for which they fight more fiercely in the present day than for all the other articles of their faith. For the first architects of local presence could not explain, how the body of Christ could be mixed with the substance of bread, without forthwith meeting with many absurdities. Hence it was necessary to have recourse to the fiction, that there is a conversion of the bread into body, not that properly instead of bread it becomes body, but that Christ, in order to conceal himself under the figure, reduces the substance to nothing. 

Well, no; transubstantiation means literally, “change of substance,” so the view is that the substance changes from bread to the Body and Blood of Christ, not that it changes to “nothing.” This makes perfect sense, since Jesus said “this is My body” and referred to eating His flesh and drinking His blood in John 6. Calvin simply lacks faith that God can do this miracles. He wants to limit God and place His actions in arbitrary categories of his own making: certainly not from scriptural indications.

It is strange that they have fallen into such a degree of ignorance, nay, of stupor, as to produce this monstrous fiction not only against Scripture, but also against the consent of the ancient Church. I admit, indeed, that some of the ancients occasionally used the term conversion, not that they meant to do away with the substance in the external signs, but to teach that the bread devoted to the sacrament was widely different from ordinary bread, and was now something else. 

What else does “conversion” or “transformation” or “change” mean? This is just more word games from Calvin. He thinks that if he wishes long enough, that the fathers will magically agree with him, when in fact they do not at all. Calvin would have it that the consent of the ancient Church is on his side, with regard to this question. Nothing could be further from the truth. It’s wearisome to have to repeatedly point out historical facts over against Calvin. But I’m happy to set the record straight and reveal once again the surprisingly great weakness of Calvin’s historical arguments (as well as biblical ones).

All clearly and uniformly teach that the sacred Supper consists of two parts, an earthly and a heavenly. The earthly they without dispute interpret to be bread and wine. Certainly, whatever they may pretend, it is plain that antiquity, which they often dare to oppose to the clear word of God, gives no countenance to that dogma. It is not so long since it was devised; indeed, it was unknown not only to the better ages, in which a purer doctrine still flourished, but after that purity was considerably impaired. There is no early Christian writer who does not admit in distinct terms that the sacred symbols of the Supper are bread and wine, although, as has been said, they sometimes distinguish them by various epithets, in order to recommend the dignity of the mystery. 

This is sheer nonsense, and one can prove it by citing prominent Protestant historians of Christian doctrine. For example:

In general, this period, . . . was already very strongly inclined toward the doctrine of transubstantiation, and toward the Greek and Roman sacrifice of the mass, which are inseparable in so far as a real sacrifice requires the real presence of the victim…… (Philip Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. 3, A. D. 311-600, revised 5th edition, Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, reprinted 1974, originally 1910, p. 500)

Theodore [c.350-428] set forth the doctrine of the real presence, and even a theory of sacramental transformation of the elements, in highly explicit language . . . ‘At first it is laid upon the altar as a mere bread and wine mixed with water, but by the coming of the Holy Spirit it is transformed into body and blood, and thus it is changed into the power of a spiritual and immortal nourishment.’ [Hom. catech. 16,36] these and similar passages in Theodore are an indication that the twin ideas of the transformation of the eucharistic elements and the transformation of the communicant were so widely held and so firmly established in the thought and language of the church that everyone had to acknowledge them. (Jaroslav Pelikan, The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600), Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971, 236-237)

Since Calvin insists that the fathers agree with him, I will now document that they do not; that transubstantiation in kernel form (not yet fully developed, as in the case of all complex doctrines, such as the Holy Trinity and Christology, that develop over many centuries) was indeed taught by many fathers, just as historian Philip Schaff (no fan of the doctrine at all) verified:

St. Irenaeus

When, therefore, the mingled cup and the manufactured bread receives the Word of God, and the Eucharist of the blood and the body of Christ is made, from which things the substance of our flesh is increased and supported, how can they affirm that the flesh is incapable of receiving the gift of God, which is life eternal, which [flesh] is nourished from the body and blood of the Lord, and is a member of Him?—even as the blessed Paul declares in his Epistle to the Ephesians, that “we are members of His body, of His flesh, and of His bones.” He does not speak these words of some spiritual and invisible man, for a spirit has not bones nor flesh; but [he refers to] that dispensation [by which the Lord became] an actual man, consisting of flesh, and nerves, and bones,—that [flesh] which is nourished by the cup which is His blood, and receives increase from the bread which is His body. (Against Heresies, V, 2, 3; ANF, Vol. I)

Origen

You are accustomed to take part in the divine mysteries, so you know how, when you have received the Body of the Lord, you reverently exercise care lest a particle fall, and lest anything of the consecrated gift perish. . . . But if you observe such caution in keeping His Body, and properly so, how is it that you think neglecting the word of God a lesser crime than neglecting His Body? (Homilies on Exodus, 13, 3)

St. Cyprian

And therefore we ask that our bread—that is, Christ—may be given to us daily, that we who abide and live in Christ may not depart from His sanctification and body. (On the Lord’s Prayer / Treatise IV, 18; ANF, Vol. V)

St. Athanasius

You will see the Levites bringing loaves and a cup of wine, and placing them on the table. So long as the prayers and invocations have not yet been made, it is mere bread and a mere cup. But when the great and wondrous prayers have been recited, then the bread becomes the body and the cup the blood of our Lord Jesus Christ. . . . When the great prayers and holy supplications are sent up, the Word descends on the bread and the cup, and it becomes His body. (Sermon to the Newly-Baptized)

St. Cyril of Jerusalem

For as the Bread and Wine of the Eucharist before the invocation of the Holy and Adorable Trinity were simple bread and wine, while after the invocation the Bread becomes the Body of Christ, and the Wine the Blood of Christ . . . (Catechetical Lecture XIX, 7; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

Even of itself the teaching of the Blessed Paul is sufficient to give you a full assurance concerning those Divine Mysteries, of which having been deemed worthy, ye are become of the same body and blood with Christ . . . Since then He Himself declared and said of the Bread, This is My Body, who shall dare to doubt any longer? And since He has Himself affirmed and said, This is My Blood, who shall ever hesitate, saying, that it is not His blood? (Catechetical Lecture XXII, 1; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

Wherefore with full assurance let us partake as of the Body and Blood of Christ: for in the figure of Bread is given to thee His Body, and in the figure of Wine His Blood; that thou by partaking of the Body and Blood of Christ, mayest be made of the same body and the same blood with Him. For thus we come to bear Christ in us, because His Body and Blood are distributed through our members; thus it is that, according to the blessed Peter, we become partakers of the divine nature. (Catechetical Lecture XXII, 3; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

Consider therefore the Bread and the Wine not as bare elements, for they are, according to the Lord’s declaration, the Body and Blood of Christ; for even though sense suggests this to thee, yet let faith establish thee. Judge not the matter from the taste, but from faith be fully assured without misgiving, that the Body and Blood of Christ have been vouchsafed to thee. (Catechetical Lecture XXII, 6; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

Having learnt these things, and been fully assured that the seeming bread is not bread, though sensible to taste, but the Body of Christ; and that the seeming wine is not wine, though the taste will have it so, but the Blood of Christ . . . (Catechetical Lecture XXII, 9; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

Then having sanctified ourselves by these spiritual Hymns, we beseech the merciful God to send forth His Holy Spirit upon the gifts lying before Him; that He may make the Bread the Body of Christ, and the Wine the Blood of Christ; for whatsoever the Holy Ghost has touched, is surely sanctified and changed.

Then, after the spiritual sacrifice, the bloodless service, is completed, over that sacrifice of propitiation we entreat God for the common peace of the Churches, for the welfare of the world; for kings; for soldiers and allies; for the sick; for the afflicted; and, in a word, for all who stand in need of succour we all pray and offer this sacrifice. (Catechetical Lecture XXIII, 7-8; NPNF 2, Vol. VII)

St. Gregory of Nyssa

Rightly, then, do we believe that now also the bread which is consecrated by the Word of God is changed into the Body of God the Word. (The Great Catechism, chapter XXXVII; NPNF 2, Vol. IV)

The footnote in NPNF 2 for this passage states:

by the process of eating . . . If Krabinger’s text is here correct, Gregory distinctly teaches a transmutation of the elements very like the later transubstantiation: he also distinctly teaches that the words of consecration effect the change. There seems no reason to doubt that the text is correct.

St. Ambrose

. . . We observe, then, that grace has more power than nature, and yet so far we have only spoken of the grace of a prophet’s blessing. But if the blessing of man had such power as to change nature, what are we to say of that divine consecration where the very words of the Lord and Saviour operate? For that sacrament which you receive is made what it is by the word of Christ. But if the word of Elijah had such power as to bring down fire from heaven, shall not the word of Christ have power to change the nature of the elements? You read concerning the making of the whole world: “He spake and they were made, He commanded and they were created.” Shall not the word of Christ, which was able to make out of nothing that which was not, be able to change things which already are into what they were not? For it is not less to give a new nature to things than to change them.

But why make use of arguments? Let us use the examples He gives, and by the example of the Incarnation prove the truth of the mystery. Did the course of nature proceed as usual when the Lord Jesus was born of Mary? If we look to the usual course, a woman ordinarily conceives after connection with a man. And this body which we make is that which was born of the Virgin. Why do you seek the order of nature in the Body of Christ, seeing that the Lord Jesus Himself was born of a Virgin, not according to nature? It is the true Flesh of Christ which crucified and buried, this is then truly the Sacrament of His Body.

The Lord Jesus Himself proclaims: “This is My Body.” Before the blessing of the heavenly words another nature is spoken of, after the consecration the Body is signified. He Himself speaks of His Blood. Before the consecration it has another name, after it is called Blood. (On the Mysteries, Chapter IX, 50, 52-55; NPNF 2, Vol. X)

St. John Chrysostom

Christ is present. The One who prepared that [Holy Thursday] table is the very One who now prepares this [altar] table. For it is not a man who makes the sacrificial gifts become the Body and Blood of Christ, but He that was crucified for us, Christ Himself. The priest stands there carrying out the action, but the power and grace is of God. “This is My Body,” he says. This statement transforms the gifts. (Homilies on the Treachery of Judas, 1, 6)

St. Augustine

For not all bread, but only that which receives the blessing of Christ, becomes Christ’s body. (Sermons, 234, 2)

St. Cyril of Alexandria

He states demonstratively: “This is My Body,” and “This is My Blood“(Mt. 26:26-28) “lest you might suppose the things that are seen as a figure. Rather, by some secret of the all-powerful God the things seen are transformed into the Body and Blood of Christ, truly offered in a sacrifice in which we, as participants, receive the life-giving and sanctifying power of Christ. (Commentary on Matthew [Mt. 26:27] )

Moreover, the belief of these same Church fathers, en masse, in the Sacrifice of the Mass, and the adoration of the Body and Blood after consecration, attests to their realism, over against Calvin’s mere mystical symbolism. We shall examine that aspect in the near future, in reply to Calvin’s (absurd, anti-historical, anti-patristic) thoughts on the Mass.

For when they say that a secret conversion takes place at consecration, so that it is now something else than bread and wine, their meaning, as I already observed, is, not that these are annihilated, but that they are to be considered in a different light from common food, which is only intended to feed the body, whereas in the former the spiritual food and drink of the mind are exhibited. This we deny not. But, say our opponents, if there is conversion, one thing must become another. If they mean that something becomes different from what it was before, I assent. If they will wrest it in support of their fiction, let them tell me of what kind of change they are sensible in baptism. For here, also, the Fathers make out a wonderful conversion, when they say that out of the corruptible element is made the spiritual laver of the soul, and yet no one denies that it still remains water. 

This is true, but it is an invalid analogy, because no one is claiming in baptism that waters becomes something else: only that it acquires supernatural powers in conjunction with a baptismal formula. Jesus never said that baptismal water would become His Body and Blood, whereas He did say that with regard to what were formerly bread and wine. It’s an entirely different scenario, so there is no analogy. The information we have in Scripture regarding both cases is entirely different in kind.

But say they, there is no such expression in Baptism as that in the Supper, This is my body; as if we were treating of these words, which have a meaning sufficiently clear, and not rather of that term conversion, which ought not to mean more in the Supper than in Baptism. Have done, then, with those quibbles upon words, which betray nothing but their silliness. 

It’s not silly at all (but it is sophistry and desperate obfuscation to conclude that an obviously relevant point is “silliness”). Catholics are accepting at face value the actual words of Scripture and our Lord. Calvin is not. It’s really as simple and obvious as that. Calvin doesn’t have enough faith to believe our Lord’s words as He spoke them. He would rather hyper-analyze them and apply men’s traditions and non-biblical philosophies, so that he can change their meaning. We believe in faith that the bread and wine are transformed, but Calvin, lacking faith, believes in transforming the clear import and meaning of Jesus’ words: reading into them what clearly isn’t there.

The meaning would have no congruity, unless the truth which is there figured had a living image in the external sign. Christ wished to testify by an external symbol that his flesh was food. 

That’s not what He said! That is Calvin eisegetically reading into what He said. Jesus said “this is my body” not “this represents my Body as a sign and symbol.” St. Paul casually assumed the same eucharistic realism, and even said that those approaching the Eucharist unworthily were guilty of profaning Jesus’ Body and Blood (1 Cor 11:27-30): something that makes no sense whatever if only symbols are present.

If he exhibited merely an empty show of bread, and not true bread, where is the analogy or similitude to conduct us from the visible thing to the invisible? For, in order to make all things consistent, the meaning cannot extend to more than this, that we are fed by the species of Christ’s flesh; just as, in the case of baptism, if the figure of water deceived the eye, it would not be to us a sure pledge of our ablution; nay, the fallacious spectacle would rather throw us into doubt. The nature of the sacrament is therefore overthrown, if in the mode of signifying the earthly sign corresponds not to the heavenly reality; and, accordingly, the truth of the mystery is lost if true bread does not represent the true body of Christ.

No; Calvin just doesn’t go deep enough in his understanding. In the Holy Eucharist Jesus gives us Himself, not just signs and figures of Himself. That is the beauty and profundity of it. It extends the incarnation, just as the various extraordinary manifestations of God’s spiritual presence extended the notion of omnipresence. When God was known as a spirit only, He was specially present spiritually and immaterially, yet directly connected with physical objects, as in the ark of the covenant, or fire, or clouds.

Even then He manifested Himself physically on occasion (as in theophanies). Now, after the incarnation and Sacrifice of the Lamb, and the resurrection, He makes Himself present physically as well, in a miraculous way. Why this should be scandalous to anyone is a bigger mystery than transubstantiation itself. Jesus is our paschal lamb. The lamb was eaten at every Passover. If Calvin wants to talk analogies, the Eucharist shouldn’t be compared to baptism, but to the Passover meal, which is what the Last Supper was.

But Calvin would have it that the Jews ate Lamb, while Christians eat merely “special” bread and wine, representing Jesus’ Body and Blood. This nullifies the entire analogy of the Sacrificial Lamb now being Christ Himself, and forsakes the typical Jewish realism and literalism, substituting for it a Greek abstraction and disembodied ethereal spiritualism. That’s a step backward, not forward.

I again repeat, since the Supper is nothing but a conspicuous attestation to the promise which is contained in the sixth chapter of John—viz. that Christ is the bread of life, who came down from heaven, that visible bread must intervene, in order that that spiritual bread may be figured, unless we would destroy all the benefits with which God here favours us for the purpose of sustaining our infirmity. Then on what ground could Paul infer that we are all one bread, and one body in partaking together of that one bread, if only the semblance of bread, and not the natural reality, remained?

He does so on the grounds that we really receive Jesus. He becomes part of us and we become part of Him, in the eucharistic mystery and miracle, and in line with 2 Peter 1:3-4 and the biblical notion of theosis, or divinization. We are the Body of Christ, which is equated with Jesus own body in a large sense. We don’t deny that there is also a figure of bread and wine involved (just as St. Augustine taught), and Paul still uses that language. But he means it quite literally, whereas Calvin spiritualizes everything away. We don’t deny the symbolism, but Calvin denies the reality. He is (as usual) “either/or”; we are “both/and.”

15. The error of transubstantiation favoured by the consecration, which was a kind of magical incantation. The bread is not a sacrament to itself, but to those who receive it. The changing of the rod of Moses into a serpent gives no countenance to Popish transubstantiation. No resemblance between it and the words of institution in the Supper. Objection. Answer.
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They could not have been so shamefully deluded by the impostures of Satan had they not been fascinated by the erroneous idea, that the body of Christ included under the bread is transmitted by the bodily mouth into the belly. The cause of this brutish imagination was, that consecration had the same effect with them as magical incantation. 

“Magic” is something that Calvin has derisively superimposed onto Catholic doctrine. It is not magic by men’s will and power, but mystery and miracle by God’s will and power. He is the one who set up Holy Communion, at the Last Supper, and in the John 6 discourse. All we’re doing is being obedient, in doing what He commanded us to do, and eating His Body and Blood, as He said we should do in order to be saved (John 6). Calvin is foolish enough to apply to Catholics what the pagan Romans applied to all Christians: a notion that Holy Communion was a crude cannibalism. He’d rather think like a pagan than like apostolic Christians (like St. Paul).

They overlooked the principle, that bread is a sacrament to none but those to whom the word is addressed, just as the water of baptism is not changed in itself, but begins to be to us what it formerly was not, as soon as the promise is annexed. 

Baptism exercises its power due to faith and the trinitarian baptismal formula pronounced over it. Likewise, transubstantiation occurs when the priest, exercising faith with the congregants, pronounces for formula of consecration over the bread and wine. Change occurs in both instances, though in a different fashion: baptism causes a regeneration in the baptized (which Calvin denies). The words of consecration cause transubstantiation, and the bread and wine become the Body and Blood (which Calvin denies), just as they did at the Last Supper. Calvin compares the wrong things to each other, and so misses the common elements between both sacraments. Matter conveys grace in both instances.

This will better appear from the example of a similar sacrament. The water gushing from the rock in the desert was to the Israelites a badge and sign of the same thing that is figured to us in the Supper by wine. 

Where does Scripture say that? Nowhere, of course . . .

For Paul declares that they drank the same spiritual drink (1 Cor. 10:4). But the water was common to the herds and flocks of the people. Hence it is easy to infer, that in the earthly elements, when employed for a spiritual use, no other conversion takes place than in respect of men, inasmuch as they are to them seals of promises. 

Again, this ignores the very words of Christ, which are conclusive in determining the very nature of the sacrament. Calvin makes an improper analogy once again, presumably in desperation, since he keeps skirting around the central issue of Jesus’ own words.

Moreover, since it is the purpose of God, as I have repeatedly inculcated, to raise us up to himself by fit vehicles, those who indeed call us to Christ, but to Christ lurking invisibly under bread, impiously, by their perverseness, defeat this object. For it is impossible for the mind of man to disentangle itself from the immensity of space, and ascend to Christ even above the heavens. 

Yes, of course, it is impossible for us under our own power, but that is again beside the point: it is God Who chooses to descend and condescend to us in the Holy Eucharist. Calvin’s “anti-eucharistic realism” arguments are becoming increasingly irrelevant and desperate.

What nature denied them, they attempted to gain by a noxious remedy. 

One proposed by Jesus Christ and verified by St. Paul . . . if that is “noxious,” may we all be filled with it! I’d rather be “noxious” in faith than obnoxious out of lack of faith and pagan-derived skepticism.

Remaining on the earth, they felt no need of a celestial proximity to Christ. Such was the necessity which impelled them to transfigure the body of Christ. In the age of Bernard, though a harsher mode of speech had prevailed, transubstantiation was not yet recognised. And in all previous ages, the similitude in the mouths of all was, that a spiritual reality was conjoined with bread and wine in this sacrament. 

The patristic evidence presented above amply refutes this characterization.

As to the terms, they think they answer acutely, though they adduce nothing relevant to the case in hand. The rod of Moses (they say), when turned into a serpent, though it acquires the name of a serpent, still retains its former name, and is called a rod; and thus, according to them, it is equally probable that though the bread passes into a new substance, it is still called by catachresis, and not inaptly, what it still appears to the eye to be. But what resemblance, real or apparent, do they find between an illustrious miracle and their fictitious illusion, of which no eye on the earth is witness? The magi by their impostures had persuaded the Egyptians, that they had a divine power above the ordinary course of nature to change created beings. Moses comes forth, and after exposing their fallacies, shows that the invincible power of God is on his side, since his rod swallows up all the other rods. But as that conversion was visible to the eye, we have already observed, that it has no reference to the case in hand. Shortly after the rod visibly resumed its form. 

Here Calvin seems to imply that what is not visible to the eye is therefore questionable and unworthy of belief due to that factor alone. And that betrays his undue skepticism and lack of faith in the miracles of God. I wrote in my Jan/Feb 2000 cover story in Envoy Magazine about the Eucharist, in opposing Zwingli’s symbolism, which is not far from Calvin’s view:

The Eucharist was intended by God as a different kind of miracle from the outset, requiring more profound faith, as opposed to the “proof” of tangible, empirical miracles. But in this it was certainly not unique among Christian doctrines and traditional beliefs – many fully shared by our Protestant brethren. The Virgin Birth, for example, cannot be observed or proven, and is the utter opposite of a demonstrable miracle, yet it is indeed a miracle of the most extraordinary sort. Likewise, in the Atonement of Jesus the world sees a wretch of a beaten and tortured man being put to death on a cross. The Christian, on the other hand, sees there the great miracle of Redemption and the means of the salvation of mankind – an unspeakably sublime miracle, yet who but those with the eyes of faith can see or believe it? In fact, the disciples (with the possible exception of St. John, the only one present) didn’t even know what was happening at the time.

Baptism, according to most Christians, imparts real grace of some sort to those who receive it. But this is rarely evident or tangible, especially in infants. Lastly, the Incarnation itself was not able to be perceived as an outward miracle, though it might be considered the most incredible miracle ever. Jesus appeared as a man like any other man. He ate, drank, slept, had to wash, experienced emotion, suffered, etc. He performed miracles and foretold the future, and ultimately raised Himself from the dead, and ascended into heaven in full view, but the Incarnation – strictly viewed in and of itself -, was not visible or manifest in the tangible, concrete way to which Herr Zwingli seems to foolishly think God would or must restrict Himself.

To summarize, Jesus looked, felt, and sounded like a man; no one but those possessing faith would know (from simply observing Him) that He was also God, an uncreated Person who had made everything upon which He stood, who was the Sovereign and Judge of every man with whom He came in contact (and also of those He never met). Therefore, Zwingli’s argument proves too much and must be rejected. If the Eucharist is abolished by this supposed “biblical reasoning,” then the Incarnation (and by implication, the Trinity) must be discarded along with it. . . .

The fact remains that God clearly can perform any miracle He so chooses. Many Christian beliefs require a great deal of faith, even relatively “blind” faith. Protestants manage to believe in a number of such doctrines (such as the Trinity, God’s eternal existence, omnipotence, angels, the power of prayer, instantaneous justification, the Second Coming, etc.). Why should the Real Presence be singled out for excessive skepticism and unchecked rationalism? I contend that it is due to a preconceived bias against both sacramentalism and matter as a conveyor of grace, which hearkens back to the heresies of Docetism and even Gnosticism, which looked down upon matter, and regarded spirit as inherently superior to matter (following Greek philosophy, particularly Platonism).

It may be added, that we know not whether this was an extemporary conversion of substance. For we must attend to the illusion to the rods of the magicians, which the prophet did not choose to term serpents, lest he might seem to insinuate a conversion which had no existence, because those impostors had done nothing more than blind the eyes of the spectators. But what resemblance is there between that expression and the following? “The bread which we break;”—“As often as ye eat this bread;”—“They communicated in the breaking of bread;” and so forth. 

That was phenomenological language; in other words, referring to what looked outwardly like bread. In the same context that Paul said these things, he also described the Eucharist as “a participation in the Body of Christ” (1 Cor 10:16) and said that “Whoever, therefore, eats the bread or drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of profaning the body and blood of the Lord” (1 Cor 11:27).

Calvin wants to present the phenomenological language alone because that seems to bolster his case, while omitting the realist language that goes along with it in each case. That won’t do; it is ultimately dishonest and deceptive argumentation: not fair to those of his readers who seek biblical truth.

It is certain that the eye only was deceived by the incantation of the magicians. The matter is more doubtful with regard to Moses, by whose hand it was not more difficult for God to make a serpent out of a rod, and again to make a rod out of a serpent, than to clothe angels with corporeal bodies, and a little after unclothe them. If the case of the sacrament were at all akin to this, there might be some colour for their explanation. 

I don’t make this argument myself, and don’t know how prominent it was. Calvin is not known for fair presentation of opposing views, so we can’t tell for sure how widespread such an argument was.

Let it, therefore, remain fixed that there is no true and fit promise in the Supper, that the flesh of Christ is truly meat, unless there is a correspondence in the true substance of the external symbol. 

And where is such a thing ever stated in Scripture, or even implied?

But as one error gives rise to another, a passage in Jeremiah has been so absurdly wrested, to prove transubstantiation, that it is painful to refer to it. The prophet complains that wood was placed in his bread, intimating that by the cruelty of his enemies his bread was infected with bitterness, as David by a similar figure complains, “They gave me also gall for my meat: and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink” (Psalm 69:21). These men would allegorise the expression to mean, that the body of Christ was nailed to the wood of the cross. But some of the Fathers thought so! As if we ought not rather to pardon their ignorance and bury the disgrace, than to add impudence, and bring them into hostile conflict with the genuine meaning of the prophet.

Nor have I ever made this argument myself, and I don’t know how prominent it was, either, so I’ll pass over it. I’m much more interested in Calvin’s positive arguments for his view, not his mocking of opposing views that were made by who knows how many people. I’ve brought plenty of Bible to the table in my own defense of Catholic views: most of which seem to be unknown or ignored by Calvin.

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(originally 24-25 November 2009)

Photo credit: Historical mixed media figure of John Calvin produced by artist/historian George S. Stuart and photographed by Peter d’Aprix: from the George S. Stuart Gallery of Historical Figures archive [Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license]

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2019-01-30T16:18:45-04:00

This is an installment of a series of replies (see the Introduction and Master List) to much of Book IV (Of the Holy Catholic Church) of Institutes of the Christian Religion, by early Protestant leader John Calvin (1509-1564). I utilize the public domain translation of Henry Beveridge, dated 1845, from the 1559 edition in Latin; available online. Calvin’s words will be in blue. All biblical citations (in my portions) will be from RSV unless otherwise noted.

Related reading from yours truly:

Biblical Catholic Answers for John Calvin (2010 book: 388 pages)

A Biblical Critique of Calvinism (2012 book: 178 pages)

Biblical Catholic Salvation: “Faith Working Through Love” (2010 book: 187 pages; includes biblical critiques of all five points of “TULIP”)

*****

IV, 14:16-26

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Book IV

CHAPTER 14

OF THE SACRAMENTS.
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16. Previous views more fully explained.
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If this is obscure from brevity, I will explain it more at length. 

Brevity is preferred where error is concerned, not only for the patience of the reader, but also for the spiritual sake of the writer . . .

I say that Christ is the matter, or, if you rather choose it, the substance of all the sacraments, since in him they have their whole solidity, and out of him promise nothing. 

How ironic that Calvin states this, while at the same time denying that Christ is present Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity (i.e., physically and substantially) in the Holy Eucharist.

Hence the less toleration is due to the error of Peter Lombard, who distinctly makes them causes of the righteousness and salvation of which they are parts (Sent. Lib. 4 Dist. 1). Bidding adieu to all other causes of righteousness which the wit of man devises, our duty is to hold by this only. In so far, therefore, as we are assisted by their instrumentality in cherishing, confirming, and increasing the true knowledge of Christ, so as both to possess him more fully, and enjoy him in all his richness, so far are they effectual in regard to us. This is the case when that which is there offered is received by us in true faith. Therefore, you will ask, Do the wicked, by their ingratitude, make the ordinance of God fruitless and void? I answer, that what I have said is not to be understood as if the power and truth of the sacrament depended on the condition or pleasure of him who receives it. 

To a large extent, this (particularly the final sentence) is in agreement with the Catholic position, as explicated in the previous several sections. Other errors here are very subtle, and so we’ll let them pass for the moment. A Catholic feels a bit like a mosquito on a nude beach when dealing with Calvin: the errors (like flesh in the analogy) are so all-pervasive and multitudinous, one scarcely knows where to go — what to refute — first.

That which God instituted continues firm, and retains its nature, however men may vary; but since it is one thing to offer, and another to receive, there is nothing to prevent a symbol, consecrated by the word of the Lord, from being truly what it is said to be, and preserving its power, though it may at the same time confer no benefit on the wicked and ungodly. 

Again, we see significant resemblance to ex opere operato, though Calvin strongly rejects the latter. It is probably the case, once again, that Calvin is rejecting (at least partially) a straw man, so that he fails to see the similarities.

This question is well solved by Augustine in a few words: “If you receive carnally, it ceases not to be spiritual, but it is not spiritual to you” (August. Hom. in Joann. 26). But as Augustine shows in the above passages that a sacrament is a thing of no value if separated from its truth; so also, when the two are conjoined, he reminds us that it is necessary to distinguish, in order that we may not cleave too much to the external sign. “As it is servile weakness to follow the latter, and take the signs for the thing signified, so to interpret the signs as of no use is an extravagant error” (August. de Doct. Christ. Lib. 3 c. 9). He mentions two faults which are here to be avoided; the one when we receive the signs as if they had been given in vain, and by malignantly destroying or impairing their secret meanings, prevent them from yielding any fruit—the other, when by not raising our minds beyond the visible sign, we attribute to it blessings which are conferred upon us by Christ alone, and that by means of the Holy Spirit, who makes us to be partakers of Christ, external signs assisting if they invite us to Christ; whereas, when wrested to any other purpose, their whole utility is overthrown.

As always, when reading St. Augustine the Neo-Platonist talking about signs, we need to understand that it is not in such a fashion as to exclude the physical presence in the Holy Eucharist of the Body and Blood of Christ. In other words, the terminology of sign is not antithetical to literalness and physicality.

17. The matter of the sacrament always present when the sacrament is duly administered.
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Wherefore, let it be a fixed point, that the office of the sacraments differs not from the word of God; and this is to hold forth and offer Christ to us, and, in him, the treasures of heavenly grace. They confer nothing, and avail nothing, if not received in faith, just as wine and oil, or any other liquor, however large the quantity which you pour out, will run away and perish unless there be an open vessel to receive it. 

In some sense, then, Calvin agrees that grace is conveyed. But in other places he seems to deny this; so there is a certain internal tension and contradiction in his sacramentology that is often observed.

When the vessel is not open, though it may be sprinkled all over, it will nevertheless remain entirely empty. We must be aware of being led into a kindred error by the terms, somewhat too extravagant, which ancient Christian writers have employed in extolling the dignity of the sacraments. 

In English, he is saying, “the fathers were wrong en masse; the Catholic Church of the centuries is wrong, and I am right.” When we realize exactly what Calvin’s departures from precedent entail, it sounds rather silly and arrogant, in roughly equal measure.

We must not suppose that there is some latent virtue inherent in the sacraments by which they, in themselves, confer the gifts of the Holy Spirit upon us, in the same way in which wine is drunk out of a cup, since the only office divinely assigned them is to attest and ratify the benevolence of the Lord towards us; and they avail no farther than accompanied by the Holy Spirit to open our minds and hearts, and make us capable of receiving this testimony, in which various distinguished graces are clearly manifested. For the sacraments, as we lately observed (chap. 13 sec. 6; and 14 sec. 6, 7), are to us what messengers of good news are to men, or earnests in ratifying pactions. They do not of themselves bestow any grace, 

Here we have the other strain of Calvin’s thought, which is “anti-sacramental” from a Catholic perspective, insofar as he denies ex opere operato and the bestowal of grace. He takes the aspect of the individual disposition too far.

but they announce and manifest it, and, like earnests and badges, give a ratification of the gifts which the divine liberality has bestowed upon us. The Holy Spirit, whom the sacraments do not bring promiscuously to all, but whom the Lord specially confers on his people, brings the gifts of God along with him, makes way for the sacraments, and causes them to bear fruit. But though we deny not that God, by the immediate agency of his Spirit, countenances his own ordinance, preventing the administration of the sacraments which he has instituted from being fruitless and vain, still we maintain that the internal grace of the Spirit, as it is distinct from the external ministration, ought to be viewed and considered separately. God, therefore, truly performs whatever he promises and figures by signs; nor are the signs without effect, for they prove that he is their true and faithful author. The only question here is, whether the Lord works by proper and intrinsic virtue (as it is called), or resigns his office to external symbols? We maintain, that whatever organs he employs detract nothing from his primary operation. In this doctrine of the sacraments, their dignity is highly extolled, their use plainly shown, their utility sufficiently proclaimed, and moderation in all things duly maintained; so that nothing is attributed to them which ought not to be attributed, and nothing denied them which they ought to possess. Meanwhile, we get rid of that fiction by which the cause of justification and the power of the Holy Spirit are included in elements as vessels and vehicles, 

In other words, he is denying intrinsic sacramental grace and ex opere operato . . .

and the special power which was overlooked is distinctly explained. Here, also, we ought to observe, that what the minister figures and attests by outward action, God performs inwardly, lest that which God claims for himself alone should be ascribed to mortal man. 

The men are merely instruments of God’s grace, as Catholics understand perfectly well. But Calvin’s either/or mentality and anti-sacerdotalism has to inevitably set the instrument (man) over against the Ultimate Cause and Source (God).

This Augustine is careful to observe: “How does both God and Moses sanctify? Not Moses for God, but Moses by visible sacraments through his ministry, God by invisible grace through the Holy Spirit. Herein is the whole fruit of visible sacraments; for what do these visible sacraments avail without that sanctification of invisible grace? ”

And now Calvin sounds traditional again (back and forth; back and forth). The end result of his heretical novelties is anti-traditional, for the most part. The aspects of Calvin’s thought that are essentially anti-Catholic tend to prevail in the long run in his followers. This is almost sociologically inevitable when one group deliberately, consciously sets itself against another, as an antithesis. The elements that are most different and innovative become more and more prominent as time goes by, whereas traditional elements become less and less prominent or emphasized.

18. Extensive meaning of the term sacrament.
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The term sacrament, in the view we have hitherto taken of it, includes, generally, all the signs which God ever commanded men to use, that he might make them sure and confident of the truth of his promises. 

. . . whereas for Catholics, they are seven in number. Sacramentals extend the concept further, though they essentially depend on internal disposition, whereas sacraments have an intrinsic power from God.

These he was pleased sometimes to place in natural objects—sometimes to exhibit in miracles. Of the former class we have an example, in his giving the tree of life to Adam and Eve, as an earnest of immortality, that they might feel confident of the promise as often as they ate of the fruit. Another example was, when he gave the bow in the cloud to Noah and his posterity, as a memorial that he would not again destroy the earth by a flood. These were to Adam and Noah as sacraments: not that the tree could give Adam and Eve the immortality which it could not give to itself; or the bow (which is only a reflection of the solar rays on the opposite clouds) could have the effect of confining the waters; but they had a mark engraven on them by the word of God, to be proofs and seals of his covenant. The tree was previously a tree, and the bow a bow; but when they were inscribed with the word of God, a new form was given to them: they began to be what they previously were not. Lest any one suppose that these things were said in vain, the bow is even in the present day a witness to us of the covenant which God made with Noah (Calv. in Gen. 9:6). As often as we look upon it, we read this promise from God, that the earth will never be destroyed by a flood. Wherefore, if any philosophaster, to deride the simplicity of our faith, shall contend that the variety of colours arises naturally from the rays reflected by the opposite cloud, let us admit the fact; but, at the same time, deride his stupidity in not recognising God as the Lord and governor of nature, who, at his pleasure, makes all the elements subservient to his glory. If he had impressed memorials of this description on the sun, the stars, the earth, and stones, they would all have been to us as sacraments. For why is the shapeless and the coined silver not of the same value, seeing they are the same metal? Just because the former has nothing but its own nature, whereas the latter, impressed with the public stamp, becomes money, and receives a new value. And shall the Lord not be able to stamp his creatures with his word, that things which were formerly bare elements may become sacraments? Examples of the second class were given when he showed light to Abraham in the smoking furnace (Gen. 15:17), when he covered the fleece with dew while the ground was dry; and, on the other hand, when the dew covered the ground while the fleece was untouched, to assure Gideon of victory (Judges 6:37); also, when he made the shadow go back ten degrees on the dial, to assure Hezekiah of his recovery (2 Kings 20:9; Isa. 38:7). These things, which were done to assist and establish their faith, were also sacraments.

Note how St. Peter draws a deliberate analogy from the physically saving of Noah and his family “by water” and the spiritual saving (regeneration) of the baptized:

1 Peter 3:20-21 who formerly did not obey, when God’s patience waited in the days of Noah, during the building of the ark, in which a few, that is, eight persons, were saved through water. [21] Baptism, which corresponds to this, now saves you, not as a removal of dirt from the body but as an appeal to God for a clear conscience, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ,

This is how the Old Testament word pictures and events are often portrayed in the New Testament: they illustrated physical salvation or deliverance (such as being saved from a fire or flood or battlefield), whereas the New Covenant emphasizes spiritual salvation and eternal life: and in this case, by the direct instrumentality of the sacrament.

19. The ordinary sacraments in the Church. How necessary they are.
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But my present purpose is to discourse especially of those sacraments which the Lord has been pleased to institute as ordinary sacraments in his Church, to bring up his worshippers and servants in one faith, and the confession of one faith. For, to use the words of Augustine, “In no name of religion, true or false, can men be assembled, unless united by some common use of visible signs or sacraments” (August. cont. Faustum, Lib. 9 c. 11). Our most merciful Father, foreseeing this necessity, from the very first appointed certain exercises of piety to his servants; these, Satan, by afterwards transferring to impious and superstitious worship, in many ways corrupted and depraved. Hence those initiations of the Gentiles into their mysteries, and other degenerate rites. Yet, although they were full of error and superstition, they were, at the same time, an indication that men could not be without such external signs of religion. But, as they were neither founded on the word of God, nor bore reference to that truth which ought to be held forth by all signs, they are unworthy of being named when mention is made of the sacred symbols which were instituted by God, and have not been perverted from their end—viz. to be helps to true piety. 

Calvin assumes (as usual) that this essential corruption has happened, without making any sort of argument to prove that it has indeed occurred. Note that he doesn’t even seem to allow for the possibility of reform of the five Catholic sacraments besides baptism and the Eucharist. He simply assumes they are hopeless and ditches them. Needless to say, this is outrageous and unjustifiable. Even the two sacraments he retains are gutted of much of their power, by the denial of baptismal regeneration and transubstantiation.

And they consist not of simple signs, like the rainbow and the tree of life, but of ceremonies, or (if you prefer it) the signs here employed are ceremonies. 

Who says ceremonies (arbitrarily pitted against “simple signs”) are a bad thing? This is assumed and not proven. Christianity is not a kindergarten religion, such that no one but the simple-minded can comprehend it, and that by means of “simple signs” — as if ceremony and ritual are to be feared and disdained.

But since, as has been said above, they are testimonies of grace and salvation from the Lord, 

Calvin keeps up this droning theme of sacraments as signs or “testimonies” of things already accomplished rather than instruments of these same things. If that were the case, then how can the following passages be squared with his “signs” approach, since the sacrament is specifically said to be the cause of the thing (i.e., salvation and/or remission of sins), not a mere sign of the thing already present?:

Mark 16:16 He who believes and is baptized will be saved . . . [disputed biblical manuscript, but still indicative of apostolic belief]

John 6:50-51 This is the bread which comes down from heaven, that a man may eat of it and not die. [51] I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any one eats of this bread, he will live for ever; and the bread which I shall give for the life of the world is my flesh.”

John 6:53-58 So Jesus said to them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you have no life in you; [54] he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him up at the last day. [55] For my flesh is food indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. [56] He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood abides in me, and I in him. [57] As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so he who eats me will live because of me. [58] This is the bread which came down from heaven, not such as the fathers ate and died; he who eats this bread will live for ever.”

Acts 2:38, 40 And Peter said to them, “Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins; and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit. . . . [40] And he testified with many other words and exhorted them, saying, “Save yourselves from this crooked generation.”

Acts 22:16 And now why do you wait? Rise and be baptized, and wash away your sins, calling on his name.’

Romans 6:4 We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too might walk in newness of life.

Galatians 3:27 For as many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ.

Titus 3:5 he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in righteousness, but in virtue of his own mercy, by the washing of regeneration and renewal in the Holy Spirit,

1 Peter 3:21 Baptism, which corresponds to this, now saves you, not as a removal of dirt from the body but as an appeal to God for a clear conscience, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ,

Now, since Holy Scripture is not enough for Calvin, and not agreeable to his taste and preferences in the matter of sacraments, we must modify it (Thomas Jefferson-style) in order to be consistent with his theology. Fortunately, we have the Revised Calvin Version (RCV) of the Bible for this purpose:

Mark 16:16 (RCV) He who believes and is baptized shows that he is already saved . . . [disputed biblical manuscript, but still indicative of apostolic belief]

John 6:50-51 (RCV) This is the bread which comes down from heaven, that a man may eat of it and signify that he is already in a state in which he would not die. [51] I am the living bread which came down from heaven; if any one eats of this bread, he proves that that he is already in a state in which he will live for ever; and the bread which I shall give for the life of the world is my flesh.”

John 6:53-58 (RCV) So Jesus said to them, “Truly, truly, I say to you, unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man and drink his blood, you can’t give testimony that you already have life in you; [54] he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood shows that he already had eternal life, and that I was already going to raise him up at the last day. [55] For my flesh is food indeed, and my blood is drink indeed. [56] He who eats my flesh and drinks my blood signifies that he already had been abiding in me, and I in him. [57] As the living Father sent me, and I live because of the Father, so he who eats me was already living because of me. [58] This is the bread which came down from heaven, not such as the fathers ate and died; he who eats this bread gives testimony that he already was living for ever.”

Acts 2:38, 40 (RCV) And Peter said to them, “Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, in order to show forth a seal of the already existing forgiveness of your sins; and your prior gift of the Holy Spirit. . . . [40] And he testified with many other words and exhorted them, saying, “Give sign and testimony by baptism that you have already saved yourselves from this crooked generation.”

Acts 22:16 (RCV) And now why do you wait? Rise and be baptized, and show that you have already washed away your sins, calling on his name.’

Romans 6:4 (RCV) We were buried therefore with him by baptism into death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, we too signify that we already walk in newness of life, which is why we are being baptized.

Galatians 3:27 (RCV) For as many of you as were baptized into Christ as a seal to prove that you put on Christ before you were baptized.

Titus 3:5 (RCV) he saved us, not because of deeds done by us in righteousness, but in virtue of his own mercy, and not by the washing of regeneration, but by the renewal in the Holy Spirit,

1 Peter 3:21 (RCV) Baptism, which corresponds to this, now proves that you are already saved, not as a removal of dirt from the body but as a seal and an appeal to God for a clear conscience, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ,

so, in regard to us, they are marks of profession by which we openly swear by the name of God, binding ourselves to be faithful to him. 

As the RCV above amply proves . . .

Hence Chrysostom somewhere shrewdly gives them the name of pactions, by which God enters into covenant with us, and we become bound to holiness and purity of life, because a mutual stipulation is here interposed between God and us. For as God there promises to cover and efface any guilt and penalty which we may have incurred by transgression, and reconciles us to himself in his only begotten Son, so we, in our turn, oblige ourselves by this profession to the study of piety and righteousness. And hence it may be justly said, that such sacraments are ceremonies, by which God is pleased to train his people, first, to excite, cherish, and strengthen faith within; and, secondly, to testify our religion to men.

That’s not what the Bible teaches (at least not in the versions other than RCV), but that doesn’t seem to trouble Calvin in the slightest.

20. The sacraments of the Old and of the New Testament. The end of both the same —viz. to lead us to Christ.
*
Now these have been different at different times, according to the dispensation which the Lord has seen meet to employ in manifesting himself to men. Circumcision was enjoined on Abraham and his posterity, and to it were afterwards added purifications and sacrifices, and other rites of the Mosaic Law. These were the sacraments of the Jews even until the advent of Christ. After these were abrogated, the two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, which the Christian Church now employs, were instituted. 

Calvin ignores the other five sacraments. In this he largely follows the thought of John Wycliffe, though the latter’s thinking was somewhat less radical.

I speak of those which were instituted for the use of the whole Church. For the laying on of hands, by which the ministers of the Church are initiated into their office, though I have no objection to its being called a sacrament, I do not number among ordinary sacraments. 

So ordination is possibly a sacrament, but not an ordinary one. Huh?

The place to be assigned to the other commonly reputed sacraments we shall see by-and-by. 

Note that they are common and Calvin’s derogatory language of “reputed” as if the case were cut-and-dried.

Still the ancient sacraments had the same end in view as our own

Interesting juxtaposition of “ancient” practice vs. Calvin’s . . .

—viz. to direct and almost lead us by the hand to Christ, or rather, were like images to represent him and hold him forth to our knowledge. But as we have already shown that sacraments are a kind of seals of the promises of God, 

The RCV (unlike every other Bible version) makes that very clear . . .

so let us hold it as a most certain truth, that no divine promise has ever been offered to man except in Christ, and that hence when they remind us of any divine promise, they must of necessity exhibit Christ. Hence that heavenly pattern of the tabernacle and legal worship which was shown to Moses in the mount. There is only this difference, that while the former shadowed forth a promised Christ while he was still expected, the latter bear testimony to him as already come and manifested.

And sacraments give grace as well.

21. This apparent in the sacraments of the Old Testament.
*
When these things are explained singly and separately, they will be much clearer. Circumcision was a sign by which the Jews were reminded that whatever comes of the seed of man—in other words, the whole nature of man—is corrupt, and requires to be cut off; moreover, it was a proof and memorial to confirm them in the promise made to Abraham, of a seed in whom all the nations of the earth should be blessed, and from whom they themselves were to look for a blessing. That saving seed, as we are taught by Paul (Gal. 5:16), was Christ, in whom alone they trusted to recover what they had lost in Adam. Wherefore circumcision was to them what Paul says it was to Abraham—viz. a sign of the righteousness of faith (Rom. 9:11):—viz. a seal by which they were more certainly assured that their faith in waiting for the Lord would be accepted by God for righteousness. But we shall have a better opportunity elsewhere (chap. 16 sec. 3, 4) of following out the comparison between circumcision and baptism. 

There is indeed a biblical parallel drawn by St. Paul between circumcision and baptism, but Calvin takes it too far if he consigns baptism to being only a sign of accomplished election or salvation.

Their washings and purifications placed under their eye the uncleanness, defilement, and pollution with which they were naturally contaminated, and promised another laver in which all their impurities might be wiped and washed away. This laver was Christ, washed by whose blood we bring his purity into the sight of God, that he may cover all our defilements. The sacrifices convicted them of their unrighteousness, and at the same time taught that there was a necessity for paying some satisfaction to the justice of God; and that, therefore, there must be some high priest, some mediator between God and man, to satisfy God by the shedding of blood, and the immolation of a victim which might suffice for the remission of sins. The high priest was Christ: he shed his own blood, he was himself the victim: for in obedience to the Father, he offered himself to death, and by this obedience abolished the disobedience by which man had provoked the indignation of God (Phil. 2:8; Rom. 5:19).

Catholics agree with this general soteriology, since it is not yet getting into disputed issues of sola fide, imputation, etc.

22. Apparent also in the sacraments of the New Testament.
*
In regard to our sacraments, they present Christ the more clearly to us, the more familiarly he has been manifested to man, ever since he was exhibited by the Father, truly as he had been promised. For Baptism testifies that we are washed and purified; 

No; it brings about the washing and purification. This is quite clear in Holy Scripture. But if a person insists on reading his peculiar anti-traditional theology into that same Scripture, then nothing can be done except to point out that this is taking place and object to it.

the Supper of the Eucharist that we are redeemed. 

Again, it helps cause the redemption; not only signify its prior presence.

Ablution is figured by water, satisfaction by blood. Both are found in Christ, who, as John says, “came by water and blood;” that is, to purify and redeem. Of this the Spirit of God also is a witness. Nay, there are three witnesses in one, water, Spirit, and blood. In the water and blood we have an evidence of purification and redemption, but the Spirit is the primary witness who gives us a full assurance of this testimony. This sublime mystery was illustriously displayed on the cross of Christ, when water and blood flowed from his sacred side (John 19:34); which, for this reason, Augustine justly termed the fountain of our sacraments (August. Hom. in Joann. 26). Of these we shall shortly treat at greater length. There is no doubt that, it you compare time with time, the grace of the Spirit is now more abundantly displayed. For this forms part of the glory of the kingdom of Christ, as we gather from several passages, and especially from the seventh chapter of John. In this sense are we to understand the words of Paul, that the law was “a shadow of good things to come, but the body is of Christ” (Col. 2:17). His purpose is not to declare the inefficacy of those manifestations of grace in which God was pleased to prove his truth to the patriarchs, just as he proves it to us in the present day in Baptism and the Lord’s Supper, but to contrast the two, and show the great value of what is given to us, that no one may think it strange that by the advent of Christ the ceremonies of the law have been abolished.

No particular objections beyond those already expressed . . .

23. Impious doctrine of the Schoolmen as to the difference between the Old and the New Testaments.
*
The Scholastic dogma (to glance at it in passing), 

. . . which is more than the usual miniscule or nonexistent attention Calvin gives to existing Catholic theological reasoning . . .

by which the difference between the sacraments of the old and the new dispensation is made so great, that the former did nothing but shadow forth the grace of God, while the latter actually confer that it, must be altogether exploded. Since the apostle speaks in no higher terms of the one than of the other, when he says that the fathers ate of the same spiritual food, and explains that that food was Christ (1 Cor. 10:3), who will presume to regard as an empty sign that which gave a manifestation to the Jews of true communion with Christ? 

But we have only Calvin’s jaded report of what the Scholastics taught, to go by, and I certainly don’t trust that, from what we have seen previously.

And the state of the case which the apostle is there treating militates strongly for our view. For to guard against confiding in a frigid knowledge of Christ, an empty title of Christianity and external observances, and thereby daring to contemn the judgment of God, he exhibits signal examples of divine severity in the Jews, to make us aware that if we indulge in the same vices, the same punishments which they suffered are impending over us. Now, to make the comparison appropriate, it was necessary to show that there is no inequality between us and them in those blessings in which he forbade us to glory. Therefore, he first makes them equal to us in the sacraments, and leaves us not one iota of privilege which could give us hopes of impunity. Nor can we justly attribute more to our baptism than he elsewhere attributes to circumcision, when he terms it a seal of the righteousness of faith (Rom. 4:11). 

This is where Calvin errs, and ignores several Pauline indications of baptismal regeneration (seen above).

Whatever, therefore, is now exhibited to us in the sacraments, the Jews formerly received in theirs—viz. Christ, with his spiritual riches. The same efficacy which ours possess they experienced in theirs—viz. that they were seals of the divine favour toward them in regard to the hope of eternal salvation. 

It is in reducing sacraments to mere seals and signs that an equality is thereby conferred between Old and New Covenant sacraments. Catholics think that the New Covenant is a significant improvement in terms of outpouring of grace, and our sacramentology reflects that.

Had the objectors been sound expounders of the Epistle to the Hebrews, they would not have been so deluded, but reading therein that sins were not expiated by legal ceremonies, nay, that the ancient shadows were of no importance to justification, they overlooked the contrast which is there drawn, and fastening on the single point, that the law in itself was of no avail to the worshipper, thought that they were mere figures, devoid of truth. The purpose of the apostle is to show that there is nothing in the ceremonial law until we arrive at Christ, on whom alone the whole efficacy depends.

No particular disagreement . . .

24. Scholastic objection answered.
*
But they will found on what Paul says of the circumcision of the letter, and object that it is in no esteem with God; that it confers nothing, is empty; that passages such as these seem to set it far beneath our baptism.

Calvin’s nameless, undocumented “scholastics” teach this way? I don’t know who they are. He gives no hard evidence. I do know, however, of one famous “scholastic”: St. Thomas Aquinas. And what he says is scarcely distinguishable from Calvin’s own argument concerning the parallel between circumcision and baptism:

The Apostle says (Colossians 2:11-12): “You are circumcised with circumcision, not made by hand in despoiling the body of the flesh, but in the circumcision of Christ, buried with Him in Baptism.”. . . Baptism is called the Sacrament of Faith; in so far, to wit, as in Baptism man makes a profession of faith, and by Baptism is aggregated to the congregation of the faithful. Now our faith is the same as that of the Fathers of old, according to the Apostle (2 Corinthians 4:13): “Having the same spirit of faith . . . we . . . believe.” But circumcision was a protestation of faith; wherefore by circumcision also men of old were aggregated to the body of the faithful. Consequently, it is manifest that circumcision was a preparation for Baptism and a figure thereof, forasmuch as “all things happened” to the Fathers of old “in figure” (1 Corinthians 10:11); just as their faith regarded things to come.

. . . Circumcision was like Baptism as to the spiritual effect of the latter. For just as circumcision removed a carnal pellicule, so Baptism despoils man of carnal behavior.

. . . The protecting pillar of cloud and the crossing of the Red Sea were indeed figures of our Baptism, whereby we are born again of water, signified by the Red Sea; and of the Holy Ghost, signified by the pillar of cloud: yet man did not make, by means of these, a profession of faith, as by circumcision; so that these two things were figures but not sacraments. But circumcision was a sacrament, and a preparation for Baptism; although less clearly figurative of Baptism, as to externals, than the aforesaid. And for this reason the Apostle mentions them rather than circumcision. (Summa Theologica, Third Part, Q 70: Circumcision; Article 1. Whether circumcision was a preparation for, and a figure of Baptism?)

But by no means. For the very same thing might justly be said of baptism. Indeed, it is said; first by Paul himself, when he shows that God regards not the external ablution by which we are initiated into religion, unless the mind is purified inwardly, and maintains its purity to the end; 

It’s easy to slant a person’s teaching if only one aspect of it is mentioned. As we have seen already, St. Paul taught that the baptized “have put on Christ” (Gal 3:27) and states that God “saved us, . . . by the washing of regeneration” (Titus 3:5). He reported with obvious agreement what Ananias said to him: “Rise and be baptized, and wash away your sins” (Acts 22:16).

and, secondly, by Peter, when he declares that the reality of baptism consists not in external ablution, but in the testimony of a good conscience. 

And in the same passage (1 Pet 3:21) he also says that “Baptism, . . . now saves you.” The same Peter preached after the first Pentecost: “Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins” (Acts 2:38). Calvin conveniently decided to bypass both portions. They aren’t part of the “sign and seal” playbook, and don’t exactly fit into that schema. So they didn’t make the “cut.”

But it seems that in another passage he speaks with the greatest contempt of circumcision made with hands, when he contrasts it with the circumcision made by Christ. I answer, that not even in that passage is there anything derogatory to its dignity. Paul is there disputing against those who insisted upon it as necessary, after it had been abrogated. He therefore admonishes believers to lay aside ancient shadows, and cleave to truth. These teachers, he says, insist that your bodies shall be circumcised. But you have been spiritually circumcised both in soul and body. You have, therefore, a manifestation of the reality, and this is far better than the shadow. Still any one might have answered, that the figure was not to be despised because they had the reality, since among the fathers also was exemplified that putting off of the old man of which he was speaking, and yet to them external circumcision was not superfluous. This objection he anticipates, when he immediately adds, that the Colossians were buried together with Christ by baptism, thereby intimating that baptism is now to Christians what circumcision was to those of ancient times; and that the latter, therefore, could not be imposed on Christians without injury to the former.

That much is true. But Paul wasn’t utterly opposed to circumcision, even in the New Covenant. We know this from Acts 16:3:

Paul wanted Timothy to accompany him; and he took him and circumcised him because of the Jews that were in those places, for they all knew that his father was a Greek.

Some have argued that this was hypocritical on Paul’s part in much the same way as Peter was acting hypocritically in the famous incident where Paul rebuked him (Gal 2:11). How great an irony, if in fact that is true!

25. Another objection answered.
*
But there is more difficulty in explaining the passage which follows, and which I lately quote —viz. that all the Jewish ceremonies were shadows of things to come, but the body is of Christ (Col. 2:17). The most difficult point of all, however, is that which is discussed in several chapters of the Epistle to the Hebrews—namely, that the blood of beasts did not reach to the conscience; that the law was a shadow of good things to come, but not the very image of the things (Heb. 10:1); that worshippers under the Mosaic ceremonies obtained no degree of perfection, and so forth. I repeat what I have already hinted, that Paul does not represent the ceremonies as shadowy because they had nothing solid in them, but because their completion was in a manner suspended until the manifestation of Christ. Again, I hold that the words are to be understood not of their efficiency, but rather of the mode of significancy. 

I guess these may be some of the reasons why St. Thomas wrote: “circumcision was a sacrament, and a preparation for Baptism.”

For until Christ was manifested in the flesh, all signs shadowed him as absent, however he might inwardly exert the presence of his power, and consequently of his person on believers. But the most important observation is, that in all these passages Paul does not speak simply but by way of reply. He was contending with false apostles, who maintained that piety consisted in mere ceremonies, without any respect to Christ; for their refutation it was sufficient merely to consider what effect ceremonies have in themselves. This, too, was the scope of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Let us remember, therefore, that he is here treating of ceremonies not taken in their true and native signification, but when wrested to a false and vicious interpretation, not of the legitimate use, but of the superstitious abuse of them. What wonder, then, if ceremonies, when separated from Christ, are devoid of all virtue? All signs become null when the thing signified is taken away. Thus Christ, when addressing those who thought that manna was nothing more than food for the body, accommodates his language to their gross opinion, and says, that he furnished a better food, one which fed souls for immortality. But if you require a clearer solution, the substance comes to this: First, the whole apparatus of ceremonies under the Mosaic law, unless directed to Christ, is evanescent and null. Secondly, these ceremonies had such respect to Christ, that they had their fulfilment only when Christ was manifested in the flesh. Lastly, at his advent they behoved to disappear, just as the shadow vanishes in the clear light of the sun. But I now touch more briefly on the point, because I defer the future consideration of it till I come to the place where I intend to compare baptism with circumcision.

It’s not at all clear that the above is necessarily contrary to Catholic teaching. But Calvin is blissfully unaware of this.

26. Sacraments of the New Testament sometimes excessively extolled by early Theologians. Their meaning explained.
*
Those wretched sophists are perhaps deceived by the extravagant eulogiums on our signs which occur in ancient writers: for instance, the following passage of Augustine: “The sacraments of the old law only promised a Saviour, whereas ours give salvation” (August. Proem. in Ps. 73). Not perceiving that these and similar figures of speech are hyperbolical, they too have promulgated their hyperbolical dogmas, but in a sense altogether alien from that of ancient writers. For Augustine means nothing more than in another place where he says, “The sacraments of the Mosaic law foretold Christ, ours announce him” (Quæst. sup. Numer. c. 33). And again, “Those were promises of things to be fulfilled, these indications of the fulfilment” (Contra Faustum, Lib. 19 c. 14); as if he had said, Those figured him when he was still expected, ours, now that he has arrived, exhibit him as present. 

Much like St. Thomas . . .

Moreover, with regard to the mode of signifying, he says, as he also elsewhere indicates, “The Law and the Prophets had sacraments foretelling a thing future, the sacraments of our time attest that what they foretold as to come has come” (Cont. Liter. Petil. Lib. 2 c. 37). His sentiments concerning the reality and efficacy, he explains in several passages, as when he says, “The sacraments of the Jews were different in the signs, alike in the things signified; different in the visible appearance, alike in spiritual power” (Hom. in Joann. 26). Again, “In different signs there was the same faith: it was thus in different signs as in different words, because the words change the sound according to times, and yet words are nothing else than signs. The fathers drank of the same spiritual drink, but not of the same corporeal drink. See then, how, while faith remains, signs vary. There the rock was Christ; to us that is Christ which is placed on the altar. They as a great sacrament drank of the water flowing from the rock: believers know what we drink. If you look at the visible appearance there was a difference; if at the intelligible signification, they drank of the same spiritual drink.” Again, “In this mystery their food and drink are the same as ours; the same in meaning, not in form, for the same Christ was figured to them in the rock; to us he has been manifested in the flesh” (in Ps. 77). Though we grant that in this respect also there is some difference. Both testify that the paternal kindness of God, and the graces of the Spirit, are offered us in Christ, but ours more clearly and splendidly. In both there is an exhibition of Christ, but in ours it is more full and complete, in accordance with that distinction between the Old and New Testaments of which we have discoursed above. And this is the meaning of Augustine (whom we quote more frequently, as being the best and most faithful witness of all antiquity), 

Yet St. Augustine was not by any stretch of the imagination closer to Calvin in thought than to the Catholic Church’s teaching. For this reason Calvin appears to always be extremely selective in citing him. He denied “faith alone” (sola fide). He denied sola Scriptura, which was an unknown concept among the fathers. He believed in the Real, Substantial Presence of Christ in the Eucharist, and in purgatory. He was thoroughly Catholic all down the line.

where he says that after Christ was revealed, sacraments were instituted, fewer in number, but of more august significancy and more excellent power (De Doct. Christ. Lib. 3; et Ep. ad Janur.).

In any event, Augustine believed in seven sacraments, not two.

It is here proper to remind the reader, that all the trifling talk of the sophists concerning the opus operatum, is not only false. but repugnant to the very nature of sacraments, which God appointed in order that believers, who are void and in want of all good, might bring nothing of their own, but simply beg. Hence it follows, that in receiving them they do nothing which deserves praise, and that in this action (which in respect of them is merely passive) no work can be ascribed to them.

Ex opere operato was dealt with previously.

***

(originally 10-27-09)

Photo credit: Historical mixed media figure of John Calvin produced by artist/historian George S. Stuart and photographed by Peter d’Aprix: from the George S. Stuart Gallery of Historical Figures archive [Wikimedia Commons / Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license]

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2019-01-14T00:36:00-04:00

This came about due to a reply by one Curt Erickson on a public Facebook page. He was reacting to my article, Could State Murder of Christians Ever Happen in the US? His words will be in blue.

***

Anything physically possible can happen, theoretically. 

Would Christians ever be persecuted, even minimally, in the US? Nah. We’re an insanely large majority here. No non Christian has ever been elected prezdnit and non Christians in any public office are a tiny minority. 

The idea that somehow Christians are facing a risk of a Holocaust or an Armenian style genocide are fever dreams invented by people who know nothing of holocausts or genocides.

Dunno. ‘Finally, we may get to a point of actual martyrdom (not at first government-sponsored). The latter would still be quite a ways off, but it’s not inconceivable at all. History is our guide. The religion of secularism and leftism is the enemy of Christianity…’, while awkward, poorly written and fairly ludicrous, clearly states that the author believes this is a realistic danger. (Or, what’s more likely, just claims to believe in order to get clicks.) 

No one’s persecuting Christians. No one’s gonna start.

I never used the word “Holocaust” or “genocide.” So what do you do? You ridiculously caricature my argument by pretending that I suggested such a thing, and then mock and dismiss it. Nice job! All I argued was that “persecution” of Christians is “the way it is possibly going” (first sentence: italics in original).

2nd paragraph: “we may get to a point of actual martyrdom.”

My language was qualified and nuanced throughout. For example: “We may possibly be spared actual physical persecution. I tend to think it will occur, however, at some point . . .” (emphases added presently).

I wrote: “Persecution against Christians has broken out in Christian cultures many times. That proves it can happen (and will happen again).” Note that this was a general statement: not just about the US. “Can happen” is self-evident. “Will happen” is not absolutely certain, but I would contend that, given the history, it is exceedingly likely and almost certain to occur somewhere.

I provided eight examples: six of which were within the last 100 years, and one (Armenian genocide) only a little longer than that. I fail to see what more proof is needed of the likelihood of persecution somewhere, than eight examples of exactly that: all in predominantly Christian cultures. To speculate that it may happen in America is not crazy or absurd at all. I used another analogy:

Could anyone have imagined in 1943, legal abortion (as a supposed constitutional ‘right’!) 30 years later, or same-sex ‘marriage’ 70 [72] years later? No, of course not. . . . So we can be almost assured that unimaginable things lie ahead that we can never imagine or conceptualize now.

It’s all perfectly reasonable analogical / historical speculation.

No non Christian has ever been elected prezdnit.

That’s not true. Jefferson was a Unitarian who denied the Trinity and the miracles and divinity of Christ. Denial of the Trinity makes one not a Christian by any standard, accepted definition of historic Christianity (see the Nicene Creed, Athanasian Creed, and the confessions of any Protestant denomination).

Romney was almost elected, and he is Mormon, which is not Christian, either. Even Abraham Lincoln was barely doctrinally Christian. He was certainly a theist, but his belief in Christian doctrines was quite scanty.

(Or, what’s more likely, just claims to believe in order to get clicks.)

Ah, nice touch. Having engaged in ridiculous straw man arguments having little or nothing to do with what I actually argued, now you switch on a dime and suggest that I am merely lying through my teeth to get clicks.

But this is how it goes in this age. Dialogue is Dead. Instead we have mutual monologues, caricature / straw men, and rank personal insults: in effect, claims to “know” (within a noxious cloud of irrational speculation) about a person’s interior state of heart and mind and what motivates them.

I also note that it is you who made a definitive declarative claim, not I. You wrote:

Would Christians ever be persecuted, even minimally, in the US? Nah. . . . 

No one’s persecuting Christians. No one’s gonna start.

I made a speculative claim, which includes within it the possibility of non-occurrence.  Which is more reasonable? I think, clearly, my speculation based on direct past historical analogy is more reasonable and plausible than your claim that it definitely would not “ever” happen: not even “minimally.”

You’re the guy that wrote that? Cool. I may have some questions for you. 

It’s so rare to get to talk to the actual author of a piece you disagree with. 

But it’ll have to wait a bit.

You have made a singularly unimpressive start.

I have had a website / blog online for now almost 22 years. It has always allowed comments and interaction.

This exchange (including back-and-forths to come, that can always be added) will be a new article on my blog. Or will you complain and protest about that?

Dave — don’t get too impressed with your ‘I’ve had a blog for twenty years’ self. It’s a miniscule chunk of Patheos, and judging from your disqus post count, it’s as poorly attended as it is poorly written. After twenty years you should be doing a lot better, or you should be doing something else. 

I was looking forward to a discussion about your persecution fantasies, but I’ve got no interest in providing you with free material. Maybe if you’d asked first, as any real writer would’ve, but you didn’t. 

Your post fails to establish that anyone’s currently persecuting Christians as you claim, and it fails to make a decent case that such a thing is likely to occur in the US in the future. 

You’re not very good at this. You should be better, given all the time you’ve clearly sunk into the project.

See ya. Par for the course and entirely predictable. If one has nothing but insults and straw men at first, they never graduate to rationality and serious argumentation. ZZzzzz

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Photo credit: Execution of Blessed Miguel Pro, Mexican Jesuit, by a firing squad in Mexico City: 23 November 1927 [public domain / Wikimedia Commons]

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2018-12-20T16:41:03-04:00

This exchange occurred underneath my post, Reply to Atheists: Defining a [Biblical] “Contradiction”. Words of Stewart Felker will be in blue. He gave even further replies in this thread than what I have recorded below, if anyone is interested.

*****

I think you’re being a bit uncharitable with some of this, Dave.

Their question of your method for disputing contradictions and suggesting alternatives — particularly, whether you think that the mere possibility of an alternative interpretation alone is enough to counteract claimed contradictions, or whether you consider the probability of this interpretation (however it is that we determine this) to be important, too — is actually a very important one that you should spend time addressing.

(Not necessarily specifically in relation to this issue of the portrayal of Joseph of Arimathea, but just in general.)

I agree. Whenever I have done this sort of thing, I invariably think my explanation is more plausible than atheist skepticism, or else I wouldn’t make the argument in the first place.

Then I guess I’d say that there are some more specific and “objective” standards for being in a position to adjudicate on issues like this to begin with.

For example, as it pertains to the Joseph of Arimathea issue, how many scholarly commentaries/studies did you consult that look at the various historical, linguistic, and contextual factors relevant to determining what the gospels intended to say here, and if there’s a contradiction?

I can’t say that I’ve spent much time on this in particular; though I have spent some time on whether Matthew’s description of him as a rich man (and perhaps other things here) was deliberately intended as a reference to Isaiah 53. There’s also been the occasional suggestion that something about this whole narrative detail, with Joseph asking permission from Pilate for burying Jesus, may be a call-back to the story of Joseph son of Jacob in Genesis, and his interaction with Pharaoh—though some commentators are skeptical of this, too (Davies and Allison in their seminal commentary on Matthew, for one).

I haven’t made any firm conclusions about either of these things, but they certainly could be relevant to determining the historicity (or lack thereof) of these details. (We may also have some reason for skepticism in the description of Joseph specifically as a *secret* disciple: see John 19:38. This could owe something to the same sort of hagiographical tendency as we find in the early tradition of Gamaliel as having converted to Christianity, too. Again though, this is just a suggestion for further research, and I have no solid opinion on it one way or the other.)

On the other hand, I have spent an enormous amount of time with other details in this narrative and the issue of contradiction here. For example, I’ve probably a cumulative two weeks doing high-level academic research on the likely contradiction (to the other gospels) in Matthew 28:2 alone.

***

For example, as it pertains to the Joseph of Arimathea issue, how many scholarly commentaries/studies did you consult that look at the various historical, linguistic, and contextual factors relevant to determining what the gospels intended to say here, and if there’s a contradiction?

None, because it wasn’t necessary for 1) my purpose, and 2) by the nature of the case we were discussing, i.e., “are there literally logical contradictions in the relevant texts?” It was claimed that there were such contradictions. My task was to demonstrate that this was not the case. That’s a matter of logic: not what all the pointy-heads think of the text.

I think I succeeded, but in any event, “DagoodS” offered no counter-arguments whatever to mine, so in my opinion he lost that debate by default or by, in effect, forfeiting. If he actually had an effective response, I assume he would have given it: being an attorney highly trained in debate and also familiar with theological debate.

In other cases, I do delve into scholarship and commentaries: especially linguistic. You’re probably not familiar with my apologetics work, and the scope of it. I have over 2100 articles posted to Patheos, and have written 50 books (ten of them “officially” published), as a professional Catholic apologist.

There are all kinds of scholars, and they all have a bias. If they are orthodox Christian (as myself), they obviously approach the text as inspired revelation and assume that it is consistent with itself and not contradictory (I have no problem with minor manuscript textual errors such as discrepancies regarding, e.g., numbers). That’s a bias, too, but I think it is a “good” bias: all things considered.

The secular or atheist Bible scholar approaches the text with great suspicion and hostility. This will color how they view it, as well. As I’ve always said, atheist anti-theist types approach the Bible and its interpretation like a butcher approaches a hog. A Christian like me approaches it with the reverence and awe that one might give to a great masterpiece of art or literature. It’s a completely different mindset. And that obviously colors the conclusions reached.

But in this instance, I was merely making logical points, and so it wasn’t necessary to delve into “the literature.” I was “defeating the defeater.”

No one is under any illusion that it would be impossible to simultaneously be a member of the Sanhedrin but also to secretly be a Christian. Instead, the question is whether it’s historically plausible for this to have been the case — or whether, as I hinted at, there may have been some sort of exaggeration along the way or something.

And, really, that’s the fundamental question for everything here, I think: what’s plausible, not what’s merely possible (or impossible). All historical reconstruction is done on this basis.

Nicodemus was a Pharisee and member of the Sanhedrin, and seems to have become a Christian, or was quite respectful of Jesus, at the very least. Paul was a Pharisee. I don’t think these things are a big deal. If the Bible reported it, and the Bible has been shown time and again to be historically accurate and precise, then we trust it for details that may seem prima facie more doubtful.

That’s the difference in approach. You — like all biblical skeptics — are speculating and looking for holes in the text, and poking holes in it. That’s how you approach it from the outset. It’s not just the denial of inspiration. It’s the view that the Bible is simply a pack of fairy tales and myths. And some of you even deny that Jesus existed (which I believe to be intellectual suicide, on the level of belief in a flat earth or geocentrism or a 6000-year-old earth.

Plausibility is a fascinating discussion in and of itself, but it, too, is highly dependent upon one’s presuppositions and overall worldview. I find lots and lots of things in the Bible (from a Christian perspective) quite plausible, whereas atheists invariably do not. Why such a difference? Well, it’s not because Christians are dumb and stupid and just “don’t get it” (as is often charged). It’s because radically different presuppositions and premises lead to different views of what is plausible and what isn’t.

Plausibility is one thing, and it’s subjective enough to allow for many opinions, that are not easily synthesized. But what I was doing in the original exchange about Joseph of Arimathea was to note that what was claimed to be literally a logical contradiction, actually wasn’t at all. Ive been through this time and again with atheists. They see contradictions where there are none. And that’s a different discussion.

I think atheists see “contradictions” where they don’t exist, because of hostility and wishful thinking. The bias going in colors their ability to reason dispassionately and as objectively as possible.

I do not (in general) spend time “speculating and looking for holes in the text,” and have not done so in this specific conversation either.

I did say that I’ve “probably a cumulative two weeks doing high-level academic research on the likely contradiction (to the other gospels) in Matthew 28:2 alone”; but that doesn’t mean that I went into things looking for a contradiction here. In fact, I originally devoted so much time toward the interpretation of that verse after having read Eusebius and Augustine’s interpretations of this in response to critics who claimed a contradiction. (And in any case, I originally mentioned that only really to contrast that with my general non-expertise on this issue of Joseph of Arimathea.)

Beyond that, and relevant to the current topic of Joseph of Arimathea, all I really mentioned was “the question is whether it’s historically plausible for this to have been the case [that Joseph was truly a secret follower of Jesus] — or whether, as I hinted at, there may have been some sort of exaggeration along the way or something.”

Again, one potential parallel for there having been some exaggeration or hagiography here was, as I mentioned, the early (non-Biblical) tradition of Gamaliel having converted to Christianity — something that many historians if not most are skeptical of the historicity of.

***

More exchanges from the combox:

“kingmcdee”Thanks, Dave, this was an interesting discussion. I do ultimately think that “plausibility” is a somewhat unreliable metric for making decisions about what “probably” happened, because it seems to me to ultimately come down to deciding that, while the text (written by someone much closer to the events than I am, and part of the relevant culture, which I am not) says one thing, my feelings about what is plausible (which are conditioned by all sorts of things, many of which are irrelevant to the discussion) make it such that I can claim that something else actually happened. And, as you say, an atheist could have very different beliefs about what is or is not plausible than a Christian might, and unless he could demonstrate that his beliefs about plausibility were rationally superior, it would be unfair for him to expect us to accept them.

Totally agree. And this is why I think it’s much more productive and worthwhile concentrating on the objective issue of whether logical contradictions are present, rather than the very subjective “wax nose” of plausibility.

Atheists claim hundreds of “contradictions”: so there is certainly no lack of that! I’ve dealt with dozens of them myself, and so have many other Christian apologists.

So what of the middle ground of probability, which assesses the likelihood or unlikelihood of contradiction based on factors inherent to the text itself, or some historical context that elucidates it?

It’s still subjective speculation, and with radically different premises coming in, nothing is accomplished by it. At the end, the Christian says x is plausible or probable and the atheist says it ain’t.

On the other hand, contradictions are objectively determined. Something either is or isn’t. Atheists claim all kinds of logical contradictions in the Bible. I and others have shown that they were mistaken.

Why do so many mainstream Biblical scholars acknowledge the existence of genuine Biblical contradictions, then? And why is denying these any different from denying, say, mainstream scientific evidence about [whatever]? (That’s not to say that literary interpretation and the physical sciences are the same thing, obviously; but they have similar standards of rationality and parsimony and peer review, etc.)

And I really don’t understand this dichotomy you seem to be driving at. In order to determine whether something is a logical contradiction or not, we certainly have to interpret the text, first — which as I’ve said usually requires a lot of detailed philological analysis. That’s where probability comes in.

Like, we should all agree that it’s logically impossible for Judas to have both died by hanging but to have also died via evisceration. Now it’s not logically impossible that he died by hanging, his body remained like that for however long, and then at some point it fell down and his bowels came out. But when we’re trying to determine which of these scenarios the Biblical texts support, here we have to rely on interpretive probability.

Why do so many mainstream Biblical scholars acknowledge the existence of genuine Biblical contradictions, then?

Because many or perhaps even most of them are hostile to the Bible and don’t believe it’s inspired. So they are predisposed to see contradictions where there are none. Premises determine outcomes.

Catholics interpret Scripture in light of the accumulated wisdom of 2000 years of Christian interpretation, and another thousand years or so of Jewish interpretation before that. We think many people who believe in God and revelation have learned lots of things over those 3000 years, that we can benefit from today.

Heterodox scholars (or non-Jewish ones, with regard to a religious Jewish paradigm) interpret according to post-Enlightenment hyper-rationalism and hostility towards religious worldviews and traditions, which is an outlook only 250 or so years old. These produce different outcomes and make people view probabilities and plausibility quite differently.

The apologist like myself can’t possibly break through all those contrary paradigms and presuppositions. Thus I don’t waste my time trying to do so. I don’t go round and round with atheists, playing their Bible hopscotch and liberal scholarship (count the number of [heterodox] scholars who think thus-and-so) games. All I can do is deal with objective and concrete particulars, and demonstrate that a claimed logical contradiction is not one. And so that’s what I do, and why we have been talking past each other this entire time (even after you decided to stop the petty insults and psychoanalysis), about Joseph of Arimathea and the larger general issue.

The one thing that scholars actually do that you don’t seem to be doing is actually taking a close look at the texts themselves (which I’ve now done in my longer comment).

These texts need to be interpreted as best as we can, using our accumulated philological and historical (and archaeological, etc.) knowledge.

Sure, everyone has a perspective and everyone has opinions. But there are certain matters of syntax and philology and historical that we can analyze and debate more objectively, no matter what perspective we come from.

So why isn’t this a good starting place? In fact why isn’t this the most logical starting place? If I’m wondering about the meaning of ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς… in Matthew 27:57 or whatever it may be, why can’t we talk about this like rational people?

That being said: I’ve mentioned the contradiction in Matthew 28:2 several times now; and although you mention the “accumulated wisdom of 2000 years of Christian interpretation,” fascinatingly Eusebius is I believe literally the only person from antiquity who devoted more than a few words to the issue — and even then, he devotes maybe 40 or 50 words to it tops, and really doesn’t say anything more than “it doesn’t contradict the other gospels because it can’t contradict the other gospels.”

This is why we have to go beyond ancient wisdom and use the full resources of modern study.

Hostile premises are present prior to any urge to bring “philological and historical (and archaeological, etc.) knowledge” (which is fine) to the table.

It almost seems like you’re saying no only that there are no contradictions (and so on), but that the very accusation of contradiction — or the very enterprise of trying to interpret the Bible critically — comes from a hostile or at least disingenuous intent.

It’s hostile intent almost always: not necessarily disingenuous, but flowing from premises fundamentally hostile to historic, orthodox Christianity. The Bible is seen (at best) as merely a fairly respectable but solely human book, written by a primitive culture that didn’t “get” many things that we find obvious — thus filled with many potential errors; or (at worst) as a dishonest collection of fairy tales, myths, and legends, intended to control and deceive people.

I think you’re making the whole issue more abstract than it needs to be.

Not to overlook the obvious, but scholars see contradictions where the text most naturally seems to suggest a contradiction, and where all alternative explanations are less plausible than this — not simply because they have some preconceived notion that ancient texts should have contradictions because they were written carelessly or by “primitive people.”

And what they find plausible is (I’ve noted repeatedly) indeed highly dependent upon their presuppositions and overall worldview. Thus, Christians will think many things in the Bible are plausible whereas the atheist and the theologically liberal skeptic do not. Disbelief in miracles and biblical prophecy alone greatly alters interpretation of hundreds of passages. One can’t escape it. Disbelief in the incarnation does the same. We all have our biases.

***

Your argument is “modern Biblical scholars interpret according to post-Enlightenment hyper-rationalism” and that their exegesis is worthless anyways. 

I didn’t say liberal scholarship was worthless. Occasionally it provides good insight. But because it is hostile to the Bible and orthodoxy, and starts from erroneous premises, usually it doesn’t.

***

I also don’t think it’s fair to accuse atheists of bowing out of conversation because they’re uncomfortable (or not knowledgeable or whatever) when the conversation starts to get into specifics about exegesis and contradictions, etc., as you’ve accused them of; because at the same time that you said this, you said “Not gonna go round and round with that” to me precisely where I finally started to get into the nitty-gritty of this, as it were.

That’s two completely different reasons for bowing out, as I have explained. I’m not interested in what every atheist and liberal exegete (real or imagined) thinks of various biblical texts. It goes round and round and nothing whatsoever is accomplished.

With atheists in my debates, they are claiming the presence of a logical contradiction. I give an alternate non-contradictory explanation and critique theirs. At that point they cease being interested. They don’t wanna go past one round where they give their presentation. Thus, what they ostensibly claim to be interested in, is shown not to be that great of an interest as soon as their view is confuted.

But I never was at any time interested in most of what you offer: endless analysis of texts with hostile skeptical premises underlying all, and never-ending claims of the “implausibility” of every Christian / biblical doctrine. When premises are radically different, discussion is very difficult to have.

That’s why I say that what I will do with the atheist (if I’m in the mood and otherwise bored, which is not always) is examine proposed specific contradictions: whether they are actually present in the text or not (because almost all can agree on the definition of a logical contradiction: though atheists seem to quickly forget as soon as they open up a Bible). But then I do that (such as my 30 replies to Bob Seidensticker), and they go silent and flee for the hills in terror.

You stick around, but I can see (as I’ve been saying over and over) that little or nothing will be accomplished by dialogue between us. But I’m doing some of this meta-analysis and epistemological analysis to at least show you where I’m coming from, since you seem to be having a hard time fully understanding it.

Why does it seem like you almost have a fatalistic attitude toward this? It’s like you don’t think it’s possible to make any sort of determination about the plausibility or implausibility of a claimed contradiction, because people are just too embedded in their biases to be able to have any sort of productive dialogue on this at all.

From my constant experience debating these things with atheists and skeptics for now 37 years. It’s not fatalistic; it’s realistic.

I haven’t said that the level of plausibility is impossible to ascertain; only that different worldviews arrive at wildly different conclusions about any given instance.

But if someone says, “x contradicts y in the Bible” I can show how in fact it does not, and move on. It’s objective and fairly decisive.

Are you suggesting that just a single reply is good enough? What if you’ve overlooked something or made an interpretive error of your own?

That gets back to premises and how they strongly affect interpretation. When discussing an alleged contradiction, the apologist can give his interpretation over against the atheist / skeptical assertion. Readers can then decide which is a more plausible explanation: contradiction or non-contradiction and non-issue.

And of course most Christian readers will think my explanation was more plausible and almost all atheist readers will disagree. That’s just how it is, because of premises and presuppositions. But at least specific, fairly objective subject matter was dealt with (as opposed to “grand” theological issues), where there may be some slight progress in a meeting of the minds.

***

I’ve said over and over, that the Christian can argue till kingdom come (as much about one issue as even you would like), and in the end the atheist will say it’s implausible and Christians will say it is plausible, and never the twain shall meet. And so I have to wisely, prudently choose which debates to get into. One must choose one’s battles wisely and choose which hill to die on. Can’t do everything . . .

And as a bonus we’re invariably accused of being anti-reason, anti-science, and anti-scholarship. You haven’t brought up science because it wasn’t involved, but if it did come up, surely you would play that card, too.

***

My good friend Paul Hoffer also made an excellent long comment about the nature of plausibility itself.

***

Photo credit: image by geralt (12-4-13) [PixabayCC0 Creative Commons license]

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2018-12-04T16:59:32-04:00

This took place on the Articuli Fidei blog, in a lengthy thread. Chris Smith’s words will be in blue. His blog is called mild-mannered musings [it appears to no longer be active]. Words of two other participants will be in green and purple.

* * * * *

Hi [former Catholic, now agnostic],

If God wants me to believe, I need a reason beyond reason, because reason stinks.

Then I would highly recommend reading folks like Pascal, Kierkegaard, or Muggeridge (insofar as you want to still read “thinkers”), as well as the spiritual masters (St. John of the Cross, St. Teresa of Avila, St. Therese et al), who approach the faith from a devotional and practical and mystical, rather than intellectual slant (insofar as you retain any curiosity at all in these matters).

Let me just add, too (as a general statement), that any apologist who thinks reason is the sum total of the Catholic faith, or even anywhere near its most important aspect, has no business being an apologist at all, as he is supremely ignorant of what Christianity (of any stripe) is. It is that fallacy that has led to the downfall of some who have tried their hand at apologetics: excessive rationalism, which is extreme and a falsehood.

Apologists deal with the issue of reason and faith, which is an important one. That’s what we do. But just because it is our area or field, it doesn’t follow that we are or should be reducing the faith to those things. Oftentimes, this is a caricature or stereotype imposed upon apologists, and sometimes a small number of nitwits on the Internet, claiming to do apologetics, unfortunately exhibit it.

Or we get folks caricaturing the enterprise of apologetics, when in fact, usually the critics who say these things have themselves been far more prone to such errors than someone like me or the great majority of my apologist colleagues (online and offline alike) ever have been. So it is often a case of projection.

In my own case (speaking of the place of reason in faith), I converted to both evangelicalism (1977) and Catholicism (1990) primarily because of the impulse of moral issues, that were highly intuitive and subjective and felt in the heart and spirit, and not solely “rationalistic” or “logical” or even primarily so.

Later I defended those things from more objective reason, assuredly, but they themselves at the time they moved my will and spirit, were more intuitive or mystical or experiential in nature.

There is a balance here, and those who perhaps didn’t realize that, and got into apologetics anyway, were placing themselves in spiritual danger, I submit. I don’t say this is the whole cause of later confusion, but definitely could conceivably be an important factor, and something to ponder.

Theological skepticism is a dead-end just as what we might call “metaphysical skepticism” is. It is the glory of Christianity that it does provide answers. The original Protestants all thought this and were passionate advocates of their own systems.
But because of ongoing sectarianism and increasing theological relativism within Protestantism, that notion has increasingly gone out the window, and now it is quite fashionable to speak the same skeptical, rationalistic language about theology as atheists do about God.

Catholicism and Orthodoxy continue in the same way that all Christians used to: offering answers that can be backed up by reason, experience, and the heart.

It is excessive rationalism that leads to a lack of faith, as we see in historic theological liberals, or a guy like the intellectually brilliant historian Joseph Dollinger in 1870, when he rejected papal infallibility and wound up excommunicated. He couldn’t grasp it because he wasn’t viewing it with the eye of faith and reason. He looked with reason alone: i.e., a post-Enlightenment over-rationalism.

But that is never an acceptable option for a Christian. We all must exercise faith, and that can never be proven with an airtight certainty. At best we can try to show that our faith is not inconsistent with reason and fact.

Then questions of plausibility and comparative systems come into play and stuff like Cardinal Newman’s “Illative Sense” or the positivist-smashing philosophical speculations of Michael Polanyi, or the sorts of warrant for belief that Reformed philosopher Alvin Plantinga discusses with great insight today.

If someone wants to be on the cutting edge of the legitimate relationship of faith and reason, I highly recommend reading folks like these. It will at least be challenging and interesting even if not persuasive in every case.

* * *
It is difficult to have a conversation with a guy who doesn’t think he can possibly be convinced otherwise. That goes far beyond my position as a Catholic, where I say that I could quite conceivably be persuaded that another position is true. Not likely at all, and I have faith that this won’t happen, but as a theoretical possibility, it is entirely possible, just as my change from evangelical Protestant to Catholic happened (quite unexpectedly and unpredictably).
* * *
Of course, anyone familiar with that book, knows that “Job’s comforters” (along with Job, too, to a lesser extent) were roundly rebuked by God at the end of the book, basically for being presumptuous loudmouths. In other words, there was a truth to be ascertained.

It wasn’t implying at all that the very pursuit of truth or answers was folly (quite the opposite!), and as is currently fashionable among semi-liberal Protestants these days. Hence God said to Job’s long-winded advisors:

Job 42:7-8 (RSV) After the LORD had spoken these words to Job, the LORD said to Eli’phaz the Te’manite: “My wrath is kindled against you and against your two friends; for you have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has. [8] Now therefore take seven bulls and seven rams, and go to my servant Job, and offer up for yourselves a burnt offering; and my servant Job shall pray for you, for I will accept his prayer not to deal with you according to your folly; for you have not spoken of me what is right, as my servant Job has.”

* * *
Enlightenment over-rationalism . . . is never an acceptable option for a Christian. We all must exercise faith, and that can never be proven with an airtight certainty.
Is that really the problem for most doubters?

It can be; I suspect it often is, but every case is different, and I don’t know the percentages. I was referring specifically to Joseph Dollinger and that sort of thought, that has close ties to a sort of post-“Enlightenment” hyper-rationalism and positivism (Hans Kung exhibits it in our time). It is the lack of faith which is the problem, because now the equation is out of balance. Christianity is not merely a philosophy (hence subject to all the epistemological requirements of same); it is a religion.

That they expect the faith to be “proven with an airtight certainty?”

With Dollinger that was part of the problem, in terms of historical propositions. He didn’t look at the question of infallibility with the eyes of faith. He was in danger of reducing Catholicism to mere historiography at that particular point of his thought. This is what Cardinal Newman severely critiqued.

It was certainly never the problem for me. I am not so foolish as to expect such a thing.

Good for you. But (accepting this) you could still use rationalism in an excessive way in order to (consciously or not) cause some folks to lose faith, as you seem to have brought about to some extent in critiquing Newman’s conception of development.

I don’t contend that it was an insincere endeavor for you anymore than I would question David Waltz’s current struggles. You believe these things, no doubt (that’s not at issue), but I think you are mistaken.

On the other hand, I doubt that the contra-Newman arguments are by any means irrefutable. But in any event, I commend you for at least grappling with Newman and his ideas. So many folks want to bash him, while offering no alternative. Looks like (from glancing at your blog) you have done much more than that, and I truly respect that effort (as one whose favorite theological topic is development).

My general impression is that the accusation of “positivism” (i.e. the expectation of airtight proof before belief is warranted) is usually a strawman argument that mischaracterizes the real sources of most doubters’ doubts.

That could be, sure. In these matters, there is much subjective speculation. Most of my stated opinions in this thread are generalizations to some extent, by the nature of the case. To the extent that a person expects answers immediately amenable to their own reasoning and satisfaction, to all (or major, or many) theological issues, this factor could quite possibly be an important one.

If one doubts papal infallibility (as David has), then he has likely thought: “it fails because of historical counter-examples a, b, c, and d.” The pros and cons of each case could be argued, sticking mostly to historiography (that would be my methodology if it came to that), but the question must be asked, “why is it that one has placed their private judgment and personal doubts above the judgment of the Church in the first place?” That is a question of faith and of the rule of faith.

One has now assumed a Protestant stance of judging the Church (indistinguishable from Luther), rather than being judged by her, and giving assent, without necessarily having every jot and tittle of Catholic doctrine perfectly understood and tied in a neat little package with a shiny purple bow.

Doubters doubt because there are problems with faith claims, not because those faith claims cannot be proven.

The problems can also possibly reside in the doubter, due to false premises, rather than in the alleged thing in the faith that is supposedly worthy of being doubted or disbelieved.

Assume for the sake of argument that a thing is true; yet someone doubts it (say, a spherical earth). Obviously, in that case, the problem is in the doubter. not the thing doubted. That could be the case here as well. Since I believe in faith, with reason, that Catholicism is true, and that Newman’s theory of development is true, obviously, I think that is the case presently, and I am quite happy and willing to show why I think that.

This (problems in the doubter’s thinking) is what I have always found in atheists, for example (many of whom I have debated). Inevitably, their objection to something in Christianity or the Bible comes from misunderstanding it or from false premises. That is what caused the problem. They were fighting a straw man themselves. If I’ve seen it once, I’ve seen it a hundred times.

This mentality manifests itself, for example, in atheists or other skeptics who amuse and occupy themselves by finding scores of alleged biblical contradictions. In most cases, there is a glaring fallacy in play. Once identified, the whole thing comes collapsing down. I’ve done it many times myself (i.e., have identified the false premise in play, and provided the counter-argument from a deeper examination of the Bible). Atheist exegesis is often as dumb and clueless as the most wooden fundamentalism is. But I can solve one “problem” and they will simply come up with another one. It’s almost a game to them. It’s almost always the case.

That is because the problem is in the person’s excessive skepticism from the outset, which in turn came from somewhere else. Until that is dealt with, solving every biblical “contradiction” in the world won’t cause them to move one inch from their position.

At best we can try to show that our faith is not inconsistent with reason and fact.

And when you fail, then what?

You have to take the step of examining supposed instances of such failures. Someone has to make that judgment, and that judgment can be argued against by the next person, who remains a faithful Catholic. The person who is judging is certainly not infallible. There is no reason to think he is, whereas Catholicism has a notion of infallibility attached to it which is a supernatural gift, as seen in the Bible, that we believe is inspired on yet other grounds, and by faith.

* * *
The claim that “one of the leading factors that cause people to fall away is the Church’s moral teachings and/or struggling with sin” not only has no empirical foundation that I know of, but also rather strikes me as a ploy designed to trivialize other people’s religious decisions.

Hardly so, given the fact that there are many prominent dissidents right within the Catholic Church, who make it clear that they do not accept all of the Church’s teachings, and pick and choose. And by the strangest coincidence, many of the doctrines they dissent on are moral ones (particularly sexual).

This being the case, it could certainly be a fact that many people leave for moral reasons. The most common case is probably that of the “irregular” marriage situation. Folks find Catholic indissolubility and opposition to remarriage too difficult, so they split.

Same thing could hold for contraception, or pro-choice (witness the Kennedys, Pelosi and all pro-abortion Democratic and Republican politicians).

This happens in all (more traditional) denominations, in fact. C. S. Lewis wasn’t allowed to get married by his local Anglican vicar because his fiance (Joy Davidman) had been divorced. This was as recently as 1960. So he found another clergyman to do it (though he didn’t leave Anglicanism).

I work with people (as a staffer at the Coming Home Network) who want to become Catholics, but don’t because a spouse doesn’t agree. And often an irregular marriage is the problem. So even when a person is convinced of Catholicism, they won’t move into it because of moral issues in their marriage that are unresolved. The spouse doesn’t want do go through an annulment, or abstain during same, or to not contracept if they go Catholic, etc. Very common . . .

Far from being a “ploy,” this is rather common and almost self-evidently true. That said, I have no idea what was the cause in David’s case, nor is it any of my business. That may be partly it, but probably not. I think he can be trusted for the report of what the major reasons were for his change of mind.

I’m simply disagreeing with your sweeping disavowal of what Nick observed. I think what he said is quite true, and demonstrably so in lots of actual cases.

I appreciate your thoughtful comments. You are correct that many people leave their faiths because of disagreements with those faiths’ moral beliefs. In fact, that’s more or less what I argued in my response to Nick: that if people apostasize and then engage in activities the faith would call “sin”, it’s typically because the apostates no longer believe in the faith’s moral standards and thus no longer consider these activities to be sinful. I did not take that to be Nick’s meaning, however. He seemed to be saying that people leave because they want to sin. That is, they still believe in the moral standards of the faith, but just don’t care enough or aren’t strong enough to abide by them. If that’s not what Nick meant, then I apologize to him for the misinterpretation. It is unfortunately a pretty common accusation, and one to which I am emotionally attuned, so I may be inclined to see it where it is not really present.

* * *
Speaking of false premises, Chris has stated the following on his blog:

Ultimately, the claim that the Bible is inerrant is simply indefensible. The errors and contradictions in the biblical text are too numerous to count. The Bible itself recognizes the existence of such errors. It makes no claim of inerrancy for itself. And even if it did, the argument for inerrancy would be circular at best. I think it’s clearly time to leave this particular fundamental” behind.

Obviously, a person who thinks that about the Bible, which all traditional Christians believe is an inspired document, will believe all the more so that Catholic doctrine has “contradictions . . . too numerous to count” since we claim for Catholic doctrine mere infallibility: a gift lesser than inspiration.

So there is one of the hostile presuppositions that can cause problems, that I referred to above. These effect one’s reasoning. They are the backdrop; the context of reasoning and how we approach things coming in.

Not only does Chris question biblical inspiration, but also the New Testament canon:

[W]e evangelical types have been trained all our lives to believe that biblical books are better than all others. So we’re not exactly the most unbiased judges.

. . . There’s no way that the book of Revelation, a fairly run-of-the-mill apocalyptic pseudepigraphon, is more valuable than the Didache. Nor can I see the value in having forged and chauvinistic epistles like 1 and 2 Timothy or 2 Peter rather than a document whose authorship is known and respected like 1 Clement.

In response to your two most recent comments, yes, I am the epitome of the slippery slope (as Rory suggested in a previous comment). Although I was raised Pentecostal, I presently consider myself a Christian pluralist.

* * *
As to your question, “why is it that one has placed their private judgment and personal doubts above the judgment of the Church in the first place,” I’d ask you precisely the opposite question. Why is it that you trust the judgment of the Church in the first place?

It is a matter of faith supported by reason. Faith is a supernatural thing. It can’t be reduced to logic and reason. It transcends those things. I became a Catholic and thus submitted myself to accept all that the Church teaches, through faith: but a faith exercised because I saw a great deal of cumulative evidence that supports this faith: particularly of he kind that is typified by Newman’s theory of development, and an overall interpretive framework for the Bible that made eminent sense and was superior to alternatives.

Is it not because you have “judged” it to be trustworthy? Does not a measure of private judgment necessarily precede the affirmation of infallibility? If so, then isn’t it only natural that this initial judgment should remain open to re-evaluation?

The answer is yes, but that is not all it is. It’s an accumulation of all sorts of evidences and factors: some I suspect, perhaps not even on a conscious level. We’re back to the same dynamic of faith and reason and how they are related to each other. We g back to the teaching of Jesus; particularly His setting up of His Church with Peter as leader; apostolic succession, patristic teaching, the vicious internal logical problems of all forms of Protestantism, and many other factors.

This question of “using private judgment to reject private judgment” is a frequent argument of contra-Catholic polemics, and I have replied to it several times.

I’d suggest that if you really break it down, private judgment (and the other faculties of the person, whether inborn or acquired) is all we’ve got. We can lament its limitations and untrustworthiness, but there is simply no alternative. Belief in infallibility requires the exercise of private judgment just as much as rationalism does.

But it’s not “all we’ve got.” This is precisely the main problem as I see it. You have entirely neglected supernatural faith: on which alone Christianity ultimately rests. God draws us; we don’t figure everything out on our own, with our supposedly independent reason. If that were the cause of salvation and discipleship, then Pelagianism is orthodoxy. But all three major branches of Christianity have roundly rejected that.

You completely overlook faith because that is your presupposition coming into the discussion (the other major point I have been making in the last several posts). You’re making my argument for me, when I go to your site and see what you believe. On the question of faith (or lack thereof), for example, you write:

I’d like to suggest that this whole argument is a category confusion. There can be no ranking of Scripture above reason, experience, and feeling because the exercise of these three faculties is logically prior to the acceptance and comprehension of Scripture. We accept Scripture as authoritative because we have had the experience of being told that it is authoritative, and because we have reflected on this and felt or concluded that it is true. We comprehend Scripture only when the experience of reading it gives rise to feeling and reflection on that experience. The same goes for other authorities, whether they be Tradition, the Pope, or the Hare Krishna: their contents can only be accepted by means of the exercise of the three basic faculties through which the world is known: experience, reason, and feeling.

In other words, experience, reason, and feeling are in a category completely their own: a category that logically precedes the other authorities that are typically proposed. So the argument that Scripture can somehow be ranked above reason or experience can only lead to absurdity. A building cannot destroy its own foundation without destroying itself. The building can be viable only to the extent that its foundation is viable.

Faith is never mentioned once. You have no place for it. It is excluded by the supposedly comprehensive categories that you construct. This is hyper-rationalism: an absolutely classic, textbook case.

And this is what I have been contending: this lack of faith and belief that there even is such a thing (by appearances, anyway) leads to things like rejecting biblical inspiration, and the canon, and papal or conciliar infallibility. You’ve made reason your god, in effect. Without faith, no one will believe those things, because, as the Apostle Paul says, God’s wisdom is foolishness to men, and it is only spiritually discerned.

One can support the tenets of faith by reason (I do that all the time, as an apologist), but it is ultimately a matter of faith in what one thinks is true and plausible, for a variety of reasons.

Thanks again for the cordial and eminently reasonable discussion.

Thanks for your kind words and the same back atcha!

* * *
The abundance of heterodox notions on your blog continue to appear. I was wondering if you also denied the fall: without which the entire Christian scheme of salvation and redemption makes little sense. Sure enough, you have done so:

The reason that the narrative of the Fall has been so popular throughout Jewish and Christian history is precisely that it captures in mythic form our suspicions about the state of the world. So rather than ejecting the narrative altogether, I think it’s useful to provide a liberal reading of it. The Fall may not be historical, but it is nevertheless a powerful metaphor.

I think the advantage of the myth of fallen humanity, even if not literally true, is that it expresses the hope that human beings are capable of ideal behavior. If you believe that there is a fundamental capacity for goodness at the core of all of us, then the failure to realize our potential can be conceived of as a “fall” of sorts. But it’s a fall from an ideal standard rather than from one that has ever really been actualized.

What’s next: the Trinity; the deity of Christ; the incarnation, resurrection, ascension? With no fall, sin as we know it and redemption are fundamentally changed, and Christianity becomes scarcely distinct from, say, Buddhism. If you are right, Brit Hume wouldn’t have caught one-hundredth of the flak he has been getting. :-)

Sure enough, orthodox Christology has been ditched, too, in Chris’s religious “pluralism”:

These apparent problems cease to be problematic when we abandon the conservative evangelical perspective in favor of a more liberal one. I am not opposed to Enns’ hypothesis that Scripture incarnates a true, divine message but does so messily. Nor am I opposed to the implication that Jesus incarnated a divine reality but did so messily. Quite to the contrary, these are propositions I enthusiastically embrace. When the traditional “marks” of Christ’s and Scripture’s divinity are removed (as Enns has done), they begin to look less extraordinary. We can begin to imagine that perhaps other texts also mediate a divine message, albeit in a similarly messy way. We can begin to imagine that perhaps other people can also incarnate a divine reality, albeit in a similarly messy way. Christ and Scripture start to look less like unique and unreplicable examples of incarnation, and more like exemplary instances thereof. When they are so conceived, the way is open for us to affirm the universality of divine revelation and to find comparable instances of incarnation in many different times and cultures throughout history, including our own. The way is open for us to affirm the integrity of non-Christian religious experience rather than a priori repudiating it, and to find the divine perspective in the sum of all human perspectives rather than in a single, narrow, sectarian one. In short, the best way to resolve Enns’ dilemma is to embrace a pluralist worldview.

So it looks at this point as if just about anything is up for grabs in Christianity. You have gutted it at its heart if you go after Jesus’ divinity and the fall of man and biblical inspiration. Without a common standard or ground at some prior point in the discussion at the level of premise, fruitful discussion becomes impossible. If indeed, your discussions with David have been key in his new agnosticism as to the truth of Catholicism (as I have seen some indications of), I think he has to seriously ponder the sorts of presuppositions you were operating from and how that affected your reasoning and conclusions.

I’m not advocating the genetic fallacy: that what you say is untrue simply because you said it and because of these manifold heresies you espouse. I’m saying that the grounds for your contentions are questionable on many fundamental levels, and that if someone has accepted your conclusions, then by the nature of the case, chances are that they have uncritically taken in some of your false presuppositions as well (judged by basic Nicene Christian standards).

I don’t exclude the possibility that faith could be given supernaturally.

Glad to hear it. But you certainly made no indication of that whatever in your article I cited, and it belonged in the overall equation. To exclude it was very telling indeed.

But presumably you would agree that some kind of rational activity is involved in recognizing and/or accepting that faith, and in deciding what is its content?

I’ve never denied that. I’m an apologist, for Pete’s sake: why would I want to deny the importance of rational activity in theological matters? That would be ridiculous. What I denied was 1) this reasoning capacity as the initiator of faith and belief; over against Pelagianism, and 2)the exclusion of supernatural faith as an extremely important supra-rational factor in all (true) theological belief.

My concern was the de-emphasis of faith and the excessive emphasis on reason, in the hyper-rationalistic sense. Reason has to be put in its proper place. It’s because it is placed too high in the scheme of things, that folks can sometimes become disenchanted with apologetics: precisely because they didn’t keep the proper balance of reason, in league with other factors like experience, intuition, mysticism, faith, conscience, etc.

And presumably you would agree that supernatural faith is not given in such a straightforward and self-explanatory way that it is easily recognized as such, do you?

Supernatural faith, by definition, is a gift of God. Whoever receives it usually does not understand every jot and tittle of its rationale and justification. It is not the equivalent of an airtight conclusion drawn from a syllogism or other straightforward logical processes. Later on, a person may build up an intellectual apparatus by which they can defend the belief that they initially received by this faith, but to say that faith comes as a result of our profound reasoning efforts, is putting the cart before the horse and a fundamentally flawed analysis of the dynamics involved.

And surely you don’t deny that nearly every Christian sect would claim precisely the sort of faith-infusion you claim, right?

As I stated: all major branches of Christianity reject Pelagianism. It is only cults like Jehovah’s Witnesses (itself shot-through with a sort of naive and curiously inconsistent hyper-rationalism) that teach something akin to it.

So in terms of practical decision-making, we’re still only left with our own resources.

I think we can use reason to defend our own positions, yes. That is why I am an apologist. I don’t think it is all there is, or nearly the most important consideration.

Those resources may include only the things we were born with, or they may include some kind of acquired supernatural faith deposit, but either way the process of decision-making and private judgment still precedes the church’s infallibility.

If something is true, it is so independently of our reasoning by which we espoused it. That’s the point. If Catholicism is indeed the fullness of Christian truth, it is so by God’s design, and not because some sharp person “figured it all out.” We’re talking about matters of alleged or actual objective truth.

The Catholic comes to a decision to accept the Church and all that it teaches. He does so (hopefully, and as in my own case) by consideration of competing claims and reasoned analysis. But becoming convinced entails a lot more than mere reason. We believe that the Church is the fullness of the faith because we believe that was what was revealed to and by the apostles. We accept that in faith, passed down from them.

And presumably the person who re-evaluates his/her belief in infallibility is doing so with any faith infusion still in effect, so the re-evaluation is not qualitatively different than the initial evaluation. The same private judgment is employed in both cases.

I have explained the essential difference between Protestant private judgment and what a Catholic does in accepting the Catholic faith, in one of my papers I linked to above.

Which is all to say that your supernatural infusion of faith ultimately doesn’t suffice to get you out of the problem at hand: that private judgment necessarily precedes the acceptance of infallibility.

This goes round and round. Practically speaking, in terms of comparative theology and competing truth claims, we can all only give the reasons why we think our system is true or more true, defend our claims from critiques, and show how other systems lack proper biblical support, or are inconsistent and illogical at several points, etc. I’m more than happy to defend Catholicism and to discuss the reasons why I think no other Christian system provides the answers to the important questions as Catholicism does.

* * *
I’m an optimist in matters of reason and faith both. I believe that right reason can persuade people of the truth and remove falsehoods from their thought processes. I believe that David could be persuaded to return to the Catholic faith and to see the error of the incorrect positions he has accepted.

Because I believe in reason, I don’t have to denigrate it by ditching it and saying “faith only” (as Edward Reiss and much of Lutheranism seems to have done), or by going to “reason only” (as you have basically done, and which is the liberal path). Nope: the true state of affairs is faith + reason: both in their proper proportion.

* * *
Based on what you wrote above, I’m still not clear on how you think a supernatural infusion of faith gets you out of the logical and temporal priority of private judgment.

Insofar as everyone has to offer rational evidences for their own views (if they hope to persuade anyone else of them: on the human level), we’re in the same boat. I defend Catholic positions, and general Christian ones when I am debating atheists.

My main point previously, however, was to say that truth is not determined by our own logical processes. It is what it is. Our task is to find it. And without supernatural faith we can’t arrive at the true faith (using “faith” in two different senses there).

Anyway, I don’t talk much on my blog about supernatural faith, it’s true (mostly because I haven’t experienced anything that would obviously fit under that heading). But I am not a strict rationalist. I think that the whole person must be ministered to and that the whole person must be involved in decision-making.

I agree. Good. I get accused of being over-rationalistic, too, as do most apologists, because people confuse what we concentrate on with the notion that it is all there is: as if most apologists are foolish enough to believe such a ludicrous thing.

One thing I do talk about a lot on my blog is conscience, which as far as I can tell would not be all that phenomenologically distinguishable from your supernatural faith.

Yes. When it is truly conscience it is God’s voice and that is supernatural. But conscience also has to be informed by apostolic Tradition and the Bible. It can’t go off on its own and contradict those, or it is not what it is thought to be.

My conscience is actually one of the factors that drove me down the slippery slope rather than one that anchored me in the faith.

Many have taken that path; but if you are relying on an atomistically individual conscience, or one driven primarily by skeptical forces, at some point (in my opinion) it is invalid and one is being led by the Evil One, if it is in the direction of falsehood.

In other words, determination of truth is primary, and if a conscience leads to falsehood or wrong behavior or sanctioning of same, then it is not from God, and is diabolically supernatural, not divinely supernatural. Truth and factuality always constitute the bottom line.

He [Dollinger] couldn’t grasp it [Papal Infallibility] because he wasn’t viewing it with the eye of faith and reason.

[Tom: a Mormon] When I read this I find it easy to make a characterization of it and then dismiss it as unhelpful, but perhaps I do not understand what is being said here.

I’m glad you decided to ask for clarification. That is always better than taking the risk of misunderstanding someone, so thanks!

A number of folks on this thread (David W included) are searching for truth. Some of us have strong commitments to our traditions and others have more neutral stances. It would seem to me that from a neutral stance or from a commitment to another faith tradition, the appeal to look at Papal Infallibility with “the eye of faith” would ring rather hollow.

Of course it would, but everything is written in a context. There are several conversations in this thread going on simultaneously, and the subject matter is quite subtle, complex, and nuanced.

My comment there was in a specifically Catholic paradigm, but also placed within a larger overall point I was making about the necessity of supernatural faith: with which all Christian traditions agree. I have been arguing (over against self-described “pluralist” Chris) that Christian faith cannot be reduced to mere philosophy or reason. Nor can it be reduced to historiography.

And so the criticism against Dollinger that Cardinal Newman made in 1870 was along these lines: he thought that he couldn’t accept papal infallibility because he was thinking merely in historiographical terms and in effect reducing Catholic historical considerations to that. But one must also look at things with the eye of faith.

Dollinger was a Catholic, you see, and was an historian. He rejected papal infallibility on historiographical grounds. Newman responded (see above) that he wasn’t quibbling about bare historical facts, but rather, with how to interpret them. And the interpretive framework is what requires faith. This is not Catholic-specific: it applies to any Christian person or group who wants to interpret history “Christianly.”

I suspect this may be part of David Waltz’s rationale, too, for why he has concluded what he has. He seems to be reading some material that tends toward this over-rationalism and minimizes the place that every Christian reserves for faith: a thing that transcends reason without being contrary to it.

The whole point is that we are trying to know if there is something worth having faith in. Unless Catholicism holds some type of priority for us, it does not seem to me that it deserves this “leg up” any more than any number of paradigms.

That’s right. It has to be argued, with those persons who have not yet accepted it. It’s what I do as an apologist.

1. In my particular faith tradition, I speak of the overwhelmingly strong (to me) position associated with some unique aspects AND from this suggest that the most consistent view of the most difficult issues is one that either breaks the tradition (like being a Cafeteria Catholic) OR looks at the weak positions with a boost from the other strong points. If A being true entails B being true and the case for A being true is overwhelming, then one can infer that B is true even if it is unlikely but slightly plausible that B is true.

Yes, plausibility and belief structures all involve axioms, reasonable assumptions and preferability of one option over another. I feel strongly that Catholicism is true because of an overwhelming number of cumulative evidences all taken together: like the proverbial strands of a rope. Papal infallibility is an example of a belief thus confirmed.

This is my attempt at a rational argument for my faith tradition in light of difficult aspects.

The overall approach is agreeable to me. We would disagree on how it comes down, in conclusions.

2. A position that I believe has merit for me, but is of little apologetic value (with the exception of the fact that I believe it is most reasonable to conclude that there is a supernatural being who exists) is my personal witness from God for my faith tradition. If I didn’t think the above rational (attempted rational) argument supported the difficult aspects of my faith tradition, I could still suggest that those things that are plausible but unlikely are still true in light of the experience I have personally had. This of course does little for external dialogue, but IMO it is not an irrational (just and extra rational) position.

I think there are beliefs that are warranted, that go beyond reason, per Plantinga’s arguments for warranted Christian beliefs, properly basic beliefs, etc.

So, I quite expect that you would say that #1 is a good reason to accept what is merely plausible about Papal Infallibility, but your “eye of faith” argument looked much more like Catholicism should receive a preferential “eye of faith” where I doubt you would grant such to Mormonism. It sounded like your “eye of faith” was much more of a #2 than a #1 to me.

I hope I have explained sufficiently. I was describing the critique of one Catholic (Newman), whose development theory is presently being questioned by David W., to another Catholic (Dollinger) who refused to abide by the proclamation of an ecumenical council: a position that is indistinguishable, as far as it goes, with Luther’s stance.

I wasn’t implying in the slightest that this particular notion would be persuasive to anyone outside of Catholicism, except to note that all Christians have a place for faith. So this faith, within the Catholic paradigm, is applied to the papal infallibility issue as well as all others. It’s not reduced to merely historical argumentation. It’s not historical positivism. One must interpret, and that is always the more fascinating part of the process.

Anyway, I will be interested to see how you might flesh out “eye of faith.”

I hope I have helped you better understand where I am coming from. Thanks again for the opportunity and the good discussion.

Thank you for your comments. It does make sense to me that an “eye of faith” is important for difficult issues when one is part of a particular faith tradition. I would suggest that there are many different degrees of conviction however. I know that I once sustained my conviction with an over reliance (close to total reliance) upon reason (as I perceived reason). Evidence against my tradition, especially when it was associated with the reason(s) I believed in the first place could (and did in one instance) shake my conviction considerably. Today, in my occasional apologetic efforts, I offer reason and for me the case is still compelling. But were I to become convinced that reason did not strongly point me in the direction I have gone, I would then have a conflict between my spiritual witness and my intellectual witness. I, like Cardinal Newman during Vatican I, am thankful for the faith to see the landscape of my tradition in a way that aligns both my spiritual and intellectual witnesses. I, like Cardinal Newman respect those who struggle and feel bad when others think they must (1) leave the faith, (2) tolerate conflict between their intellectual witness and their spiritual witness, or (3) jettison significant (IMO) portions of the faith.

* * *
I still think you’re coming very close to question-begging and a double standard. Pointing to supernatural faith is fine, as long as you only mean that people should take their felt conviction into account when making decisions (and as long as this standard is applied consistently to religious people across the board, and not just to Catholics). If the appeal to supernatural faith is used to exclude questioning and/or deconversion, however, then you have gone much too far.

But I’ve never done that. You keep implying that I have, and I keep saying it ain’t my view.

Your question to David earlier in the thread– “why is it that one has placed their private judgment and personal doubts above the judgment of the Church in the first place?”– leads me to believe that you are using it in this latter way.

The question makes perfect sense when asked of a Catholic, because a Catholic has already rejected private judgment insofar as it clashes with the Church: in faith. Therefore, it is perfectly relevant to ask by what process a catholic has gone from the Catholic rule of faith (infallible Church authority) to a Protestant one of private judgment.

I’d also add that the significance of supernatural faith can only be as strong as the experience of it.

It’s not an experience, but an act of God which is not necessarily consciously felt at all.

When I was a Pentecostal, our extra-rational justification was miracles. The nice thing about that was that it was fairly objective and observable (although many experiences were highly subjective as well, such as speaking in tongues, hearing God’s voice, etc.). Ultimately I decided that most of the experiences I had been socialized to view as miraculous were not really all that miraculous, so the extra-rational leg-up was no longer compelling to me. When I investigated Mormonism, I was told that I could obtain an extra-rational “testimony” experience if I prayed about the Book of Mormon. I did so, but obtained only weak and conflicting emotional sensations. So again, the extra-rational component was not deeply compelling to me. In the case of your “supernatural infusion of faith,” it seems like it would be difficult even to identify it as such.

That is not the ultimate criterion of proof, but rather, what the Bible says about it. One who believes it is already believing that the Bible is inspired.

And again, there is always the possibility that someone just won’t feel much in the way of supernatural faith at all, in which case the appeal to said faith won’t be a particularly compelling defense.

Again, you compare mere feeling with God’s sovereign actions.

* * *
I guess I’m still a bit confused as to what exactly your view is. Earlier in the thread you seemed to agree with me that supernatural faith is one of a number of different factors that must be kept in balance during our judgment-process, along with reason, experience, intuition, mysticism, and conscience. Now though, you seem to be denying that it is part of our conscious awareness, and more or less equating it with Providence. And I still can’t figure out, given either definition, how any of this solves the problem of the logical and temporal priority of private judgment to the acceptance of infallibility. And to complicate matters, you went on at some length about how your point was that truth is objective and external to ourselves, which I don’t really disagree with and which in any case doesn’t seem to have much to do with your points about faith and infallibility. Perhaps your real point lies in your statement that “a Catholic has already rejected private judgment insofar as it clashes with the Church.” Under this view, a Catholic by becoming a Catholic has forfeited his right to question the Church. I can’t figure out, though, whether this is a legal argument (i.e. “you made an oath, so your soul is ours”) or a sort of logical/developmental argument (i.e. “private judgment was an earlier, childlike state of existence, but now you have passed beyond it to the higher level of robotically accepting infallibility”). (Please forgive my wry and possibly offensive attempt at humor.) To the legal argument, I’d respond that our obligation to the truth is at least as important as our obligation to keep our oaths, so if we find out that an oath violates this other moral and legal obligation, then I’d view breaking the oath as the lesser evil. To the logical/developmental argument, I’d go back to the issue of the logical and temporal priority of private judgment. By denying the authority of private judgment to judge the tradition, the Catholic denies the very means by which s/he came to accept the tradition in the first place, and thus undermines his/her own position. Realistically, private judgment simply cannot be forfeited, because our reason/intuition/conscience/faith etc. are always with us, no matter how we may try to suppress them. I suspect God designed us that way.

You can have the last word on this.

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(originally 1-19-10)
Photo credit: Circe Denyer [PublicDomainPictures.NetCC0 Public Domain license]
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2018-11-27T15:23:24-04:00

Creation, Freedom, Rebellion, Suffering, Etc.

This exchange comes from the Debunking Christianity blog (my favorite atheist / agnostic haunt at the moment), from a discussion thread Daniel Morgan’s words will be in blue.

* * * * *

“God desired to love and be loved by other beings. God created human beings with this end in view. To make us capable of such fellowship, God had to give us the freedom to choose, since love cannot be either automatic or coerced. This sort of free will, however, entailed the danger that we would use it to go our own way in defiance of both God and our own best interests.”

[I think this is from Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga ]

This argument is well-known. I thought there was something I was missing. First, the question of how and why God would choose to create at all is a good one.

Yep, but not the topic at hand.

Perfection would only seek higher perfection, or maintaining its own perfection.

On what basis do you conclude that?

Why, if God foreknew all that was to come, did It then decide to disrupt the perfection of Its own existence by instantiating evil, pain, and suffering (choosing not to love God is not necessarily evil, by the way, that is an onus for the theist to show)? How is that plausible?

Existence is better than nonexistence. Creation allows more sentient beings to enter into love and the good things we know in life and to eternal life if all goes right. That’s self-evidently a good thing, just as when we are enjoying a baseball game (as when our Detroit Tigers took the pennant yesterday), we like it when more people share our enjoyment. This is why going to sports events or concerts are fun. Imagine sitting there all by yourself in the stands. Not quite the same, is it?

So I take existence as a good thing. The question then becomes: was the evil and suffering entailed by free will worth it, so that God could (or should) create? He thought so, and I believe in faith that it was good to create, based on many reasons I have to believe that He exists and that He is good. Not that it ain’t difficult to comprehend; very few Christians would say evil is not perplexing.

When I think of all the love and enjoyment and pleasure I receive from my wife and three sons and a daughter, it is immediately self-evident that they should exist rather than not exist. The more children the merrier. I love children. They bring joy to one’s life. But they are valuable in and of themselves, not simply because they bring me pleasure. That is just one benefit among many to their existing. Likewise, God and His creation. It’s better for you to be here than not be here. It’s better for me, and so forth. Therefore, creation itself was a good thing. The bad things do not outweigh it (so we believe).

God wanted to be loved so bad that It said, “Well, it’s worth having a few people suffer in torment for eternity if a few other people can live in paradise with me for eternity and worship me.”???

If you frame the issue in these ridiculous, caricatured terms, of course no one will believe it. But this isn’t serious analysis. If you think Christianity is that ridiculous why do you bother attempting to talk to a Christian at all? It’d be like me seeking out conversation with a flat-earther or someone who thinks he is Michelangelo, in a rubber room in a mental asylum. I have neither the desire nor the time to do that.

Freedom of will and freedom of action are two separate things. This is a serious refutation of the free will theodicy, as we can carefully go through and show that the freedom of action that humans possess to do evil is completely unnecessary and unrelated to the question of whether they will to love God (or not).

I see.

And, as I hinted above, God determines (supposedly) what is evil (eating the fruit), as well as the consequences thereof (or the method of redemption). Therefore, all of the things that the theist takes for granted from the Bible can be shown to be completely unnecessary and, in many ways, illogical for a creature that would want what is best for other creatures.

Unless I saw that argument, what could I say?

e.g. The idea of “original sin” and “federal headship” are taken for granted because they are the only way to make sense of how (supposedly) it is that we are affected and afflicted with evil when we do not have the same situation as our supposed perfect great-great-grandpa did. The question of fleshing out how fair or just this scenario is, relative to other scenarios (wherein God does not let Adam breed, and starts over, so that instead of “sin” affected roughly 15 billion people throughout earth’s history (or more), it only affects 2 people…We always take things for granted without remembering that God makes the rules (in your worldview) and holding God to making those rules which minimize pain, suffering, and evil . . .

And the conclusion is? Let me guess . . . . (drum roll) God doesn’t exist! Right!

Et cetera. We can examine all of these sorts of ancillary and contingency issues to see if they make sense and are consistent with perfection, omniscience, and omnipotence, and I find them quite lacking.

Yes we can, and many thoughtful people find theism perfectly plausible and atheism perfectly implausible. All we can do is keep making our arguments. But argument itself is not enough to convince an atheist. They need to be shown love. Say, if I saved your life at great risk to my own, or gave up something for your sake, then that might get you wondering, “why did he do that?” And I would say because it was right and because this is what God teaches me to do. Some profound event like that is what changes hearts and minds, usually. Not abstract argumentation.

Likewise, I think Christians become atheists oftentimes because they are sick of some hypocrisy among Christians that they see, or were treated abominably by professed Christians, or were in a corner of Christianity that doesn’t represent the mainstream and they got a wrong impression of the whole.

Further, the question of whether or not people in heaven can choose to love God, or will love God whether they want to or not, is always an interesting parallel: if they will love God eternally, and no second “fall” is possible, then I would argue this cannot be considered “free will”. If that is true (that there is no FW in heaven), then I would ask why it is that the price of FW (evil) is somehow “accounted for” on earth and for 70 years, but the price of FW (evil) is not “accounted for” in heaven?

I think this is an excellent aspect of the “problem” and one I wonder about a lot myself. At this point my understanding is that freedom need not involve the necessity of actual (or even potential?) contrary choice. Christians believe that the angels were created sinless and free, and most of them never rebelled. So they have remained sinless all this time since they were created. It is possible. We also believe God is free, but He not only never sins; He is unable to do so because this contradicts His own nature. Evil and sinning are not essential to the definition of freedom.

As for heaven, it is clear that God has to bring about a change in creatures so that there is no more sin (we Catholics think purgatory is the process by which that happens). The difference between heaven and this life is that we somehow “passed the test” of this life and achieved salvation with the necessary help of God’s grace, so that He can now transform us. We freely followed; then we were transformed and freely follow without sin henceforth. Therefore it wasn’t just a bunch of robots, where “following” is existentially meaningless.

God thought 70 years (or so) of FW was enough for humans to have, but then decided to make them into auto-God-loving-robots for eternity?

They’re not robots; that’s the whole point. They freely accepted God’s grace in this life so that they could make it to heaven in the first place, after having corporately rebelled against God (original sin). Now God gives them enough grace (having ceased their rebellion) to be both free and sinless again, as human beings were originally.

It is logically implausible. (note I’m not saying “impossible” – but it’s just not very believable)

I think it is quite difficult to comprehend and mysterious indeed, but it is not technically contradictory for a free creature to somehow never sin.

Evil resulting from present human choices and evil resulting from God’s present choices must also be addressed – natural evil. I know you mentioned you had a paper on this and I’ll try to get around to reading it.

Here is that paper. I argued that it is incoherent to argue on the one hand that God hardly ever (perhaps never) intervenes in natural law, but that He must intervene 10,000 times a second to prevent every imaginable human suffering. I think that is a silly notion of how the world sensibly operates. Rather, God lets the world go on as it does, with its natural laws, intervening only rarely in a miraculous way. We are responsible to make the world a better place.

We’re not a bunch of helpless babies, requiring our “daddy” (God) to do everything for us. Every baby reaches a place where it gets a diaper rash or gas pains or scrapes its knee or bumps its head on an end table corner. Parents can’t take that away. But they can comfort and understand the pain. Likewise, by analogy, with God and us.

We find that wills are acted on towards desires – that is, we will things that we desire. Human nature, supposedly perfect before some “fall” event, still had the desire to do the one and only thing God decided to make a violation of goodness (eating the fruit – it “looked good, etc.”).

The sin was rebellion against God. The word picture of fruit is only a means by which to illustrate that mankind decided to foolishly go its own way by not obeying the Creator. Again, it’s just like parents and children. We all understand this. Everyone knows that a mother and father have incomprehensibly more knowledge and wisdom than a one-year-old. You can tell a young child not to touch the flame on the stove or play with knives or put its head through a window, etc. Some will listen (we had great success with ours in that way) but some won’t and will do it, thinking they know better.

But yet when it comes to God, atheists can’t seem to comprehend that a Being of that sort, Who is omniscient, is infinitely above us. Why would we expect to understand everything about such a fabulous Being? But suppose this God chooses to communicate Himself to us in terms we can understand? So we believe God did so in history (with direct communication and miracles) and in the Bible.

God told the first humans to obey Him, because of Who He was and who they were. They chose not to. We believe that this rebellion was corporate in some mysterious sense, and that all mankind is involved in it. A cosmic change occurred.

But the principle behind it is as simple as understanding that a baby is utterly foolish to disobey his or her parents in simple matters of health and safety. They choose to obey by some intuitive sense (“this person feeds me and seems to love and care for me, so maybe I can trust them when they say I can’t do this thing that makes me curious and gives me a desire to do”) or disobey (“I know better than this big person. I don’t care if they feed and clothe me. So what? I’m gonna disobey them because I want to. Period.”).

It has been pointed out on here before that those desires are controlled by God,

They are, huh? So there is no free will and determinism is the thing?

and that although we are all free to cut off our own arm with a rusty saw blade, we choose not to act on that, because it conflicts with our desire to be pain-free and happy and functional.

Of course.

For whatever reason, you think it is more believable that God gave Adam and Eve some sort of “sin” to choose that was easy for them to want to choose. That makes little sense.

I just explained it. It is the irrationality and desire of a child that any parent is aware of. There is this desire for independence and thinking one knows better than the “guardian” that they happen to be left to deal with. Child to parent is as creature-human to God.

There is absolutely no good reason that God cannot say, “The only thing I don’t want you to do is cut off your own arm with a rusty spoon.” Choosing to allow freedom, and create a good/evil dichotomy, in such a way that lessens the likelihood that humans will fall into it and bring about all this pain and suffering is necessary for a good God.

As Alvin Plantinga has shown, it is impossible for even an omnipotent and good God to make a world with free will and make it impossible for there to be suffering and evil. He proves this by inexorable logic, not speculation. You disagree? Great; show me where his logic went astray.

I can go on and on,

So could I. I’ve already gone on and on here. LOL

but suffice it to say that I (and others) have thought much about this defense. In the end, although Plantinga presents us with something to try to excuse God for allowing evil, it just doesn’t stand up as believable an option (as some alternative options would be) under scrutiny.

“Believable” or “plausibility” is a subjective judgment involving premises which can themselves be questioned. We Christians have lots and lots of premises, and we build upon them. Most if not all premises can be questioned at some point, unless they are absolutely basic, or laws of logic or mathematics. This is true for atheists as well.

I have argued for years that we are all basically in the same epistemological boat. If you question my premises as an atheist, I can turn around and question yours. We can play that game all day. You will be in no better shape in the end than any Christian, and perhaps much worse off, and more inconsistent and incoherent, or left without meaning that can be objectively established.

Faith or some sort of inductive leap comes in, with any viewpoint. No exceptions. Now, how we arrive at our viewpoints despite this inability of everyone to construct an absolutely airtight, unquestionable system is what I find truly fascinating. Why does the atheist go the way he does, the Christian another way, a Buddhist a third way, etc.?

I know that many factors are involved. That is a given. But insofar as we can seek some epistemological super-reason for why people believe as they do, I would go again with Plantinga and his explanation of other minds and his contention that certain things (including belief in God) are “properly basic” and that it is not irrational to hold them as such.

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(originally 10-15-06)

Photo credit: Andrea Lodi (12-10-07) [Flickr / CC BY-ND 2.0 license]

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2018-11-27T14:37:47-04:00

From an atheist discussion list: 13 January 2002, uploaded with editorial permission from Steve Conifer, whose words will be in blue.

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I’d like to get down to basics and inquire as to the atheist’s (or agnostic’s) first principles, axioms, starting-points, premises, initial presuppositions or assumptions (pick your favorite term). Then I’ll play Socrates a bit if I may. :-) Just a summary is fine; I’m not looking for a treatise at this point, or even a bare-bones outline of atheist epistemology, or “atheology” if you will: just the very first premises you start from, such as, e.g., “I exist,” “minds exist,” “the senses can be counted on to accurately perceive external natural events,” “non-sensory ‘internal experience’ is inherently untrustworthy and hopelessly subjective,” “logic [as classically understood] is an immutable eternal principle,” etc.

I am assuming that atheists on this list are of the post-Enlightenment (usually positivist or analytical, and materialist) humanist variety, with no particular religious belief (as a working generalization). I realize that all belief-systems are more complicated once you look at them more closely, and the shortcomings of generalization, but as I said, I’m just trying to find out how these (various atheist) views are built up: what the starting-points are. I’m not trying to “do” technical philosophy at the moment (if I am ever qualified to do it). All positions (philosophical, religious, or otherwise) start with axioms — I think we can all agree on that; there is no escaping it.

Every atheist has positive premises that he believes. Nobody operates on a basis of simply “I don’t believe x, y, and z, and that is my axiomatic starting-point.” You believe something, in a positive sense. I changed the nature of my initial inquiry by acknowledging that, yes, there are many sorts of atheists (which I knew, anyway). Nevertheless, a certain type predominates on this list. So I changed the question to “what are your premises?” (i.e., any given individual).

Atheists start with first premises just as I do. It is foolish to think that in order for you to talk about your own beliefs, you must make mention of a God whose existence you deny. That would be like me as a Christian saying that in order to talk about my beliefs, we must start by discussing polytheism, or the nonexistence of spirits and the supernatural, tenets that I deny. I’m not interested in polemics and controversy at the moment: just the basis upon which materialism or naturalism logically builds itself up. You ought to welcome such an inquiry.

You are not merely operating on a minimalist premise of “I don’t believe in what doesn’t exist [God]; that is my starting-point.” You must affirm something without reference to that which you deny, in order to have any belief-system at all, in order to communicate in words at all, otherwise you are merely babbling nonsense (in its literal meaning).

Atheists must, at some point in their thinking, of course, diverge from theistic conclusions, but not necessarily in the beginning. On the other hand, even when an atheist states, “the universe exists,” the tacit assumption which lies behind that is, “the universe is self-existent and has no cause outside of itself.” In other words, how the universe came to exist at all is the question we all must ultimately deal with if we are curious about nature and reality.

When I wrote, “every atheist has positive premises that he believes,” I was referring to the atheist as a species of man, viz.:

1. Every person has positive axioms in his thought.
2. Atheists are persons.
3. Therefore, atheists have positive axioms in their thought.

I could just as well have said that “every gardener has positive axioms in his thought” or “every art museum curator has positive axioms in his thought.” Logically speaking, no implication is present which would require atheist presuppositions to be unique to atheism, or in inherent conflict with theistic presuppositions. That comes later (in the larger worldview), but not at the very beginning, as we are seeing now, with the first replies to my initial question. I, for one, am quite happy that there are many common beliefs which theists and atheists share.

Some questions and issues which might arise in the course of this discussion are:

1. How did the universe come to exist in the first place? And why do you believe it exists?

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2. Why are the senses to be trusted to give us knowledge about the real world? For instance, sensory observations could be merely systematic illusions. A certain “logic” (or self-consistent alternate “worlds”) might be said to be present even in dreams which aren’t real, in terms of natural events corresponding to the “visions” therein. Arguably, truth also comes from inside our heads, from the very way we think, before we ever get to the “outside world.” It seems to me that we have to place an extraordinary trust in the reliability and accuracy of our senses (and in our brains, which process and organize the data received from sensory perception) to even be able to take in data of the scientific sort: that which is “publicly available” and “justifiable” and falsifiable, and replicable, and so forth.

3. We can agree on the necessity of logic, but we must keep in mind that all logic involves premises, as logic consists merely of laws of relationships of one idea to another. One must still begin with ideas which they take as unquestionable in order to do logic at all. So, again, there are implicit, unspoken assumptions behind all axioms.

4. Many of atheist’s axioms are commonly-held, more or less across the board (excepting perhaps, several eastern religious views, where the universe is an illusion, or maya, etc.). But how they are understood and applied will differ fairly quickly, between atheist and theist. Also, the epistemological grounds for holding the axioms in the first place may differ, perhaps greatly.

Furthermore, one can distinguish between the following two propositions:

A. All atheists have starting assumptions or axioms.

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B. All atheists’ starting assumptions or axioms are inherently atheistic (and therefore, unalterably opposed to theistic assumptions).

I accept A, but not B. Many atheists seem to mistakenly think the Christian is arguing B because they seem to be (I speculate) predisposed to think that all theist critiques of atheism see little or no common ground whatever between the two views. I agree that some strains of Christian apologetics or religious philosophy do that (one in particular is called presuppositionalism, which is dominant among Calvinists), but “mainstream” Christian apologetics and theology do not. And I believe that the Bible itself does not do this either.

The epistemology (or what might be called the “ontological framework”) which lies behind atheists’ vs. theist’s premises might differ widely. No doubt those factors will enter into this discussion in due course as well. One might ask why atheists and theists diverge in their beliefs in the first place. In a nutshell, I would venture to guess that it is because materialist atheists (which I understand to be the “standard” or most prevalent kind) deny the existence of spirit and the supernatural: a sort of intrinsic “anti-Platonism.” Everything is reduced to physical matter and the laws of nature. I think there is a failure of what might be called the “intellectual imagination,” whereby matter is seen as the be-all and end-all of reality. That is what I would regard as the fundamental mistake or error.

I would argue that this position is not as self-evident as most atheists seem to cavalierly assume. And the reason for that is the set of axiomatic assumptions lying behind scientific inquiry: that which bolsters, in the materialist mind, atheism, and supposedly mitigates against any non-materialist entities (science almost being tantamount, in effect, to “God” for many atheists). One has to make several assumptions to “do” science at all, none of which are airtight and unquestionable, for example:

1. The universe exists.
2. One’s own senses can be trusted to accurately perceive external events.
3. Uniformitarianism of natural law.
4. That order is “ontologically superior” to disorder and chaos.
5. That order is a real entity, existing outside our minds, etc.
6. Laws exist and can be codified and systematized.
7. There are such things as theories and hypotheses which may correspond to physical realities.

Etc.

Traditionally, Christians (and even some non-Christian cultural observers) have asserted that modern science in fact arose (and arguably, necessarily) in a Christian milieu, and that there was very good reason for that: science required starting-assumptions which Christianity provided. The above questions were resolved by recourse to God, who created our minds and made them able to perceive and conceive, and Who created the universe with laws so that it could be orderly and predictable and observable in the first place: Kepler’s observation that scientists were “thinking God’s thoughts after him.”

Why materialist atheists are so convinced that neither spirits nor miracles nor the supernatural exist, and how and why they think mind, intelligence, and things like DNA could evolve in a materialistic universe, are questions I am curious about. I hope to delve into those in due course.

Science is something all parties can largely agree on, since it is so verifiable and replicable. The differences really stand out when we talk about origins and First Cause and teleology; why and how the universe is here, does it have any “purpose,” and if there are entities which transcend matter and natural laws alike. We contend as Christian philosophers that God as First Cause is perfectly plausible, and at least as good, if not more so, than any other explanation of the universe, according to reason and modern cosmology.

We say that science cannot rule out spirits and God because they are simply not its domain, being neither physical, nor subject to natural laws. And we say that miracles (the supernatural) can be verified by observation, and thus cannot be so easily dismissed as philosopher David Hume and others seem to think. Lastly, we contend that God is as necessary for thought, intelligence, and the ability to be rational and to do science and philosophy, as logic itself is, because only an Intelligent Designer could put together all the marvels we see in the brain, things like DNA, and the universe as a whole, and make possible both the marvels themselves, and our ability to perceive and understand the workings (and for that matter, beauty) of them.

Here are “large” truths whose negations I take to be incoherent, hence truths which I regard as necessary:

(1) Something exists.
(2) Laws of logic cannot be violated; contradictions cannot be true.
(3) Incoherent propositions (e.g., Socrates is a prime number) cannot be true.

Good. I agree. But I am curious as to how and why something came to exist, rather than nothing.

I am toying with the notion of adding

(4) There is nothing that science could never (even in principle) discover and explain.

How in the world do you arrive at that conclusion? And why would you even consider it as an axiom? It seems to me to involve several intermediate assumptions and deductions.

Well, it is basically just a tenet of something like positivism or naturalism, a somewhat different way of saying that metaphysical sentences (e.g., “there is a personal being outside time and space”) are cognitively meaningless.

Another discussion . . . I don’t buy the concept of defining away metaphysical entities by merely playing around with words. That’s partially why I’m not that fond of the ontological argument, because it is so utterly unempirical. But it is infinitely superior to this sort of analytic positivist gobbledygook, which would rather render concepts like God “cognitively meaningless” than examine the possibility that God’s existence is perfectly consistent with a scientific view of the universe, and as plausible an explanation of origins as any other.

But for right now I will stick with just (1)-(3). It is with some hesitation that I affirm the necessity of even (1), and I concede that I may be wrong about that one. However, it is my contention that meaningful discourse with someone who doubts (2) would be impossible, and such discourse with someone who doubts (3) would be very, very difficult (if not impossible).

Absolutely.

What I doubt is the NECESSITY of (1), not the TRUTH of (1). That is, I have doubts that “something exists” expresses a proposition that MUST be true, but of course I unreservedly affirm that it expresses a proposition that IS true.

For what it’s worth, the Christian says that the existence of the universe is not a necessary state of affairs. So for a materialist, this belief would negate the necessity of #1. We do think that God’s existence is necessary, in order for anything else (material) to exist. But since for you spirit and supernatural are nonsense and gibberish, this whole paragraph is rendered null and void. :-)

I am sympathetic to calling (4) a necessary truth because I have great difficulty conceiving its negation, i.e., the proposition that there might be something which science could never (even in principle) discover and explain.

Why? You just gave several examples above of something quite near to this, if not fulfilling what you have “great difficulty conceiving”: e.g., “As for how the multi-verses came into existence, we might suppose that we cannot answer that because the explanation for it lies within the laws of the multi-verses themselves.” Then you stated, as to the mystery of why something exists rather than nothing: “In the final analysis, . . . the best answer at present is a supremely simple and thoroughly honest ‘we don’t know.’ ”

Yet you are tempted to call #4 a necessary truth, when you yourself refute it all through this post (self-refutations always make the critic’s job so much easier)? Science — by your own virtual admission — can’t even explain the origin of that which is its specialty and field of inquiry: the universe! Yet you want to believe that it can explain anything, despite any and all evidence to the contrary. Curious. Odd. And very revealing as to your presuppositional biases. Science, too, is a philosophy, and it starts with unprovable axioms. It’s not the sum of all knowledge. Not by a long shot.

After all, as Ted [Drange] recently queried, what is the (conceptual) difference between an empty jar and a jar containing only a necessarily undetectable existent? My answer is, “The difference between a world just like ours and a world full of magic that has no effects whatever on anything whatever.”

The fallacy here is in assuming (on what basis, I wonder?) that the supernatural would not and could not have an effect on the natural, or partake of observability, or (in its effects) be capable of undergoing observation (e.g., a medically-verified healing). The difference is the fact that the existent is in the second jar, of course. If you want to merely talk about “appearances,” I find that uninteresting philosophically. E.g., we can’t see natural gas, either (even the odor we smell is added so we’ll know it is present at all). Don’t mean it ain’t able to cause bacon to be fried indoors or help dry up a pair of wet socks.

Which is to say, there is no difference at all between the two. To put it (sort of) succinctly, to me the supernatural is impossible nonsense, and talk of the supernatural is meaningless gibberish,

I can see that, but why?, is the question? You having great fun poking holes in caricatures of what you oppose is one thing; explaining why you oppose it (i.e., the real thing, rightly understood) and how your view is epistemologically superior, quite another.

The supernatural is to me impossible nonsense because the idea of supernatural beings is incoherent. Therefore, talk of the supernatural is (cognitively) meaningless gibberish.

How is “the idea of supernatural beings” incoherent (it’s interesting that you used this word rather than “impossible”)? Because spirits can’t exist? Is that all you got for me: dogmatic assertions on no grounds other than unprovable axiomatic assumptions?

but psychologically and sociologically fascinating noise-making of the most urgent variety.

Atheism is equally fascinating from our standpoint, I assure you.

No doubt. It is, after all, rebellion against God Himself,

More like a revolt against reason and logic, judging by your present response. :-)

whose existence is so incredibly apparent in “nature and conscience” that no sane and honest person could rationally deny it.

There are many reasons, I think, why people come to have atheist beliefs, just as there are many for coming to believe in Christianity. There are non-rational, emotional, and psychological (even geographical and sociological) influences on both sides. To deny that for either is folly, in my opinion. I find the study of both processes equally interesting, myself. But I don’t by any means regard the average atheist as a dolt and gullible idiot (quite the contrary), let alone insane and dishonest, as so many atheists regard us. I think atheists have made honest or inadvertent mistakes in their reasoning process, and adopted inadequately established premises, which are at least as unprovable as our axioms (and, of course I believe, less plausible). Hence, the present thread. You are not disabusing me of my present beliefs on this matter at all thus far. :-)

Natural gas can be detected both actually (in various ways) and in principle. By contrast, a necessarily undetectable existent cannot be detected (even in principle).

The very statement presupposes that something exists (“existent”); therefore it could conceivably exist! Therefore it is not a meaningless or inconceivable object, because existence is a pretty important trait to have. Whether one can detect it or not is irrelevant, except as a practical matter. But as I reject the pragmatic criterion of truthfulness, that is of no import to me.

At any rate, you seem to have totally missed the point of my example, which is that to utter sentences like “there exists something that could never be observed, measured, recorded, etc.” is both vacuous and unintelligible.

Not at all. It only seems to be that to you because you axiomatically presuppose that only observable things exist in the first place. That is hardly compelling, being circular from the outset, and no real argument.

For such sentences lack content

Not at all; they merely lack empirical content. There is a difference, you know.

and nobody can understand what it would mean for them to be true, despite all that some might say to the contrary.

Nonsense. That was why I used my natural gas analogy. A better one might be one atom of ytterbium (Yb) floating around the room I am in. How likely am I to be able to detect it? Does that make it nonexistent? Appealing to sophisticated scientific machines does not overcome the analogy, because we’re talking about my perception. Just because I can’t perceive something (or even if it is flat-out impossible to perceive) does not necessarily make it nonexistent.

Thus, if science can’t observe a spirit, this proves absolutely nothing one way or the other about whether spirits exist, because no one who knows anything about science would expect it to be able to do so, as spirits are not matter, and science is the philosophy of matter (yes, it reduces to philosophy: its called empiricism). Science could observe the effect of a spirit or the supernatural, though; that gets back to the miracles discussion. In fact, science always does this because everything it observes was created by God, or that which is causally derived from same. :-)

There is just no proposition there at all;

No, there is no perception there at all. What is this?: the philosophical application of “out of sight, out of mind”?

there is only more of that meaningless noise-making that I referred to earlier.

It’s only meaningless if you presuppose that empirical observation is the key to all knowledge (and you must tell me why that would be). Otherwise, it is perfectly legitimate logic and possible reality. I’m quite surprised that you can’t see this, as sharp as you are.

As Dr. Drange writes in his book NONBELIEF & EVIL,

If a sentence is unintelligible, then either it does not express any proposition at all or else it expresses a proposition that is inconsistent or in some other way unthinkable. Therefore, it does not express anyone’s belief.

And if a sentence is deemed unintelligible because unproven and unprovable axioms render it that way from the outset, by arbitrary definition, then we can create nonsense in any sentence we like, can’t we Steve?

If people go around saying, “I believe there is a personal being who is outside space and time,” then my reaction is to deny that they really believe THAT. Rather, such people are apparently mistaken about their own beliefs.

Why, if logic and mathematics and geometry can be perceived as outside space and time, and eternal principles of the relationships of ideas? So now you’re telling me that in fact I don’t (and can’t) believe what I believe? That’s interesting. We must flesh that out sometime. But I always tire very quickly of the word-games of analytic philosophy. If I wanna spend my time playing around with words, I’d much rather play Scrabble or write poetry, or come up with clever aphorisms or limericks. No offense intended (you don’t think much of Christianity, either, so why beat around the bush?).

To have a belief requires more than just the disposition to assert given sentences. It is also required that there be some thinkable set of ideas to serve as the object of the belief. [end of quote]

That’s what we’re trying to get at with regard to your views, but as usual, it has already been switched around to the lambasting of theism.

But if a sentence is unintelligible, then it does not express any such set of ideas. It cannot express anything which anyone could entertain in thought and which could thereby be the object of a belief.

Yep. The question is what determines “intelligibility”? If you think it is some spectacular and irrefutable philosophical discovery to simply assume empiricism with no proof and then to go on and regard anything non-empirically ascertained as nonsensical and meaningless, then I must inform you that you have overestimated the strength of your position just a wee tiny bit. It’s another instance of building a house of cards with no very sure or solid foundation.

I have no idea what it might mean for a being to be necessary.

Do you have any idea what it might mean for logic to be necessary? If you do, please explain how such an analogous belief in God is intrinsically unthinkable or inconceivable?

As Hume noted, “There is no being the nonexistence of which entails a contradiction.”

I can conceive of God not existing. I have no problem with that. David Hume, remember, accepted God’s existence on the basis of the teleological argument, which he made himself, quite forcefully. Many atheists don’t seem to be aware of that, and I pointed it out last time I was here. So he is in our camp on this one, and very few atheists are willing to call Hume stupid or gullible, or one who believes in things which are “gibberish” and “meaningless nonsense,” etc.

It might be said that the best explanation for why things appear to exist in a certain way is because they really DO exist in that way, and that that is the best explanation because it is simpler than the skeptic’s alternative. Though it has its defects, I think there is great merit in this type of approach to the skeptic’s challenge.

My analogical mind latched onto this immediately. Try this:

It might be said that the best explanation for why belief in God is nearly universal and that God appears to exist in a certain way is because God really DOES exist in that way, and that that is the best explanation because it is simpler than the atheist’s alternative. Though it has its defects, I think there is great merit in this type of approach to the atheist’s challenge.

Why would this argument for God’s existence be less valid or sound than the way you use the exact same logic for existence of the physical world? In both instances we are dealing with a widely-perceived reality, held by the vast majority of people. Most people regard God as a necessary belief in order to get through life, just as acceptance of the physical world is required to get through life with “life and limb.” Atheists are in a minority amongst theists, just as absolute idealism or solipsism is a tiny minority amongst those who accept the material existence of the universe. What’s the logical difference?

Gotta love philosophy (actually logic) when it is this much fun :-)

If (1) [“something exists”] is indeed a necessary truth, as I believe it is, then it makes no sense to ask how the world (or the “first thing”) came to be. For it DIDN’T come to be.

On what basis do you believe it to be a necessary truth, though? Existence per se is a separate proposition from the possible beginning or eternality of existence. Existence and duration are distinct concepts. It seems to me that two possible scenarios can occur:

A. That which exists always existed, never did not exist, never had a beginning (nor will it have an ending) and is infinite in duration.B. That which exists began its existence some time in the past and is therefore finite in duration.

It simply is (or, alternately, there IS no “first thing”; the world is just eternal).

In a metaphysical philosophy conveniently disconnected from science, sure!

If, on the other hand, (1) is a merely contingent truth, then one possible explanation for the existence of the universe is that it began acausally. That is how most contemporary cosmologists (incl. Stephen Hawking, Alex Linde, and Andre Vilenkin) think the present-day universe was birthed.

Can you explain this curious concept in layman’s terms, so we can grasp more clearly what exactly you are talking about. How does something like the universe begin without a cause, and what is the evidence for such a remarkable assertion?

Another possible explanation is that the observable universe sprang from an (unobservable and possibly no longer existent) hyper-universe of sorts. Perhaps there are (or were) many such “bubble worlds.”

“I’m forever blowing bubbles . . . ” (God)

Do you consider this more plausible and rational than positing a God? It obviously is not a scientific belief at all, since the thing under consideration is “unobservable” and maybe non-existent. One wonders how the evidence which can be brought forth for God is any less compelling than this!

Contingently unobservable entities can be inferred to exist from their effects. (God, by contrast, is a NECESSARILY unobservable entity).

Effects of God can certainly be observed. They are called “miracles.” You simply assume (like Hume) that miracles are impossible, hence that God is “a NECESSARILY unobservable entity,” unlike your “bubble worlds.” You also seem to have forgotten that a certain man claimed to be the Christian God come in the flesh. :-) Just because you don’t believe something doesn’t make it “a NECESSARILY unobservable entity.”

As I understand the situation (which is pretty dimly), the theory of multi-verses is, like the notion of an acausal inception, quite popular among working physicists. As for how the multi-verses came into existence, we might suppose that we cannot answer that because the explanation for it lies within the laws of the multi-verses themselves; and, whether necessarily or due to empirical constraints, we lack knowledge of those laws.

But you’re willing to possibly accept this nonetheless, lest the alternative be the dreadful God-hypothesis, which is, of course, irrational, unbelievable, implausible, and unworthy of adherence, being far inferior to “multi-verses” whose laws cannot be known, and about which we can (by the nature of the case) know nothing or next to nothing. Talk about fideism! This puts the most childlike, gullible faith of the most uninformed Christian to shame. This is the sort of faith which is impervious to all disproof, since it has no proof whatsoever in the first place!

Yet another explanation is that the universe was brought into being by an impersonal mechanism of some sort, or a finite deity who is now dead, or an infinite yet largely malevolent deity who created the universe for the sole purpose of tormenting its denizens with things like earthquakes and plagues and tornadoes (from whose devastating results this wicked god derives boundless glee).

All options which are, of course, more plausible and feasible than the traditional God of Christianity. Of course . . . who could deny that?

In the final analysis, though, I agree with Mark: the best answer at present is a supremely simple and thoroughly honest “we don’t know.”

I deem that as infinitely superior to the other options you have presented, so I am delighted that you adopt it after the quick run-down of the alternatives (excluding theism, which is prima facie absurd and irrational).

Right now there is just too little information about the matter to make a reliable judgment concerning it. Though the best guesses of our brightest scientists appear to be on the right track, the fact of the matter is that the origin of the cosmos may be the last “Great Mystery.”

Fair enough.

In any case, it should go without saying that even the weakest of naturalistic explanations is ipso facto superior to even the simplest and most plausible of supernaturalistic explanations,

Only under materialistic and naturalistic assumptions, so this is not particularly compelling reasoning, unless we are first informed as to why naturalism is self-evident over against supernaturalist dualism or theism.

for the former is just naturally much less obscure and far less extravagant than the latter.

I often find truth to be rather extravagant. Occam’s Razor is nowhere near as impressive to me as the complexity of DNA or galaxies or even your average pretty sunset or woman. The more we learn, the less simple things get, so why would we cling to a maxim which touts the likelihood of simplicity being truth?

Furthermore, I do not even consider the “God Hypothesis” (i.e., the hypothesis that the universe was created by a timeless, bodiless, omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, omnipresent personal being) to be a viable candidate for the simple reason that it does not even meet the basic criteria of an explanation, namely, illumination and understanding. It is also unreasonable, anomalous, counterintuitive, and incomplete.

First of all, the “God of the philosophers” or philosophical theism is not, strictly speaking the Christian God. A Creator-God would have to, it seems to me, be timeless and a spirit and quite powerful indeed, and arguably personal (since He makes created personhood possible), but I don’t see how the four “omnis” are required for a minimally-conceived creator. The other negative qualities you see in the proposition merely follow from the axiomatic and often circular skepticism and materialism of your premises, so they are of little use to our discussion. With those qualifiers, I don’t see how the theistic scenario is a whit less plausible than your others, about which you admit we (and you) know little.

Where have we heard this chant before, of “there is no necessary need to posit a God”? Darwin, was it? Actually, it was the materialist evolutionist scientists after him (and after T.H. Huxley, who said that evolutionism didn’t necessarily imply materialism, by its very nature) who said these things.

One of my points (if we ever get back to my discussion of premises) is that our predispositions and biases constantly color how we perceive (and even conceive) the world. The atheist scientist will tend to readily adopt such a theory (as we observe Steve doing) because it upholds his prior notion of atheism. It may be weak or actually have some merit to it, but he will be almost inevitably be predisposed to adopt it, so that he can lessen his own “cognitive dissonance.” Likewise, the theist will be predisposed to accept what might be called “classic Big Bang cosmology” because it appears to him so consistent with monotheism and creatio ex nihilo. Bias is universal.

Bias among scientists (and philosophers, too, for that matter) is no novel concept. This has been examined at length by Thomas Kuhn and also much recently by Stephen Jay Gould. My interest in the present discussion is to determine why your particular axioms seem true and unquestionable to you, and (in due course) by what process they logically lead you to atheism (i.e., materialism, or secular humanism; whatever term you prefer).

. . . (Also, try reading the articles by Smolin and Linde, where the evidence for the model in question is meticulously examined.)

What I read (not in these articles, but in your earlier postings in this regard) was sheer and mere speculation, which seems not a whit more plausible to me than an Intelligent Designer who was behind all these marvels of what I call creation.

I never said that the given explanations are MORE plausible than the God Hypothesis (GH). However, certainly they are (at least) EQUALLY plausible.

Why? And try to answer without trotting out all the “omnis,” which are irrelevant to a bare philosophical theism, or deism. Simply put, theism is not Christianity. The latter is a far more developed version of the former, adding in the huge factor of revelation. But when making theistic arguments, there is no need at all to import all the “omnis.” Even a Creator need not be omnipotent, etc. You must know this. I can’t believe that you don’t. Philosophy is not religion. Even philosophy of religion is neither religion nor theology. It’s the gigantic distinction between arguing for theism and arguing for Christianity. I do the former here, most of the time. And if I get to Christianity in the course of discussion, I almost never argue for exclusively Catholic Christianity, because that is not my point here.

So, GH is NOT the best explanation for the existence of the universe; the other explanations are just as good. There is thus NO REASON WHATEVER for preferring GH over those (alternate) explanations. Naturalistic explanations are by their very nature simpler and broader in scope than supernaturalistic “explanations.”

So what? Why bow to the god of Occam’s Razor? Why should that be some unquestionable axiom? The more we know, the more complex the universe becomes. Mendel’s peas (and, for that matter, bare “natural selection”) have ended up in DNA, which is not a “simpler” explanation, but a vastly more comprehensively explanatory one. So God is complicated! Big wow! He’s no more complicated than, e.g., some entirely fanciful hypothesis of how life came (by purely natural, perhaps even random processes) from non-life, which materialist scientists still have little or no clue about, yet continue to believe, with no compelling positive evidence that such a thing could ever take place.

(I put quotes around “explanations” because I do not think something so obscure and unenlightening as “God did it” warrants the label).

No one is saying it did, so that’s neither here nor there. But it is a quick and easy way to make the theistic option appear inherently foolish.

They posit at least one fewer entity and do not introduce a bigger mystery (God and his nature and methods) than the mystery they were introduced to dispel.

Again, this “simplicity” mantra is not all that impressive to me. Science is simpler than, say, mythological creation myths, but matter itself (the stuff of science) is extremely complex, and the quick denial of any design or teleology (on circular materialistic grounds) simply doesn’t work anymore. Science has gotten beyond that point.

Because if an explanation x is simpler than an explanation y, then x is more a priori likely than is y;

Why? So Mendel’s pea experiments better explain genetics than DNA, because they are simpler? Newtonian physics is more true than relativity on the same basis? The Genesis creation account is far simpler than Punctuated Equilibrium, so it is obviously true, etc. ?

and, all else being equal, if x is more a priori likely than y, then x is more likely the case than is y.

Unless you prove why I should accept the premise, I reject the conclusion. I would opine that coherence and cumulative, comprehensive explanatory value is profoundly more evident as an indication of truthfulness than simplicity.

I never claimed that science could never (even in principle) explain the origin of the cosmos, should there indeed be such. Rather, I suggested merely that it cannot do so at present (at least not fully). The difference between being contingently unexplained and in principle inexplicable is vast indeed!

Agreed. But, you see, whenever a materialist grants that he can’t explain everything, he grants a little more (however little he may think it is) to the theist, because we, too, believe in some things we can’t fully explain or understand. Absolutely comprehensive understanding is not in the cards for any view.

If it was so obvious that God is not shown in creation, and that materialism could fully explain it, then wouldn’t you think that science could explain the universe and its origin more or less totally by now? But if there are intricate complexities, then it is reasonable to posit some Design: something other than sheer chance and randomly colliding atoms. One either grasps this or they don’t. But for those of us who do, we regard it as self-evident and intuitively true. Pick at that all you want, but you have equally unprovable assumptions, which is a big point of my thread. It is not a matter of gullible, irrational blind faith vs. science and reason.

My chief objection to the Cosmological Argument for God’s Existence could be formally constructed as follows:

(1) There are alternate (nontheistic) explanations for the origin of the universe that have NOT been shown to be inferior to the God hypothesis.
(2) Therefore, the God hypothesis has NOT been shown to be the very best
explanation for the origin of the universe [from (1)].
(3) For there to be a cosmological argument that empirically supports the
existence of God, it would have to be the case that someone has shown that
the God hypothesis is the very best explanation for the origin of the universe.
(4) Therefore, there is no cosmological argument that empirically supports
the existence of God [from (2) & (3)].

The premise that Dave was apparently inclined to attack is (1). Unfortunately, though, he never really made it clear just what is wrong with that premise. In response to each of the five alternate (nontheistic) explanations for the universe that I put forward in our dialogue- we might call them “the Brute-fact Explanation,” “the Acausal-inception Explanation,” “the Hyper-universe Explanation,” “the Impersonal-mechanism Explanation,” and “the Finite-or-malevolent-deity Explanation,” respectively – Dave simply complained that it is unscientific and no more plausible than the God hypothesis. I have several replies to that:

1. The Acausal-inception and Hyper-universe Explanations (as well as, arguably, the Impersonal-mechanism Explanation) are perfectly scientific, as both are in principle testable and falsifiable. Furthermore, while neither has been clearly or uncontroversially confirmed by empirical data and neither is universally accepted among cosmologists, elements of both can be found in the theories of leading physicists such as Stephen Hawking and Alex Linde, and both receive at least SOME support (albeit indirect) from science. Therefore, describing them as “pure speculation” or something of the like (as Dave did several times during our discussion) is patently wrongheaded.

2. Even if all five of my alternate (nontheistic) explanations for the universe WERE completely unscientific, that would NOT render them inferior to the God hypothesis and so would NOT suffice to refute premise (1). For the God hypothesis is ITSELF completely unscientific (in that it posits a cause for the universe which even in principle defies scientific investigation and which does not conform to the scientific method). It is also obscure, anomalous, unreasonable, counterintuitive, incomplete, and incomprehensible. In those respects alone it is explanatorily INFERIOR to even the weakest naturalistic explanation and so cannot be regarded as the best explanation for the universe.

3. In order for premise (1) to be true, it need not be the case that the given alternate (nontheistic) explanations are more plausible than the God hypothesis. It need only be the case that they are EQUALLY PLAUSIBLE to that hypothesis. Hence, Dave’s complaint that none of the explanations in question is more plausible than the God hypothesis is simply irrelevant to the above argument (as well as to our discussion).

It is clear, then, that Dave has his work cut out for him if he wishes to successfully defend the Cosmological Argument (or show that the atheist’s “axiom” that the universe can exist sans a divine being is somehow mistaken or flawed).

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Photo credit: posted by QuotesEverlasting (8-1-13) [Flickr / CC By 2.0 license]

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2018-11-26T17:02:40-04:00

From public discussions on an Internet List devoted to the question of existence of God: May-July 2001. Uploaded with the full permission of Sue Strandberg (who refers to herself primarily as a secular humanist). This was one of the best dialogues I’ve ever had with anyone (maybe my second favorite ever; and the other was with an atheist, too). Her words will be in blue:

*****

It is the hidden nature of the facts of religion, the revelatory truths that are not available to the nonbeliever, which can make it so incapable of resolution.

You are confusing esotericism (more common to the Gnostics and New Agers today) with revelation. Christian revelation certainly is available to the non-believer, in the Bible. But they (just like Christians) do need to learn how to interpret the Bible, as all literature needs to be properly interpreted.

And since religious claims often deal with which individuals or groups are especially wicked, spiritually depraved, unholy, unworthy, or damned, this inability to resolve conflict can become dangerous.

All groups of human beings have the unfortunate tendency to demonize “outsiders.” Atheists are no exception, even going after Jesus, making Him out to be a “bad” person. Christians (in the eyes of many atheists and skeptics) are one or more of the following: intolerant, hypocritical, holier-than-thou, ignoramuses, pie-in-the-sky simpletons, money-grubbers (the TV evangelists — some of that is true, sadly), closed-minded, gullible, irrational, women-haters (the abortion issue), “homophobes,” bigots, anti-Semites, cultural imperialists, snake-handlers, anti-scientific, Nazis, Fascists, and on and on. Take your pick.

I think this is a deep human problem (the dehumanizing of outsiders), not a specifically atheist or Christian one. There are those in both our camps who are of this sick mindset. If you say the Bible produces it in my ranks, I quickly respond that Marxist rhetoric or other ideologically-left, radical feminist, and secularist literature and teachings produce it among your comrades. So it’s another wash: why talk about it? The best in both our camps readily condemn this hatred and nonsense.

I agree with you here, that the demonization of outsiders is a human problem, one that is not caused by religion but which is often reflected in it. My point was that tolerance does not come out of certainty, but out of the willingness to doubt, to consider other viewpoints, and to value the diversity of ideas as a good in itself.

Technically, I don’t think tolerance requires doubt per se (skepticism), or relativism (of which “diversity” is often a synonym), but rather, a willingness to be proven wrong (even if the prospect of that is quite remote), and a deliberate attempt to grant the benefit of the doubt and good faith and will to the other, and the extension of charity at all times.

This basic tolerance is the foundation of Humanism, whether it be theistic or nontheistic. Not all humanists achieve the ideal, of course, but science, democracy, and humanist ethics all take respect for opposing opinions as a tenet.

In theory, yes, but people being people, there are all sorts of species of intolerance about, from the “right” and the “left” alike. These are so obvious that I need not even trouble myself to list any examples.

Religion, on the other hand, can easily define entire groups as being”against God” at one fell swoop — and being against God is so much more than having a false belief or wrong opinion. One should not tolerate evil, even evil that appears in the guise of good. The stakes have been raised.

I have tried to illustrate that biblical, apostolic Christianity is much more ecumenical and tolerant than that, via examples from the behavior of Jesus and Paul. I think one can speak of the state of being “against God” generally, but on an individual basis it is extremely difficult to have enough information to make that determination.

Certainly secularists can be irrational, but it is much harder to support a claim from a secular standpoint by arguing that one’s facts and evidence are “beyond science” and “above reason” and thus don’t need demonstration to others because these others lack the spiritual discernment to understand. There is a sacred “don’t touch me” quality to spiritual claims which all too often are not claims about the spirit world, but about this one.

Christians, unfortunately, are often guilty of ignorance of science and reason alike, and of a self-righteous “epistemology,” so to speak, but one must always judge a worldview by its best and brightest proponents, not its worst.

Marxism and radical feminism are so dangerous because they are secular philosophies which act as if they are religions, complete with sinners, saints, salvation, damnation, heresy, and all the attendant dogma.

Precisely; they involve a sort of sleight-of-hand, by adopting some of the worst abuses of religion in the service of what is claimed to be “science” or “philosophy.”

The religions and variations of religion which earn my respect the most are the ones that act as if they are secular philosophies.

But that would be the same error in reverse, would it not? Various “secular” modes of reasoning and argumentation can be utilized to defend Christianity, but in the end, Christianity is obviously not “secular philosophy” and must be approached on its own terms.

One can say that the Nazis were wrong on their facts because one can show that there is no good empirical evidence for either a Master Race or a Jewish Conspiracy. The justification for the Holocaust does not stand up to scientific analysis.

Nor does the justification for Marxism. Nor does the justification for radical feminism and its cultural fallout stand up to the best sociological analysis. Etc., etc.

I agree. Secular Humanists are as often in opposition to the irrational radical left as the radical right. We are not very popular with extreme feminists and postmodernists, to put it mildly.

I knew there was a reason why I liked you so much . . . :-)

Some feminists have developed a strong anti-science bias, a belief that reason and evidence are the means men have used to oppress women so they are wrong things in and of themselves, not simply wrong when they are used badly, which we can all agree on. This could also be because many of their claims lack sufficient support — or because the evidence goes the other way. The idea that sex is a purely social construct or that men and women have no differences in their brains is flat out wrong as viewed from the basis of empirical studies in sociology, anthropology, and neurology.

Amen, sister! Of course, Christianity goes even further and holds that gender differences are innate and built into creation, as a design of God. But what you say is close enough to our view.

There is a biological basis for male domination in the human species which can be modified if we desire but not simply eliminated by wishful thinking. Perhaps that is not what feminists want to hear, it might not even be what I want to hear, but tough: it is where the evidence leads.

Wow . . . I am impressed! Christians say that both men and women, being fallen creatures, have become corrupt, thus giving rise to all the abuses of male power-hungry brutality and female guile and conniving, shall we say. Both are equally fallen, but both are also equally capable of greatness as well.

Humanists are not under obligation to find the world as we like it, but as it really is.

As are Christians. Humanists are as unlikely to suddenly start believing in God as Christians are to stop doing so. So there are things both sides would be predisposed to resist with all their might.

And when people wish to keep their beliefs and don’t like the contrary findings of science yet can’t refute them with stronger evidence for their side, they often take one of two options: they can either claim that their beliefs are above and beyond what science can investigate, or they can claim that science is simply one culturally-driven method of social construct-making among many others, with no more validity than any other opinion. Or both.

But those anti-Semitic pogroms which took place over the ages due to a belief that the Jews were cursed by God rested not on empirical evidence in the world, but on religious claims about the next one.

To the best of my knowledge, the Catholic Church never formally or dogmatically taught this. There were individuals who were rogues, as there always are (usually political operatives, and nominal Catholics). Martin Luther made far worse statements in this vein (and you should see how he describes Catholics and their Church too!). If the Church did teach anything like this, it has certainly been overturned, and you see great efforts by the current pope to make overtures to the Jewish people. I already posted to this list what Pius XII did for the Jews: far more than all other relief groups combined. Sounds really anti-Semitic, huh?

If you want to talk about arbitrary, irrational grounds on which to commit genocide, you will have to talk about abortion, where the “crime” of being inside one’s mother’s womb is sufficient enough to warrant execution. And guess who is the greatest opponent of that? Guess who even opposes the death penalty? You got it . . .

— and I am not so sanguine as you seem to be that religious differences within Christianity can be eventually settled just by reading the Bible and consulting the Holy Spirit to discover what God really wants.

Already dealt with. My position on this is exceedingly more complex than you seem to think. But that’s okay. This topic is not a simple matter; not given to quick summary.

When we deal with disagreements in religion there is less common ground for arbitration because so many subjective factors are being brought in.

Yes. Of course you think the degree of this is far more than I do. Oftentimes, I think that when different sorts of Christians disagree on this and that, they are being inconsistent with the principles of their own group. My dialogues with Protestants are filled with these sorts of examples. But I readily agree that Christian differences are certainly a scandal and a disgrace. That’s a major reason why I am a Catholic.

I think those religions which insist on complete consistency with secular methods of demonstration are more likely to be trustworthy in moral issues. And when it comes to religions not your own, this would probably be what you yourself would feel comfortable with, too. Not much you can do about being accused of being a witch.

Theism does not give an account of this [morality and values] at all, because from what I can see there is no actual attempt to explain the “why” at all.

There is a very serious attempt. It is called original sin, or the Fall. And there is the concept of God, which can be arrived at through natural reason alone, to a large extent.

We got our values from a Being which has these values as irreducible components of its character. So why and how did this Being get to be this way instead of another way? It just is.

That’s right. God just is, because He is eternal and never had a beginning. If the universe can conceivably be eternal (as some – many? – atheists seem to want to believe, despite Big Bang cosmology), why not a Supreme Being Who is Spirit? It is equally plausible prima facie. Many great philosophers have thought so, of course. Even Kant was convinced of the moral argument for God. Even Hume was convinced of the teleological argument. And these two are regarded as the great Destroyers of many of the traditional theistic arguments.

We get love from a Love Force; we get morals from a Moral Force; we got life from a Life Force; we were created by a Creative Force. “Like comes from like” attempts to explain a mystery by ducking the ‘how’ question completely and gives no account, rational or otherwise, of origins.

The “how” is precisely located in the character, nature, or essence of God. It is a serious, coherent, and self-consistent explanation, whether one agrees with it or not. Your view starts with an axiom; so does ours; there is a certain epistemological equivalence. How one regards the relative plausibility of each theory will in large part hinge upon one’s larger philosophical view as to dualism, materialism, and so forth (none of which can be absolutely proven, either).

You talk of empiricism, but the ultimate epistemological grounds for that (and exclusion of spirit or of God) need to be explained and justified. I don’t see that materialistic evolutionary theory has yet explained the origins of, e.g., DNA, or even life in general, if we want to get nitpicky about explanatory value . . .

As for whether humanity ought to carry the values that it does, Theism can’t justify this any more than nontheism,

I maintain that it can, because it contains a non-arbitrary standard, to which all persons are bound. It seems to me that atheism cannot achieve that standard (I am trying to see if someone here can convince me otherwise).

because once again the problem jumps back a step and the question simply becomes “why ought we to care about God?” You can only attempt to answer this question by appealing to the very values that you are trying to ground.

No, not at all. We care about God because (if He exists in the first place — on other grounds) He is our Creator, and we were made to serve and love Him (just as a child naturally loves its parents. It doesn’t sit there and philosophize: “gee, maybe I should push away when mummy comes to hug or suckle me because I have no epistemological and non-circular justification for loving her.” :-)

We would, in this theistic scenario, have an empty “God-shaped void” inside of us that only God can fill. Again, this is already assuming God exists (on other grounds). But in my opinion it avoids the logical circularity you claim must exist, in order to answer the question, “why ought we to care about God?”

There is a problem here, I think, when we talk about the “God-shaped void” that humans have. We can point to experiences and elements in human lives which can explain our “need for God” without relying on the assumption that there is an actual God.

When I speak like that at this point, it is not an argument per se, but simply a presentation of the theistic worldview as an alternate to atheism. It’s like saying, “given A and B, C seems to be plausible and to make sense.” That’s not really an argument, as much as it is a bald statement and a willingness to argue the point; more like a provisional resolution to be discussed.

God is like a cosmic father: we have fathers, and can attempt to account for our attachment to parents through biology or other secular explanations. God is like an ultimate rescuer: we have all directly experienced the satisfaction and relief of being rescued from harm in our lives. God is like a personal explanation of the universe: we use personal explanations when we deal with people in social situations all the time. God is like an expression of love and virtue: we encounter the human emotions and behaviors of love and virtue in our dealings with each other. God is a mystery, and a mystery revealed: every human life has experienced wonder about the world, and the joy in its discovery. God is immortality: all of us live and want to keep on living, and have done so from moment to moment, capable of imagining the next moment before it happens.

From what I can tell there is nothing in the concept of God which is not directly experienced in some fashion in human lives. Thus, a “God-shaped void” CAN be explained as an extrapolation of common human circumstances from ourselves onto the universe as a function of our ability to form abstractions. The idea that the Universe is grounded on and involved with personal attributes and concerns can plausibly be regarded as something which has naturally flowed from Man outwards, as an expression of natural egocentrism.

It could indeed. But on the other hand, all this may also be construed to suggest God because He is there in the first place. We have all these personal attributes, so it makes sense (just as a theoretical plausibility-structure) that there is a Creator-Person from Whom the traits originated, and Who gives them “ontological” or “existential” or “cosmological” purpose and meaning. We have a need for God because He is really there, and in some sense must be there for humans to feel purpose.

Just because we also have needs for love and mothers and fathers does not suggest to me that therefore it is likely that God doesn’t exist, simply because aspects of piety and spirituality echo more mundane and ordinary and normative human attachments. This sword cuts both ways, so it is not a particularly effective argument.

If one has a need for water periodically (thirst) do we think that this indicates that water does not exist? We have needs for love or sex, so they, too, exist. Human beings seem also to have a nearly-universal need for some sort of God; a religious sense. So therefore, religion and God likely do not exist?!!!

The principle of analogy, then, is at least as satisfactory as the usual “psychological crutch” or “pie in the sky” or “projection” atheist theories. In fact, there is a whole argument to be made that the atheist very much wants (by predisposition and preference) for God to not exist, because if He does, that makes demands on their lives (sexual, moral) which otherwise could be rationalized away; God takes away “freedom” (or, as the atheist says, “self-determination,” as if this is some unquestioned, noble and good thing).

It need not be explained this way, of course: you can still insist that it flows the other way, from God to man.

I think that is every bit as plausible.

But it is nevertheless possible to give a secular account of a desire for God while working with the premise that “we would not have a need if it were not possible to fulfill it.” The needs we have which relate to God are also needs we have here on earth, and we have all experienced their fulfillment here on earth. God is simply the same thing, writ larger.

So, to me, that suggests that He exists, not that He probably doesn’t exist.

But what, then, of God? If you assume that we would not have a need unless there was something already there which would be capable of
fulfilling it — then how did God develop a need for human beings?

He has no such need (at least not in Christian theology).

God existed before there were human beings or anything else other than God. God was complete, perfect — and yet somehow from out of nowhere and for no reason it has a character which desires and wants something that does not already exist, and has never existed: someone else to love.

In trinitarian Christianity, this problem is solved: the Persons within the Trinity love each other from eternity. That is how God can be said to be love. But we stray into Christianity, and I want to avoid that at all costs in this thread.

The “God-shaped Void” in human beings can be explained without the existence of God because God is composed of many elements which we
experience in our lives. God can still be inferred as the source — but it need not be. But where did the “Human-Being-shaped Void” in God come from?

He has no need. But love would conceivably have an aspect of wanting to share the goodness and fulfillment of existence with creatures. So creation would flow from the nature of love, not some sort of “necessity” or “desire” which would not exist in a perfectly self-existent and complete Being.

If the one demands an explanation, so I think does the other.

I’ve done my best. Looking forward very much to your reply. I enjoyed this a lot. I really admire the way you express things, even though we have, of course, profound disagreements.

Thanks. And I think — and hope — that the disagreements we have are not as profound as they may seem. :)

Me, too. I look forward to reading your next reply.

There are many different definitions and versions of God, and only a few of them make sexual and moral demands that might be difficult or unwelcome (and keep in mind that most people find that self-sacrifice increases the value of whatever has been sacrificed for and thus the satisfaction of achieving it).

Fair enough, but that doesn’t rule out a desire for sexual freedom as a strong incentive for rejecting Christianity. That’s too obvious a point for anyone to really doubt. It doesn’t mean that every non-Christian does this, but it happens a lot more than atheists would ever want to admit. I vaguely recall some statement from Julian Huxley, I believe, where he actually honestly admitted this.

Atheists — at least, Secular Humanists — believe that demanding strong evidence even for very pleasing, gratifying, and comforting claims of the supernatural and paranormal is a form of discipline and responsibility that requires a strict intellectual integrity that is sometimes difficult to achieve and maintain. Neither side has an exclusive right on “accepting accountability.”

I agree with this 100%. But I do think that Christianity is more than philosophy and science, so that many in those fields will never accept it, because they (quite foolishly and arrogantly) won’t allow for any knowledge beyond the confines of their own field of study or inquiry. Not to mention the Christian doctrine of God’s free, unearned grace, without which no one could believe in the first place.

The belief that atheists refuse to accept reasonable evidence for God because they don’t want God to exist is, in my opinion, one of the most dangerous beliefs in theism.

Then why would not the converse charge of theists wanting God to exist not also be considered “dangerous”? If people can have one sort of psychological orientation, they can surely conceivably have the other as well. I think it is a wash.

I agree with you that relying only on psychological explanations for belief or nonbelief would be a mistake, but I also [think] that doing so for theism does indeed make sense if the theist is using — as one of his main arguments — the claim that if God doesn’t exist then this will lead to psychological discomfort. Atheists generally do not make the argument that there is no God because it would be uncomfortable if there was one.

Of course they don’t. But that doesn’t mean that it isn’t true that they feel more freedom and autonomy given the assumption that God doesn’t exist. In fact, many of you candidly admitted as much in my survey. And for certain hedonistic or narcissistic approaches to life (none of you, of course), this would be a great incentive indeed.

You may infer or guess that this motivation is somehow hiding under the arguments we are making, but we don’t have to infer or guess at any such secretive, hidden motivation on your part if you walk right into it.

Such explanations are clearly possibilities for both beliefs. Many people do in fact use God as a crutch and sort of “cosmic bellhop,” and many spurn Him as a slave master or stern father-figure who “messes up” their freedom and – above all – their sexual freedom. But it is very difficult to establish this on an individual level, and little is achieved from arguing in this fashion.

The reason I think that it is more dangerous to mutual tolerance and respect when theists assume that atheists don’t want God to exist than when atheists assume that theists believe in God because they do want God to exist is because the moral and ethical implications are very different.

Theists are, at worst, being accused of being careless and sloppy in their methods, of allowing their personal hopes and desires to unduly influence their conclusions.

Oh, c’mon Sue. You must know we are accused of much more than that by your fellow atheists and humanists!

I was referring not to charges about subsequent behavior and actions, but to the specific instance of belief formation. It is a philosophical question in epistemology, one which can be explored through reason and science, and one that is like many many other questions.

And that’s precisely how I seek to analyze atheist beliefs.

This isn’t very epistemically responsible, perhaps, but we all do this at times in all sorts of matters, even atheists. This says nothing drastic about the character or worth of someone who does this. We have all loved and respected people whom we think have allowed their feelings to get away with them in some area, who have accepted theories which we don’t believe to be true. Even great heroes have their weaknesses, and even wise men can err. My own father believes that space aliens built the pyramids, but I admire him anyway Enthusiasm must be guarded against if we care about truth, but it’s hardly a bad quality in itself. It’s human, and may even be a sign of a loving heart which overrules a cautious head.

But what does it say if someone rejects a belief in God because they don’t WANT God to exist? What is the usual explanation for this among average Christians — or even some of the Christians on this list? What seems to be entailed by the basic assumptions of Christianity itself as informed by the Bible?

As I have explained on this list, the Catholic (and biblical) view concerning unbelief is very multi-faceted and – one might say – “tolerant.” I have always held that religious belief and its justifications and motives is an extraordinarily complicated affair, not easily summarized for any individual. The atheist has a host of assumptions which color his thought, just as Christians do. We believe many of these are false, so that it is not so much a rejection of God as we know and love Him, but a rejection of a “god” which is in fact not the God of reality at all, but a cardboard caricature.

The very arguments atheists use clearly demonstrate this. The Problem of Evil seeks to establish that God is either evil Himself or so impotent that He is not recognizable at all as the God we Christians worship. Steve [Conifer] and [another list member] have attacked Jesus Himself, as an evil or at the very least an exceedingly arrogant and strange, bizarre person. That is not the Jesus we love and worship. God is viewed as a capricious tyrant because of the doctrine of hell. Etc., etc. So we conclude that most atheists are rejecting what they severely misunderstand, and that it is a problem more so of intellect (and the will which is acting on this false belief) than of character defect.

I think you misunderstand the nature and intent of those arguments. They are not meant to claim that God is awful, therefore we shouldn’t believe in it. They are meant to show that the claims about some gods do not meet our observations, and thus there probably isn’t one like that.

Some definitions appear to contain logical contradictions when coupled with givens of experience.

“Appear” is the key word here.

I have written this before, but I’ll repeat it here. The most common argument I hear from theists in the religion debate rooms is not really the Design Argument or the Moral Argument or the Cosmological Argument, but the insistence that the nonbeliever simply doesn’t understand the DEPTH and GOODNESS of God. Their views are shallow, they either made them up or got them from equally shallow theists. And this seems to be true whether the atheist has a background in Fundamentalism or Taoism, Tillich or Aquinas, Mysticism or Evidence That Demands a Verdict. I call it the “Well – I – Don’t – Believe – In – THAT – God – Either” Argument. Everyone seems to make it. I bet that somewhere there is an atheist right now with a firm and clear grounding in Catholic apologetics being told that NO WONDER he is an atheist, Catholicism is sooo shallow

You guys say (I’m speaking very broadly again) we are ignorant of science and rationality and philosophy; why should it be so shocking to you that we would regard atheists as being ignorant of the true God, the Bible and theology?

You may be speaking broadly, but in doing so you I think you are mischaracterizing the atheist position, or at least the Humanist one. Science, rationality, and philosophy can’t possibly be our unique possession, because the whole point is that they are capable of being shared by everyone, and most everyone does indeed understand and use them to some degree. They are our common heritage because they are based on what is common to all human beings and observers. Our insistence is that you try to persuade us from the common ground, and how could we call it a common ground if we thought you were ignorant of science, rationality, and philosophy? From what I’ve read of what you have written you most certainly are not.

So are atheists ignorant of the True God, theology, and the Bible? That depends on whether you are talking about individual atheists or atheists in general.

Generally.

Some know theology and the Bible very well. And if God does not exist, then we know the True God better than you do. ;)

:-)

When I came into this forum, I was quite up-front about not being a professional philosopher. I recognize my limitations, and they don’t bother me. One can only do so much, and there is so much that interests me; if only I had the time.

But I have been repeatedly informed that anyone can easily interpret the Bible, as if it were the simplest thing in the world.

Actually, I think our point has been the exact opposite: that it is far from the simplest thing in the world.

That was not the impression I got at all. I saw Ted Drange make quite dogmatic statements that the Bible teaches thus-and-so; also Steve Conifer and Nick Tattersall particularly.

If it was, there would be a consensus of reasonable, thoughtful, intelligent people on what the Bible means and we do not see that. I think that when some of the others on the list argue with you over the meaning of specific verses, their point is not so much to show that their interpretation is correct, but just that one can argue that such an interpretation is correct with enough justification that one can
hold it and still be a Christian. But that is their issue…

Anyone here is at least as good at hermeneutics as I am (probably better, because they are so “objective,” you see, whereas I am brainwashed with my Christian/Catholic presuppositions and predispositions). After all, I’ve only studied the Bible intensely for 20 years. I’ve only devoted my life to defending Christianity for the same length of time. Why would I know any more than your average atheist who blows the dust off his prized Bible, opens it up, and proceeds to give us the authoritative interpretation of verse x? Who could argue with that?

The Christian God is too specific, and thus its nature and traits are irrelevant to atheism as such.

If you’re going to argue against the biblical God, it would be nice to at least know what Bible-believers claim this God is.

What is the least common number of characteristics something could have in order to be considered a God, and how likely is it that this exists? That’s the first question, and the one that counts to most of us, or should. We don’t ask the nature of God, we ask the nature of reality. Is reality formed and controlled by a Mind or something with mind-dependent values — or is that an unnecessary and inconsistent assumption?

In terms of philosophy alone, I would agree. The “God of the philosophers.”

Of course, if it were true that atheists don’t believe in God because they misunderstand God and think it evil, that would seem to be to our credit morally, however detrimental it might be to our epistemic integrity.

Indeed, and that is one of my beliefs.

Rebelling against a God of Evil would be ethical: choosing to not believe in something because you would rather it wasn’t true is sloppy.

Yep.

Often this is explained by claiming that nonbelievers would literally rather die than have to live up to standards and principles of honor,
integrity, virtue, and obedience.

I have rarely seen such a view expressed. But I often hear the contrary expressed in Christian circles, where I have moved now for over 20 years. Natural law in fact presumes that all people have the knowledge of basic morality and the capability to act to some degree upon that, even before the reception of divine grace.

They want to have rampant sex and other pleasurable indulgences without any future accountability — they want to do as they please, they want to go without any rules, they want to live narrow and selfish and vain lives.

Well, we all have those tendencies, whether Christian or not. Original sin affects us all, not to mention our sex-crazed culture, which is doing nobody any good. We do believe that without God’s grace, it will be much harder for a person to resist these things. You can hardly be surprised that we would think that. It necessarily flows from our beliefs about grace and justification.

To explain the kind of people who do not WANT the embodiment of Love, Security, and Justice to be real — who blind themselves to His obvious existence and unselfish love and steel themselves against the promptings of their own consciences and hearts — we’re not just talking about “sloppy thinking” here, are we? We’re talking about the kind of degraded and determined sinful blindness that would merit eternal Hell — and the kind of people who might even prefer eternal Hell to a Heaven that does not give them egotistical priority.

Do you really see no difference between the two? And can you not understand why an atheist sees a very real danger in a religion which can so easily bring such ‘spiritual facts’ in to judge his character?

I can certainly understand that this sort of view would be offensive to you, and clearly it hurts you personally (even deeply, it appears to me). I am perceptive enough to see that. My main response would be to reiterate that the causes of unbelief are many and varied, and that anyone who makes such a rash judgment is not acting in accordance with either Christian charity or theology, rightly-understood.

Personally (I can always speak for myself), I think you are a delightful person, very intelligent and filled with helpful insights. I like you and enjoy our dialogues immensely. Given that, I could hardly make such rash judgments as to why you don’t believe in God. I don’t know why that is, except that I do know you were raised as freethinker and I know that childhood development plays a crucial role for all of us, whether we acknowledge that or not. In your case, you obviously don’t possess the animus and hostility that many people who were inadequately raised as Christians possess. I didn’t have that, either, in my secular/occultic period in the 70s because my Christian upbringing (Methodist) was so nominal and minimal.

One tends to develop such hostility when they are forced to engage in some religious practice or belief by hypocritical parents who do neither themselves, or when they are inadequately taught, especially in the realm of apologetics, which would naturally interest intellectuals, so that they can possess a rational belief-structure, and know why they believe what they are told to believe. I embraced all of my beliefs by choice, and upon becoming a serious Christian I studied apologetics soon thereafter, so that I could synthesize my Christianity with my other beliefs, particularly history and philosophy, and to a lesser degree, science (because I took less of that in college). I read C.S. Lewis early on, and he became a seminal influence on me.

On the other hand, I think you vastly underestimate the prejudice towards Christians (mostly that we are ignoramuses and intolerant bigots who wish to force our views on everyone else). Even within Christian ranks, there is the terrible divide between the (small minority of) anti-Catholic ranks among Protestants, and Catholics. I have been the victim of far more bigotry and sometimes outright hatred from anti-Catholic Protestants than I have ever received from atheists or secularists.

For example, the worst experience I ever had on a list was on a Calvinist one, where within two days (before I was kicked off) I was called everything in the book: a liar, deceiver, apostate, etc. It was the most outrageous and unfair treatment I ever received in my life. One person said that I was damned for sure, and urged everyone there not even to pray for me. All because I was a Catholic!

Heh, I can just picture that. Here you toddle in, all bright and shiny and filled with good will and tolerance — “come, we are all Christians, let us meet in the Socratic marketplace of debate and discussion and see if reason can help us arrive at a better understanding of God’s will!” — and WHAM, you run up against the wall that says that God’s will has been so plainly revealed already that you must have steeled yourself against Him by hardening your heart in order to believe the falsehoods you do. Yes, I can relate to this, as you may readily imagine.

You are very good at creating word pictures. :-) You even seem to be affectionately (gently) teasing me, which is cute. In my opinion, Calvinists cannot possibly be anti-Catholic without engaging in intellectual suicide; sawing off the limb they sit on. It is a compelling historical argument, I think. You might enjoy some of the exchanges I have had with these types, for your enjoyment on some boring, snowed-in evening. I have less than no patience with them at all, and no doubt it shows, but I think they deserve whatever anger they receive, because their views are despicable, and eminently unscriptural.

Would you respect and spend time talking with a flat-earther or a KKK bigot or a pedophile who sees nothing whatever wrong with what he does? I don’t have a problem myself with granting these folks free speech, much as I despise their positions and hatred (with regard to the latter). But spend time? Not I . . .

Heh. Well, this makes us different. I have indeed spent time with KKK bigots and pedophiles who argue for their position because I’ve spent time
in an internet chat room dedicated to debate and discussion and they come in. So far, no flat-earthers, though I’ve met New Agers who would probably be open to the concept if it was presented in the right way. Did run into a guy once who thought the earth was hollow.

The reason I bother to argue with bigots and pedophiles is that you can’t understand why they are wrong until you understand their position and why they hold it — and there is usually a grain of truth in there somewhere which you have to answer, if only to yourself. And the mere fact that they are trying to persuade me means that they must accept, even if only for the time, that I am enough like them that I can see their point. And once they are there they are enough like me that they may see mine.

Usually, if you understand the premises and assumptions someone is working from, you find that if you put yourself in their place the views they hold are perfectly reasonable and you would probably advocate them yourself. The problem is usually not the nature of the person, but the nature of their premises and assumptions. And if they are wrong they can’t just be wrong by my standards, but by their own, too.

We both admire Thomas Aquinas and think he was a good man in general, but in his Summa Theologica he speculated that the tortures and the punishments of the damned would have to be able to be directly observed from heaven “in order that the bliss of the saints may be more delightful for them and that they may render more copious thanks to God for it” and nothing be missing from their felicities. I do not throw up my hands and give up on the underlying humanity of Aquinas despite this. Neither do you. People are not consistent and never have been — not even the saints, apparently.

Where I disagree with you perhaps is in your easy characterization of the Calvinists and Fundamentalists as being outrageous and unfair. From our point of view, perhaps. Humanism, founded as it is in Greek philosophy and science, rests on respect for the critical opinions of other people.

There is such a thing as an utterly unworthy argument, which doesn’t even merit the dignity of a reply, though, right?

No, I don’t think so. I think that if someone has given enough thought to an idea or belief that they can hold it sincerely and in good faith — and
if their argument seems persuasive to them — it always merits the dignity of a reply, because something somewhere in the argument has spoken to their own human dignity and thought, which I must share if I’m human.

Interesting. A lot of this judgment of mine is based on the necessity of proper time management. I have a day job, additional “job” of being a semi-professional writer, a wife and three children, and I am interacting constantly on the Internet, so I must “choose my battles wisely,” so to speak. I do commend you attitude of charity, though. It is pretty extraordinary, and I think it has affected my view on this matter somewhat.

But if you work on the premises of the anti-Catholic, anti-atheist mindset there is nothing bigoted or malicious about rejecting views caused by a will towards evil.

Rejecting views is one thing, but every Christian has the obligation to be loving, even towards enemies. One must charitably attempt to dissuade. The way these people act is a disgrace to Christianity. How can they expect to win over someone if they treat them with utter disdain? This is not Jesus’ way at all.

If one must always be loving towards enemies and charitably attempt to dissuade, then how can you argue that there are some utterly unworthy
arguments that do not even merit the dignity of a reply?

Well, I think you have a valid point. As I said, a lot of this is a matter of limited time, and the necessity to make a choice as to who to talk to. In that context, the flat-earther will be very low on my list of priorities, if not unworthy of a reply altogether. :-) If I don’t “have time” for him in the next ten years, the practical outcome is little different, anyway. :-)

First you put flat-earthers, bigots, and pedophiles in this group, and later you add Mormons and Scientologists. The Calvinists are only doing the same thing, adding in Catholics and atheists to the groups which don’t deserve the dignity of a reply because they are so outside of common sense that it isn’t worth talking to them.

Well no. They will talk to us, but they (the anti-Catholic faction) insist on constant insult and blatant demonstration of their profound ignorance where we are concerned. That is a lack of charity and personal insult, whereas refusing to deal with certain issues is (or may be) intellectual derision only.

Actually, I have a hypothesis about Calvinists in particular that I’ll share with you, just as a sort of side issue here. I haven’t tested it or anything, so it’s just a bare speculation based on some limited things I’ve seen and read. In my experience, Calvinists tend to be particularly nasty when they debate — even the intelligent debaters, the people who spend a lot of time on apologetics. There is a lot of taunting, goading, and ad hominems going on. Like you, this puzzles me because most people seem to recognise that you’re not going to win anybody over if you treat them with contempt. And yet they do.

But reading Calvinist theology I was struck by one of their major tenets: that reason cannot lead one to God. Natural theology and evidential arguments are useless because the nonbeliever (whether atheist or Catholic) has blinded and fortified themselves against the Holy Spirit through pride, and is not on the common ground where they can even be capable of understanding till they recognise this. The Calvinist is not trying to persuade so much as break through what is being suppressed.

Given this, it is possible I think that the Calvinist apologists are using insults, disdain, and mockery as a deliberate tactic designed to humiliate the other person so badly that their pride suffers — and thus give the Holy Spirit a chance to enter or be recognised. It’s a way of being cruel to be kind, a kind of “tough love,” if it’s seen in this sense. If our problem is self-esteem and self-pride, knocking us down a peg or two might be more efficious in attacking the real problem than approaching us with kindness and gentleness. Jesus, after all, went at some people with a whip. The point is to save your soul, not make you feel good about yourself while they are doing it.

This would make some sense, I think, though again I’m only going from a few personal experiences and might be giving too much credit to their good intentions and not enough credit to the fun and glee that comes from watching an enemy suffer. Goodness knows Calvinism contains enough other beliefs that can pretty easily de-humanise an opponent — or perhaps I should say “humanise” them, since it seems to be one of the varieties of Christianity most hostile to humanism as a view in general, just as Catholicism can be one of the varieties of Christianity that is the most sympathetic.

Extremely interesting hypothesis about Calvinists, Sue. Wow! You may very well be onto something here. I love new insights like that. We should actually ask a Calvinist this and see how they respond. That would be equally fascinating to see, I think.

If they are right and you ARE a liar and deceiver then they don’t have to entertain your arguments.

Correct. Just as I don’t entertain Mormon or Scientology arguments.

And God has spoken very plainly on this issue, and who are they to disagree with God?

They have no excuse at all on the lack of charity. If I am evil and going to hell, riding on the Scarlet Beast and Harlot of Rome, etc., then their duty (from their point of view) is to save my soul. And you don’t do that by lying about a person, their motives, and their beliefs, and their Church, claiming that they worship the pope and/or Mary, commit idolatry at every turn, etc. ad nauseam. One can tell when prejudice is afoot. Black people are very good at that. And I have become very familiar with it myself, after having converted to Catholicism.

You are dead in the water before you begin, because the well has been poisoned.

You got it. And in my first post to this list I criticized how Christians often do the same thing to atheists.

I don’t think other areas, such as political and social disagreement, engender quite the same kind of condemnation.

No, there’s nothing like the self-righteous indignation of the religious bigot.

Certainly it can be heated, I don’t argue with that. But a beginning assumption that the other person is against God can lead to an intractible, inflexible position on the character of this person that no argument or demonstration or reasonable rebuttal can mitigate. It raises the stakes. As you have seen.

Yes, I have experienced this myself. But I was equally opposed to such stupid, judgmental behavior before I suffered at the hands of anti-Catholic bigots. Jesus demands no less of any of His disciples. I simply understand the maliciousness of it better now, having been on the receiving end.

I harbor few illusions that my arguments for Secular Humanism will convert or change the mind of the True Believer towards the truth of their religion. My hope and goal is that they will better understand that my position is reasonable — that the existence of God or truth of Christianity or verity of their denomination is not the sort of obvious, self-evident claim that only the depraved would doubt. Atheism is an epistemically legitimate position that just may be right.

I can’t go that far, but I’ll say that most atheists I have encountered seem to me to be sincere and honest in their intellectual aspect. How they arrive at their views involves, I think, a long and highly complex process, to which I alluded earlier. But I agree with you insofar as my goal, too, is much more to persuade non-believers that my position is reasonable or at least that I am pursuing it with full vigor of reasoning and critical faculties as well as with faith.

Which I grant of course. :)

When Fundamentalists assume that the Catholic Church is the Whore of Babylon and a tool of Satan, good luck getting them to believe that you chose this Church rationally out of your honest and sincere effort to better understand the nature of reality and the nature of God. The argumentation of Athens has collided with the revelation of Jerusalem.

They are being irrational and allowing emotions based on false beliefs to entirely color their perceptions and behavior. They are irrational, but they don’t adequately represent true Christianity when they do that (not in that aspect). It looks like you want to make out that they are being consistent Christians (fideism, irrationality). I would vehemently deny that. They are acting like nothing more than the corrupt Pharisees which Jesus condemned in no uncertain terms.

I think it is possible to justify a lot of very inconsistent positions in Christianity by finding the common ground only in the basic beliefs and
then adding in interpretation. The behavior of the Calvinists can be seen as consistent with Christianity if you were to grant their premises.

Oh yes. I agree.

It does no use whatsoever to tell them to be kinder or more reasonable, since they are neither unkind nor irrational at all from their point of view and if we think about it we can see that. Their “unloving” behavior is like showing disgust for a pedophile, or perhaps being cruel to be kind, as I suggested.

Even if God made His will even clearer and more evident, you would obviously reject it, since you reject it now. Welcome to the club ;)

I agree totally with you on this point. One must always grant the intelligence and sincerity of the opponent, short of compelling, unarguable evidence to the contrary.

The same treatment (with different terminology) is very often directed towards political conservatives, pro-lifers, and critics of evolution, in academia, in the media, in the entertainment industry, in the political realm, and elsewhere, because all of these positions are not considered “mainstream” or “politically correct” in our secular society. They are unfashionable; not “chic”; not in vogue. So I’ve received my share of prejudice, too, believe me, because I am in all these categories, being the inveterate nonconformist and gadfly that I am. :-)

But I do accept and agree with your dislike of the tendencies you mention, and I would like to apologize to you on behalf of Christianity for any such treatment you have received in the past. That was wrong, and not in accordance with Christian principles. And the next time it happens, send the idiot who does it to me, and I will give them a severe tongue-lashing (“biblical rebuke”) for hypocrisy and lack of charity. :-) And for attacking someone I now consider a friend . . .

And I consider you a friend as well :) But I think you are a bit hasty when you say that the tendency to attribute bad faith on the part of atheists is not in accordance with Christian principles,

It is not. I pointed out somewhere how Jesus treated the Roman centurion. He was always gentle with anyone who was simply ignorant. He was merciful, kind, understanding, tolerant. This is our model, not John Knox or some flaming lunatic zealot who is every stereotype that non-believers have about Christians and more. Look how Paul spoke to the pagan Athenians (Acts 16). This is the very opposite of condescending derision. He recognizes their sincerity and religiosity, and tries to build bridges to Christianity, based on existing commonalities. Paul is our model, and Jesus. You are wrong about this. We can speak in broad generalities about hard-heartedness existing as a sin, but we can’t judge individual hearts.

and you are being a bit uncharitable towards the so-called bigot. The Fundamentalists are generally very good people with a sincere desire to love others: they are the victims not of ill will, but of bad theory.

But that doesn’t excuse their behavior. There is no way in heaven or hell that hatred and malice and lying can be synthesized with Christianity.

I do not consider you a bigot, and yet I recognise that as a Catholic you must at some point work on the assumption that since God exists and it is reasonably clear that He does, something is probably wrong not just with the intellect, but with the hearts and souls of those who seek to deny this.

Possibly; not necessarily. But I don’t have enough information to decide that in each individual case, which is the point. I do believe as a Christian that all of us suffer from the defects of original sin.

It seems very clear to me that the existence of God is not an obvious, self-evident, open and shut case so that only people who are somehow morally defective or sly and overweeningly stubborn would find it unconvincing. There is legitimate dispute on the issue in the same way there is legitimate dispute on free will and determinism, ESP and precognition, and other theories in science or philosophy. The existence of the Loch Ness monster is not an Animal Rights issue, but an empirical one. And the existence of God should not be made into a moral issue.

There are many reasons for both belief and nonbelief, and many proofs and disproofs on both sides. I refuse to adopt any single, simple explanation for either stance.

God is defined in most societies as a Direct Embodiment of Love, Fairness, and The Good who is concerned with the welfare and ultimate happiness of human beings (no, not all societies, but most that we on this list are familiar with.) The idea that there is a large class or group of people who would NOT WANT this Being to exist, who would not freely want to be enlightened as to the True Nature of Reality and would not freely want to be tenderly embraced within its all-encompassing Love Beyond Understanding for an Eternity of Bliss fills me with shock.

The numbers aren’t large, but relatively small, which is part of the point. Most people in all cultures and at all times, have been religious. Secondly, what is usually rejected is not this all-loving Being, but the tyrant who “damns billions of people to hell,” etc., etc., or the “Jesus” whom Steve [Conifer] constructed in his reply to my Survey (a “Jesus” thoroughly unrecognizable to me, one who is His disciple). I have always maintained that if indeed people knew that God existed and what His true nature was, that they couldn’t possibly resist Him. But unfortunately, people believe all sorts of wrong things about God, and so refuse assent (if an atheist) or obedience (if a non-Christian theist).

That’s one reason why I am so fired-up about apologetics, because many objections to Christianity are based upon pure stereotype, caricature, misinformation, old wives’ tales, passed-down bigotry, cultural mush religion, or flat-out untruths. Part of my job is to see that if someone must reject Christianity, that at least they know full well what it is they are rejecting. Apologetics thus deals with the aspects of religious faith or belief which have to do with knowledge and reason. It cannot touch the aspect of the will, which is another matter altogether. Nor can knowledge alone make people believe, because grace is also required. The apologist simply removes whatever roadblocks to faith (mostly intellectual, but also moral) he is able to remove.

Who would these incomprehensible monsters be? The inclusion of myself in this group leaves me almost speechless.

But I haven’t included you. I don’t know all the reasons why you don’t believe in God, and it would take a very long time of getting to know you very well personally to even venture a decent guess, if ever at all (I am very reluctant to ever make such judgments about individuals). I am discussing these matters (in the current instance) from a very broad social-psychological perspective, turning the tables on the standard “psychological crutch” argument.

What kind of religion would force nice, normal, ordinary people to believe this of me — and others — in order to make sense of a Hell for nonbelievers, and thus keep the integrity of the theory and system intact?

Again, this is only one possible reason among many, many extraordinarily complex reasons for belief or nonbelief. So you are being far too melodramatic.

A bad one, and a dangerous one, in my not so humble opinion.

And a caricature of the religion that believe in, in my still humble opinion.

I’m not sure I understand how you can claim that God “wants to share” with others but does not have a desire to do so. A love without need or desire seems to be a kind of contradiction, since love usually entails a strong yearning for the happiness and presence of another. This would have to be some new kind of love I am not familiar with, I think.

Well, most of us aren’t completely familiar with it, because it is beyond our normal experience as human beings. We aren’t self-sufficient, nor do we have perfect love, so only dim analogies at best can be applied. Mainly I meant to say that God has no need of creating humans, but did so out of love. But these are very deep matters and I don’t claim any particular expertise on them.

We can certainly understand loving without a need to do so. Say, e.g., I loved children and liked to babysit them. If I am babysitting 100 children, my need would certainly be met, and #101 would be unnecessary in that sense. But if #101 child shows up I could choose to exercise love and care for it even though I had no particular need to do so, which wasn’t already met.

I’m also not sure that you answered the question I asked. “Creation flows from the nature of love” doesn’t explain how or why God wanted to create something that never existed.

One of the essences of love is to give and to share, and creation is giving (life) and sharing (existence), wouldn’t you say?

A perfectly self-existent and complete Being would be complete and would not seem to be capable of having a “want” — especially for something that isn’t part of itself and never has been.

In that sense, yes, but we are speaking of an active love which is proactive and creative, not of any need.

Your claim is that we wouldn’t want there to be a God if there wasn’t already something there just like it that fits the bill — that our desires are a reliable indication that there is Something Out There which draws and attracts us to it.

Indeed.

God wanted humans, which must be why it created us. Where did this want come from, given that there was no one “out there” to attract it?

From His own nature, which is why we believe men are made in God’s image. Originally, I suppose, human beings were a sort of Platonic concept in God’s mind. So God made the image a reality; gave it physical being and a soul.

Why would it be part of its nature, which is already complete? Was God complete but unsatisfied?

No; He was complete, but loving, giving, and creative. Creation is a positive good. Human beings existing rather than not existing is a good thing, if creation is good. And it is very good because we are in God’s image, which is marvelous and wonderful. So God created. Love shares; love creates; love reaches out. That’s how I understand it, anyway. I’m sure a theologian like Aquinas or Augustine would explain it in infinitely more depth.

The yearning of man for God can be explained either through natural explanations concerning similar needs we evolved for security, justice, love, etc. here on earth OR through the theory that there is a Being out there which is drawing us towards Him.

Or both.

I still don’t see how you can explain the yearning (or “wanting to share”) of God for Man, given that God is supposed to be existing before Man and not only capable of being self-sufficient, but completely so as a matter of definition.

I hope I have explained it adequately.

The truly interesting thing to me is how to regard this huge divergence of perceived proof or lack of same. How should we interpret that (apart from the usual silly caricatures on both sides: atheists are evil conspirators; Christians are irrational and gullible morons, etc.)? The underlying assumptions and epistemological bases are what fascinate me the most in this whole larger controversy which we engage in here.

Yes, I agree — they are the same things that interest me. There is an interesting difference, though, in the way the two groups seem to approach the question. Since I do not think there is a God, trying to understand why so many think there is one will involve me in discovering and exploring how ordinary and intelligent people come to be so certain of things that aren’t so — and this understanding will range across not only religion but science, politics, social systems, psychology, neurology, etc. etc. God is only one question in the larger theme of man’s ability to err even while sincere and of good intention and character. And if I am wrong about the existence of God, I would appeal to these same types of explanations for why I made the mistake.

Many theists, however — since they believe there is a God to which all men of good will are naturally drawn in understanding — often try to understand why some men think there isn’t one by assuming depths of depravity and evil in the human heart.

We assume that about every human heart, not just that of atheists, so it can’t be used as a charge of selective application.

I think it is selective to an extent because in this particular question you make assumptions of extraordinary depravity . . .

Again, Christians believe all people suffer from “extraordinary depravity” apart from grace. It’s called original sin, and I’m sure you are familiar with the concept.

or willful blindness on the part of atheists in particular.

“Willful” is very difficult to determine. It certainly occurs, but ultimately God will decide when it does, not men, who can’t see into other human hearts. This is all biblical and Catholic teaching, not just the “exception” of “Dave the tolerant Catholic-despite-his-own-church”, etc.

When you assume that atheists haven’t reached their conclusions about God on the basis of evidence and argument but because of a psychological will to rebel against what they must know is true you have made them into a special case.

But I haven’t assumed or asserted this of any particular individual (though I might suspect it). I simply say that there are such individuals, atheists or otherwise. Christians are nearly as rebellious as any other group, because this is a universal human problem: the desire to be autonomous. I would never say an atheist has no evidence or argument which he thinks mitigates against God’s existence. I say that they are operating on false principles, premises, or shoddy logic somewhere down the line.

I think that with the atheist it is primarily an intellectual problem of misinformation and disinformation. Once it gets entrenched it is very difficult to dislodge. This false information in turn may produce an ill or bad will (or the latter may predispose one to the former). It could possibly become a ploy to avoid the obligations which accrue upon bowing to God. But I can’t know this for sure. I believe it occurs among some based on what I have observed in human beings, and because – yes – it is taught in the Bible as well, especially in Romans 1.

Certainly you can’t object to me explaining your disbelief by wrong information, logic, etc., as that would be exactly how Christian belief is explained away, no (at least in the more charitable instances)?

The premise that the Christian God exists allows you to bring in facts of the matter about what motivates atheists which you would not bring in if you simply saw the existence of God as being a question on the level of other questions in philosophy or science.

Of course revelation is also involved for any Christian. But this is too simple. The interrelationship of psychology and belief is extraordinarily complex, as indeed you yourself alluded to in an earlier comment. As a sociology major and psychology minor, I think I have a little better sense of that than the average person. These speculations are not simply brought about by religion and revelation but also by social psychology, even anthropology.

If this is not true for me, then it will be true for Nick or Ted or even (gasp) Steve. Or someone else.

It may be. I don’t assume that at all, as I engage in discussions. Mostly I observe obscurantism and obfuscation rather than bad faith or insincerity. But even those things I don’t claim are undertaken deliberately. I think they flow from the false beliefs and how they affect people’s thinking in a deleterious way. But you’ll note how some people here regard me. One person is convinced that I am a bigot with a closed-mind, insincere, and Lord knows what else. He is doing precisely what you and I agree is wrong, in our approach to others and their ideas and character. So this tendency works both ways, of course.

Where this point comes in will be related to how tolerant you are … and vice versa.

Indeed. I hope my present letter is “tolerant” in your eyes. I think your letters are uniformly excellent.

We do believe that the will and perhaps evil intent might lie behind unbelief, as with many other objective sins, but not necessarily so, as there is much intellectual confusion and misunderstanding also. For myself, I might generalize about atheists or other non-Christian categories (everyone does that about other groups), as to why they don’t believe, but I always try to extend the judgment of charity on an individual basis, and not to make charges concerning which I have too little evidence to make.

Which I think admirable on your part and does you credit. I have a question for you, one which I have asked on this list before, though not recently. I’ll make it simple, it has to do with how you explain atheism. Do you believe:

1.) God has placed undeniable, self-evident internal knowledge of His Presence in every heart, and those who claim to not have this are willfully lying to themselves and others.

2.) Evidence of God’s existence in the world is so clear and obvious that anyone who does not acknowledge it must be either perverse or intent on blocking it out.

3.) Evidence for God’s existence is ambiguous; a rational person with a good heart can honestly come to the mistaken belief that God doesn’t exist.

In other words, is the existence of God 1.) pregiven internal knowledge 2.) obvious conclusion 3.) neither internal nor obvious?

None of the above, as written, because you make a basic error. You incorrectly make deliberate intent a prerequisite for #1 and #2. I don’t believe that in most cases people are “willfully lying to themselves” or “perverse or intent on blocking it out.” I think that they (particularly intellectuals and more educated folks) believe certain things mistakenly, and then proceed to build a massive edifice of false belief with a weak (false, untrue) foundation.

Actually, since the three options were meant to be all-inclusive, I think you have opted for #3. Perhaps you misunderstood what I wrote, I may not have been clear. I was basically asking if it was possible for a reasonable person to come to a mistaken conclusion on the existence of God, not whether it is more reasonable to think that atheism is true.

I think I understood. But if #3 is deemed to be my choice (if one must be chosen), I would still state that what is “ambiguous” is (in the atheist’s case) the perception of the “obvious” evidence for God’s existence, not the evidence itself. That’s why I maintain that none of the three accurately portray what my opinion on the matter is.

There are Christians who believe that knowledge of God and/or evidence of God is so clear, obvious, and unambiguous to everyone that atheists are simply playing evil games with themselves, a perverse, unnatural, and deliberate attempt to defy God. It is possible to interpret the Bible in this way.

This is too philosophically and psychologically simple. Romans 1 and similar passages about willful unbelief are general statements; not applicable to each individual because we can’t read hearts to see if this sort of thing is in fact going on. One must also interpret it in harmony with other passages showing how Jesus and the Apostles actually approached unbelievers.

It is also possible to believe that while God can be found by searching within or by observing without, the evidence is not so clear that only the morally depraved acting with ill will and on bad faith would be — or, more accurately, pretend to be — an atheist.

The classic Christian position (Augustine, Aquinas et al) is that natural theology is sufficient for all to know that God exists. The particular characteristics of this God, however, are a matter of revelation and cannot be attained by natural reason alone, apart from faith, grace, and supernatural revelation, where God simply communicates to man His attributes and care for us as a heavenly Father and our Creator.

Obviously, the first interpretation is dangerous to mutual respect. And pretty much cuts off any debate.

Indeed.

The second interpretation, that this “might be true” in some cases, or even many cases, but not all, allows us to share a common ground, but the ground is a bit shaky.

This formulation is closer to my own opinion (which is the orthodox Catholic one, as far as I know).

The argument is always there waiting ready and prepared as a plausible final resort. The people in heaven and the people in hell, those in eternal bliss and those in eternal torment, seem to have such drastically different fates despite the fact that people here on earth seem to be basically the same kind of ordinary people, mixtures of good and bad.

That’s because God can see things in human beings in a much deeper way than we think we can conclude by limited observation, often distorted by jealousies, resentments, insecurities, condescension, prejudices, incorrect conclusions based on behavior, mistaken perceptions, and so forth.

It is very tempting to consider that perhaps they only SEEM to be the same kind of people, and use the first interpretation, in order to jibe with our sense of justice.

God will judge people based on what they knew, and what they did with that knowledge. One would have to truly know that God is Who He is, and reject Him, to be cast into hell. Ignorance is not a damnable sin. Willful rejection, disobedience, and rebellion may very well be. Invincible ignorance might go either way, depending on the person’s will and its role in the existing ignorance. There is a difference between people refusing to know and simply not knowing something, due to lack of information.

After all, belief in Jesus as Christ can’t be too unnecessary, or why the all bother on God’s part?

All who are saved will be by virtue of Jesus Christ. But they don’t necessarily have to have heard of Him, or what He did.

The first parts of #1 and #2 are true. Why people come to not believe or accept that is a far more complicated matter than your simplistic “willful lying,” “perversion” and so forth. Unbelief, I think, involves a long, complicated process of building up a paradigm and worldview, where atheism appears – in perfect sincerity – as more plausible than Christianity.

It involves things like tyrannical fathers (or no fathers) or teacher-nuns, lack of role models of real Christians (and the ubiquitous examples of “hypocrites”), lousy apologetics and catechesis among many, many Christians, traumatic childhood experiences, the favorable contrast of the “smart” college professor in contrast to the “ignorant backward” Christians, being forced to go to church by religiously nominal parents, cultural mores and trends, entertainment stereotypes, feminism, politics, peers, throughly-secularized public schools and whole fields (sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, etc.) and on and on. All of these things create impressions and ideas in our minds. We then act upon them and develop our beliefs.

I understand something about paradigm transformations and what is involved because I have changed my mind on so many of these major issues myself. I know from my own experience that I was perfectly sincere in my earlier beliefs and acting upon the knowledge I had then, to the best of my ability. So I am not inclined at all to attribute ill will or bad faith. Yet I don’t deny that it happens.

I can easily see that most atheists on this list, e.g., don’t have the slightest clue as to what true Christianity really entails. That’s not meant as an insult, but actually a roundabout compliment (in the context of this dialogue). This very ignorance explains the vehemence and zeal with which you hold your opposition to Christianity. For how can one reasonably espouse what he has only the dimmest comprehension of in the first place? If I thought for a second that Christianity was what it is described to be on this list, I would leave it in the next second. And that gets around to the function of the apologist: to clear away all this massive amount of falsehood, distortion, cardboard caricatures of Christianity, straw men, and so on.

And what other claims would you put in the same category as claims about the existence of God?

Natural law (i.e., objective morality), the senses, consciousness of our mind and other minds and conscious beings, logic (with the aid of proper education, to some extent).

I’m not sure what you mean here. Most of these things are not in any dispute, they are readily available in our daily experience.

You asked me what I thought was in the same category; this is how obvious I think the existence of God is.

To deny that we have senses or that other people have minds or that logic works requires questioning the foundations of our experience of reality.

Precisely. That is how even an evidentialist like me views God also.

I’m not saying it ought not to be done, just that I would not include God in the same category as “the belief that we are conscious explains our experience of being conscious.” God is a much more complicated and remote explanatory theory than that.

I understand this is what you believe; I was simply expressing my view, since you asked me.

As for Natural Law/Objective Morality, that does seem more consistent with the type of questioning “does God exist?” involves.

Okay; good.

From what I can tell we both agree on objective morality. I know many reasonable people who disagree with us, some on this list. I suspect it may be a matter of definition, and also suspect that it may be resolvable over time by discussion — but admit it may not. And we might be wrong, of course. So I wouldn’t assume that there is a good probability here that Steve or Nick disagree with me on this point because deep down they know I’m right but want a relative, subjective morality so they can justify hurting other people without guilt. Or that anyone probably works like this on such a complicated issue.

People sincerely believe in false philosophies. Some may hold to relativism because of personal motives, but I think they are in the minority, and I can’t be sure that any individual believes this, short of the most compelling, undeniable proof.

If God has revealed itself adequately to everyone, then there must be some people who have a stubborn and willful ability to delude themselves against the acceptance of Ultimate Good.

This is true, but it is not the only factor.

If the best, most likely reason for atheism is a stubborn and willful ability to reject Ultimate Good, then there is something seriously morally wrong with atheists that can’t be said to be wrong with Christians and other theists, behavior aside. And it’s this “behavior aside” part that worries me.

Atheists — by and large — don’t reject what they believe to be “Ultimate Good,” knowing that it is indeed that. They reject what they believe to be non-existent (God) based on bad reasoning and a host of other factors, some of which I listed above. But the longer one lives with false beliefs, I would say the more susceptible they are of picking up bad habits of thought and behavior and slowly corrupting themselves (intellectually and morally), so that they become even less likely to accept what the Christian says is evident – all things being equal. Perhaps this is some of what is meant by the biblical phrase “hardening of the heart.”

Heh– this is not so different than the concerns many rational skeptics have. Living with the belief that faith is a final arbiter of truth and we ought to trust other means over and beyond reason can gradually corrupt one’s love of truth so that over time one loses the ability to distinguish between what is real and what feels “right” or good.

It could, but it doesn’t have to have that effect, if indeed faith and revelation are valid constructs, and if they can co-exist harmoniously with reason. Another instance of throwing the baby out with the bath water. Rationality can be equally as corrupted, if not much more so. Look at what happened in the French Revolution, for Pete’s sake. The “goddess of reason” and all that bilge . . . Marxism was supposed to be so rational and scientific (and atheistic) and it led to Lenin, Stalin, and Mao. Nazism adopted at least some ideas from Nietzsche (whether they distorted his views or not, I know not, but the point is that all these influences were non-theist and supposedly “rationalist”).

We lose our ability to think critically, because reason is seen as something that is in opposition to the heart — and public knowledge is seen as inferior in status to private knowing.

Only head-in-the-sand fundamentalists do this, or those in any Christian camp who don’t take the trouble to learn their faith and the rational justifications for it.

James Randi said “It is a dangerous thing to believe in nonsense.”

I couldn’t agree more.

It can be. Most people can compartmentalise their religious way of thinking from the way they come to believe in other things.

They do this precisely because that is how our secularist, humanist society (with its marvelous public schools) has taught them to think: that religion is a marginal, entirely subjective affair having little to do with reason. In other words, Christians have been educated into a stupor and propagandized with all these secular worldviews, and – being human – they start to show the influence of their surrounding culture. The medieval synthesis of Aquinas and the Scholastics was exactly the opposite view: that reason and revelation, faith and rationality can be entirely synthesized.

I have long argued that the excessive, silly hyper-compartmentalization of knowledge was a function of the abuses of already-rotten Enlightenment rationalism, where knowledge was no longer regarded as a unified thing. So Christians who exhibit these same tendencies are simply acting in the post-modern (even relativist) fashion, whether or not they are aware of it.

They will be skeptical about dubious and unproven claims in their daily life, and yet enshrine having child-like trust in religious claims.

There is such a thing as a rational trust or faith. Faith is not the equivalent of irrationality and gullibility.

But bad habits of thought, as you say, have a tendency to creep into other areas. You might call these areas superstitious nonsense, gullible quackery, and general flapdoodle (you can borrow that word if you don’t already have it!).

What a word! Is that an original? :-) My position is that there is much of this nonsense in Christian circles, but also equally as much in theist/secular/humanist/materialist scientific circles.

So might I.

You just did! LOL

We probably draw the line in different areas, though. ;)

I would suspect as much. LOL

By the way, I have heard many Christians complain about the growing view of God as Loving and Tolerant to a fault, the New Age version of a generic God that, like Mr. Rogers, loves us “just the way we are” … a slap happy vague everyone is going to heaven and will reach a higher plain of existence blah blah blah. I suspect you are familiar with this modern tendency.

Yes. I’m not so sure it is solely “modern” – human beings having the nature that they do.

Thus assertions that atheists don’t believe in God because they don’t want to be accountable or have to give up their vices makes little sense to me.

People – of any belief-system – come up with all sorts of rationales and justifications for their immoral behavior, be it sexual or materialistic (greed), selfishness, cruelty, refusal to take responsibility, skimming company funds, or what-not. I don’t see that it is arguable to deny that a belief in God would tend to mitigate against such behaviors, to the extent that God is perceived as “watching over” and disapproving of these things (the Ten Commandments alone would deal with most of ’em), or that He will judge them in the end, up to and including hell itself. Those beliefs are not conducive to a lifestyle which is deemed to be “free” and without “unnecessary constraints” (in other words, the typical 60s/libertarian/free love/whatever makes you feel good mentality).

If you think people are rebelling against all discipline then seemingly it would be so much easier and more comfortable to simply believe in a Nice God who will let us all live forever and loves everyone all the time and is Real Cool to boot (Buddy Christ, maybe .) Surely you think there is at least some kind of austerity and self-restraint in atheism, given that we might instead choose to believe in a god or goddess that wants us to live it up?

Cute and interesting. :-) I guess I would say that all the false ideas and cultural forces are arrayed against Christianity, rather than for this ridiculous sort of God, so that the atheist simply rejects theism, rather than adopt a nursery-school version of it. The atheist (especially the philosopher-atheist) is much more likely to adopt that view because it is taking a certain kind of post-Enlightenment skepticism to its logical conclusion. Philosophy is shot-through with this thinking. The long and short of it is again, intellectual influences reaping their fruit. But I do much prefer a convinced atheist (on a strictly intellectual plane) to a nominal or theologically-liberal Christian. I would suspect that the will is more likely to be awry in the latter than in the former, and that much less rigorous thinking is taking place.

This view that a God understood would inspire universal love seems to make a great deal of sense to me, if God is indeed what theists claim it is, the source and foundation of Love and Goodness itself.

Excellent!

It also goes along with what I have observed of your own kind and thoughtful nature.

Awwww; thanks. That’s very nice of you to say. I already said I liked you, so I guess we have formed a Mutual Admiration Society! :-)

But if this is so, then who is in Hell?

Those who knew what God was, and still rejected Him; in other words, pure rebellion with a full consent of the will and perfect knowledge of what is being rejected.

But this seems to be a contradiction. If all who truly understood God would love God

They will not, because they have free will. What I was saying was more along the lines that understanding is a prerequisite for a real love.

then it makes no sense to also say that many who understand God will not love God. If God is indeed the source and foundation of what all people are drawn to as Good then to say they can still know and reject this makes little sense.

Evil and rebellion against God never does, but nevertheless, some people reach this point.

I can understand it if you say people reject God because they don’t recognise the true nature of God, but not when you say that they reject God because they DO recognise the true nature of God but want to follow their own way. This is because God’s way WOULD be our own way, if we had a clear and true picture of God, given your beliefs.

Yes, but people manage to believe otherwise. You will not accomplish much if you try to analyze evil as a rational process. It is not. It is almost as illogical as it is immoral.

It seems to me that the only way to reconcile a fair God of Love with Eternal Damnation is to assume that there must be some people who — even if they knew for a fact that God existed and understood to a certainty that God was Good — would still be capable of resisting and rejecting God.

Precisely.

If God is to be made objectively Good then some people must be made objectively evil — not just ordinary human nature “sinful,” but different than those of “us” who are ordinary humans and yet still capable of knowing and accepting God. That this is so must just be one of those “spiritual truths” that are beyond science and reason.

It’s as simple as a rejection of someone on inadequate grounds, analogous to a spurning of a worthy lover or parent, for no really good reason. It comes down to a choice to separate oneself from God, and to choose oneself instead. Again, this is presupposing that one perfectly understands the choice made. They obviously would have to know that God exists, in order to truly reject Him.

That’s why I personally believe that many atheists are in a far better spiritual place than many, many Christians. Jesus treated the Roman centurion and the Samaritan woman at the well with far more compassion and understanding than he did the hypocritical Pharisees. That was largely based on what each knew, and what they did with their knowledge. The Centurion actually came to Jesus to request healing for his servant, and Jesus said that he had rarely seen such faith among the Jews. This is the true Christian approach to nonbelievers, not a smug, arrogant judgmentalism and assumption of the worst about the other person.

And this, I suspect, is why for many people the existence of God can’t simply be a scientific claim to be accepted or rejected on the evidence.

Including myself. I don’t claim that any theistic proof is compelling or undeniable. My view is that an accumulation of many and various proofs lead one to conclude that Christianity is quite plausible, and the best option to explain reality. Then faith comes in, and grace. One can never minimize the importance of those in Christianity.

And that is the problem as I see it. By insisting that faith and grace are necessary in order to accept the existence of God . . .

That is a clear teaching of revelation, and hence, of God.

. . . you put those who do NOT find the evidence plausible or convincing into an area of willful wickedness that would not apply if we were simply philosophers or scientists arguing with each other.

Not necessarily. You are painting with that broad brush of yours again. I like you a lot better when you use the dinky, fine little brush. The whole point as I see it here is that faith and grace are of a different order than reason. They are not contrary to reason, just different from it. The atheist is looking at plausibility, logic, and so forth but completely overlooking the central, fundamental role of faith. And no apologist can grant that faith. It comes from the Holy Spirit as a free gift (one can ask for it though). Christians believe that even the asking was a result of God’s enabling grace.

And this is what for Christians makes the question of the existence of God very different than other questions, and where the difficulties in relating to nonbelievers can creep in.

Not the existence (which can be known through natural theology and reason) but the attributes, the gospel, salvation, etc., which require revelation, grace, and faith.

If I am trying to decide a question over the existence of something which may or may not exist we never otherwise assume that the thing I am wondering about is capable of granting knowledge of it by a direct intuitive means, which seems to be what is involved in grace or faith as you’re using it here.

There is no other object I can think of which can give — or withhold — a direct, binding intuition or insight into its existence in this fashion. The closest I can come is in the realm of emotion — ie unless you have felt what it is like to love your newborn child you can’t directly know exactly what it is like to feel this love, for example. But the child itself isn’t allowing me to know that it exists by some means other than direct experience or reason.

Nor is God. But to fully know and love Him and have Him come into your heart (what we call the Indwelling), faith is required, and prior grace from God. What can I say? With God we are dealing with something exceptional by nature, so I wouldn’t expect there to be any other direct analogy.

So, if faith is fundamental to a knowledge of God,

No, to be a disciple and believer in God as He has revealed Himself in the Bible and Christianity.

and if faith is granted as a gift from the Holy Spirit, then why does the Holy Spirit decide to give it to some people and not others?

Of course, this is one of the deepest, most debated mysteries of Christianity, and not capable of a completely satisfying answer, as it involves the thoughts and ways of God, which are far above ours.

Is it an arbitrary matter, with little rhyme or reason? Few Christians would be comfortable with this, I think.

Certainly not. Even the more extreme Calvinist positions would admit that they don’t know why God chooses some, but that – in faith – His reason is just and not arbitrary.

Is it because some people have the kind of character that deserves or allows this gift, and others do not?

Absolutely not. No one deserves it by nature. That is what is known as the heresy of Pelagianism, which Augustine vigorously fought. It is pure grace.

Generally, that seems to be the belief most Christians are comfortable with.

Not rightly understood. The sheerly gratuitous nature of salvation is something many Christians poorly understand. Here is my own view. It is called Molinism, a position developed by the Jesuits over against the Thomist view:

Salvation is purely by grace. Yet it doesn’t annihilate or rule out human free will and choices (it is not irresistible, as Calvinists believe). God gives the grace to some, sufficient for salvation. But in so doing, He utilizes His middle knowledge (scientia media) whereby He – being out of time and omniscient – has the ability to know how certain people will in fact react to His grace, in all possible situations and contingencies. He then takes this knowledge into consideration with regard to whom He chooses to distribute His grace to. So salvation is totally caused and initiated by God’s grace, yet the response of human free will, and God’s foreknowledge of it, explains why some receive sufficient graces for salvation and others do not. It removes any arbitrariness or injustice in God’s election of some to heaven and others to hell.

Do good people always believe that good things are true?

No.

If atheists don’t believe in God because they lack the necessary faith and grace, then why do you bother bringing in human errors?

Both are relevant factors. But on a practical human level, we all have the choice to follow God or not. Election, predestination, foreknowledge, Providence and all that are almost abstractions in a very real sense. They’re fun to talk about, but we don’t know who is elect or not. We do know that we are free creatures, able to make choices. Catholics believe that God gives all men a chance for salvation, not just the elect. We deny the Limited Atonement of the Calvinists, where it is held that Christ dies only for the elect, not for all men. But free will necessitates that some rebel against God.

Why make an evidential case for God which attempts to prove God through reason and then, when the evidence is rejected as insufficient say “well, of course, you need faith and grace, that is central?” It can only be central if the evidence is inadequate, and if the evidence is inadequate then there is nothing seriously wrong with coming to the conclusion that God does not exist — nothing epistemically or morally wrong.

Again, your confusion is that you think Christians believe that God can only be known at all through grace. Most Christians would deny this, and appeal to natural reason and theology as a means to know of God’s existence. Even most Calvinists would agree, if I’m not mistaken. I think it is only a minority who would reject all natural theology altogether. So in dealing with an atheist, the Christian would naturally appeal to reason first, rather than to revelation, because the atheist rejects the authority of the latter. This is just common sense. It doesn’t mean, however that the apologist is rejecting the crucial role of grace (or revelation) for a second. If you now want to discuss grace, I would be more than happy to do that also. But that is pure theology and revelation; no longer philosophy.

I suspect that this is why faith and grace, when brought in, can lead to uniquely negative views of the atheist. Somehow, the atheist does not deserve grace or faith. Or is too hard-hearted to accept it. Or is too hard-hearted to give it.

One can’t make that determination very easily at all. We don’t know who is damned, and should never presume to know (though the Calvinists on the list I mentioned were “sure” of my supposed damnation). I’m convinced they would have burned me at the stake had they had the power and opportunity to do so. Frightening . . . The Catholic Church doesn’t claim to know that any particular person is damned, not even Judas Iscariot.

This may not be what you have concluded or believe. But it certainly seems to be what most Christians conclude, and I can see the power of their reasoning, if I grant their assumptions.

No Christian viewpoint has the wisdom to know who is damned and who isn’t. You can trust me on that one. All they can know is whether a person is out of line with a certain “orthodoxy” or moral code here and now, but they don’t know where that person’s soul would go when they die. Only God knows that.

The problem is that I can’t grant all their assumptions. I can grant for the sake of argument that there is a magical supernatural being which is capable of giving us direct revelation.

However, if this is so I can see that there are still inherent problems with being able to distinguish this “real” direct revelation from natural accounts of similar types of feelings of certainty that are not real direct revelations — and therefore the problem of being able to know that there is such a thing as “revelation” at all. The fact that I can see this and acknowledge this as a difficulty is not “hard-hearted” of me and I know this because I grant that I know my own heart. There is no hostility in me towards the idea of God in general and I see nothing hard-hearted or callous in the strict use of reason and science. It’s an attempt to be honest, and to be honest is a form of love.

I believe you. I can only direct you to reasons why I believe in revelation. These are many: documented miracles, fulfilled prophecy, martyrs, changed lives, the moral impact of Christianity on culture, religious experience, the fact that Christian moral teaching seems to be confirmed in practice again and again, the extraordinary person of Jesus, etc.

The documented miracles amount to anecdote, when all is said and done, and are not sufficient to establish the violation of accepted natural laws to people who are not already convinced of the truth of the religion. The fulfilled prophesies are not so clear and incontrovertible that they stand up to skeptical scrutiny, and the changed lives and confirmed moral teachings make as much sense if the religion is interpreted from secular assumptions as on the assumption that it is true. Which is all to say that your evidence is not of the kind that can persuade skeptics — even skeptics of good will — but of the kind that can inspire and confirm truths to believers.

*****

You want to stand on the common ground with Fundamentalists but find your arguments ignored because the real problem is that you lack the common ground of faith and grace, despite the fact that you consider Catholicism the BEST example of faith and grace you have found. You are being condemned here not for what you feel are your shortcomings, but for what you feel are your virtues.

Well put. But here it is a matter of sheer ignorance. The false beliefs, inadequately thought-through lead to the prejudice, in my opinion. The overwhelming ignorance is then covered with a veneer of highfalutin’ religious lingo, to try to make it appear respectable and of the highest purpose. I utterly despise this, and condemn it whenever I see it, because Jesus also did, and I try to imitate Him.

And this is how I feel as a Secular Humanist. I may be wrong, but if so I am wrong for the right reasons.

I agree with you. I get the feeling that you aren’t arguing with me, so much as with Joe Christian. I have already condemned these attitudes in my very first post. So I made your argument over 6 weeks ago. :-)

And the reasons matter more than the conclusion.

This is where I would start to disagree. I believe that we always need to examine our premises and beliefs and theories, to see where they might be wrong. It is not only the reasoning process which is so noble, but the conclusions we come to also. Reasoning is simply use of intelligence. Coming to true conclusions is knowledge. Applying the truth to real life is wisdom.

I don’t understand this. Isn’t the act of examining our premises, beliefs, and theories to see where they might be wrong called “reasoning?”

Yes.

Or are you trying to make the point that sometimes reason will lead us to the conclusion that we ought to decide a matter based on emotion? If that is a reasonable thing to conclude, then reason was still the method.

I was saying that knowledge and wisdom are different than mere reasoning process or logic.

What I was trying to say is that commitment to a careful process of reasoning in order to find out what is true is more important to our character than a decision to pick out truths that appeal to us. I know you agree.

Of course I do.

I think you would also agree that such discipline is also more likely to allow us to arrive at truth.

Yes.

No, not every time. But it’s the way to bet.

And the Christian thinks that revelation, too, is part of this truth we are both striving after.

If I miss evidence of God because I am too stringent and strict in my criteria, because I demand scientific evidence for what I feel is a scientific claim, then I am still right to do so. I ought to draw the wrong conclusion, because the evidence isn’t the kind that ought to persuade me, given my commitment to what I see as epistemic virtue.

You need to think about why you think science is the sum of reliable knowledge (assuming you do – it sure seems so to me).

This is why God can’t just be a metaphysical claim about the ultimate nature of reality which can’t ever be known one way or the other.

That’s right; this is fideism, which is very dangerous and has produced all sorts of nonsense and religious bondage.

There is no evil inherent in rejecting a scientific claim for epistemic reasons; there is no blame in choosing a metaphysical view that really doesn’t make a difference either way. And somebody has to be in Hell.

I’m not sure what you mean here.

I mean that reconcile them as much as you can, there will always be an ultimate tension between Athens and Jerusalem.

I think there can be paradoxes, but ultimately no tension (not in terms of contradiction). Reason and revelation, Christianity and science, faith and rationality, are all perfectly harmonious. There are problems to work out (as in all thoughtful views), but I have seen nothing sufficiently compelling to convince me that these syntheses are impossible or implausible.

I repeat myself more than I should . . . It may be that part of the reason I’ve rambled on is my knowledge that there is a possibility that you will put this on your very nice website and thus there may be curious Catholics who are looking at an atheist’s point of view for the very first time. I would hate to leave some vital point out or express something so poorly that they would be left with the impression that we’re on opposite sides of the fence in areas where I think we are not on opposite sides at all, but coming at the same truths from different directions.

There are so many very bad explanations for why someone would be an atheist in the theistic community, just as there are many bad explanations for why someone would be a Catholic in the Protestant community.

Yep.

Bottom line, we believe what we believe because we think it is true, if we give thought to the issue. I think what matters in the end can’t be whether we believe in God or not, but whether we commit to something greater that ourselves — and yet recognise that nothing is so “great” that it ought not to be questioned and explored.

Well, I appreciate where you are coming from, but of course I can’t agree to a notion that God is optional in any search after truth and reality. Nor can I agree that everything must be able to be “questioned” and that nothing could be in a category of unquestioned dogma. I have said that I am willing to overthrow any of my beliefs. But I still hold to the belief that certain things can legitimately be considered dogmas. All Christians must believe that. To not do so would be to cease being a Christian. So I can conceive of leaving Christianity if persuaded otherwise, but as long as I am here, I believe that some things are unquestionable, on a faith or religious basis. I hope I have expressed this clearly. I know it may appear contradictory, but it is not.

I do understand that in order to be considered a Christian you have to consider the existence of God and the inspiration of the Bible as unquestionable dogmas, as foundational truths. But in order to become a Christian one can’t start out with this, and it is this process of arriving at what is true that leads to our conflict.

You have stated elsewhere that Natural Theology demonstrates that the existence of God does not have to be accepted on faith but can be shown to be the most reasonable explanation for our existence and that of the universe. Not more reasonable than Naturalism, however, because without a means to distinguish between what we don’t know and what God has therefore wrought it is more prudent to assume ignorance on our part instead of activity on God’s. The natural universe we observe together is the mutual starting ground, the common point of agreement, and thus requires no such step.

It is not that I don’t see you as seeking truth passionately, nor do I doubt your commitment and sincerity. It’s just that I think that accepting faith and revelation at the outset shows that you seek truth a bit too passionately, and impatiently.

There is a famous Sidney Harris cartoon that skeptics enjoy. It shows two scientists in front of a blackboard which one of them has covered with mathematical symbols and scientific notations of proof — and there in the center of two arrows are the words “suddenly a miracle occurs.” The second scientist is saying to the first: “That middle step needs work.” And so it does, and so it should.

Naturalism is a reasonable belief even if it isn’t true because it rests on a consistency and coherency in method. Christians tend to respond by pointing out that if Naturalism isn’t true then we’re wrong to hold ourselves to a foolish consistency. Since God might exist, then we ought to entertain the idea that there are means of knowing that go beyond science, reason, and philosophy.

But God might not exist also. What happens when we go beyond our means of checking ourselves and allow ourselves dogmas which can’t be overthrown without overthrowing God? Faith is a kind of hubris that says we can KNOW because in trusting ourselves we are really just trusting God. We become gods in order to claim God. And I think that is not wise.

*****

The atheist feels that reality is greater than man, in that it does not go away or change itself based on whether we believe in it or not.

We agree totally with you so far.

A commitment to truth requires that we use methods that take ourselves and our “faiths” out of the equation as much as possible. The Humanist believes that the best way to live is to live in and with love — love for the truth, love for virtue, love for man, and love for the universe.

Perhaps that is why you seem to think that those who exercise faith must not, therefore, be seeking truth as passionately as those without faith are. The logic follows inescapably from your statement above (even if you did qualify it slightly). If you exclude faith (and/or revelation) from the outset as any sort of means to seek after truth, then inevitably you must question the validity of any person of faith saying that he is seeking after truth with just as much commitment and sincerity as you are. It is a category exclusion.

In a sense, we can say that this love is our “god.” The Christian often says that God is Love. Somehow this has turned into a debate where both sides are arguing that the opposite belief corrupts us. I think they are the same belief — whether there is a God or not.

Well, that’s not all bad, and far better than many secularist “religions” I have seen. I appreciate the search for common ground, as you know. My way of saying something similar from the Christian perspective is to state that the humanist is operating on the basis of a natural law (morality) and a conscience put there by God, and is made in the image of God (who is Love), even though he or she denies this, of course. That explains the commonality in a way that makes God absolutely necessary and the First Cause, rather than a mere optional belief.

*****
We maintain that all human beings have sufficient knowledge internally and from the external world to know that God exists, and that He is the Creator (whether He used evolution to create or not). But atheists disagree. How shall we figure out who is being more realistic about the degree of evidence actually available?

I think the evidence is quite compelling. I look at the universe. I examine how I think about morality and aesthetics and reflect upon my yearnings for a better world than what we have. I see the character of Jesus and hear about various substantiated miracles. I see lives changed for the better after believing in God. I look at how my own life has changed in a profound way. I observe how the moral laws given to us by God in the Bible seem to work far better in practice than secularist alternatives (e.g., many studies have shown that conservative Christian married couples have a far more satisfying sex life than their sexually-liberal, promiscuous counterparts). I look at what the Christian worldview has produced in culture and in history.

I think God has given more than enough, but it is not quite enough to be believed by all on the basis of reason alone. Why? Because some faith is required. It may be somewhat analogous to human romantic love. Each must have faith in the other. There is no absolute proof that a marriage will always be happy. But they believe it will be, based on what they do know of the other person.

If the atheist could assume for a moment that Jesus did in fact rise from the dead, that would be quite a compelling proof, would it not (at least as compelling as God writing “John 3:16” in the stars, which would convert hyper-atheists Steve Conifer and Ted Drange on the spot LOL)? Normally, when people die, that’s it. But assuming that for a moment, would this be a sufficient proof for an atheist? Jesus claimed to be God in the flesh, did miracles, said He would rise from the dead, and did. Some people believed; most did not. So the record (again, on the Christian assumption) shows that even extraordinary “manifestations” of God’s existence will not convince even a majority of the people.

Or say that this would indeed convince an atheist if and only if they saw it firsthand. Well and good. But then atheists and other skeptics will become severe Bible critics, ignoring all the overwhelming evidence of its historical trustworthiness (even short of its alleged inspiration) and therefore deny the historicity of what it reports. So the thing actually happened, but historical skepticism prevents those in later generations from believing it. Skeptics can always find ways to disbelieve something if they want to (the will), or else are beholden to a philosophy which doesn’t allow the thing to be possible or plausible in the first place (the mind). Therefore, that is not God’s fault, but human beings’ fault.

I view both atheistic and theistic beliefs as extraordinarily complex and varied phenomena. I do know for a fact that people have a great capacity for self-delusion. I know this from my own experience and from long and close observation of others, as a sort of armchair pop psychologist (I majored in sociology and minored in psychology). One of the few things Freud got right was his ingenious exposition of the subconscious and unconscious. I find those things to be profoundly true.

God has already has shown Himself in a general sense. He wants faith from human beings, not demands, as if He is some sort of dog doing a trick in obedience to His “master.” Immortality or life after death is regarded as an inherent need of human beings by Christians, for the following reasons (and others):

1. Existence is good (an axiom more or less assumed by all of us; we avoid death at all costs; we have a strong survival instinct; we cringe at terminal illness, etc.).
2. Therefore to cease existing or to not exist is less good, or, conceivably, not good at all.
3. To exist eternally in some conscious fashion is better than to cease existing.
4. Therefore, we desire to continue to exist as a function of our assumed belief that existence is good, and the cessation of it, bad.

I think it is as simple as that. Whoever cares little about their impending annihilation must not have given much thought to the value of their existence, in my opinion. And if their existence had little or no value in the first place, suicide would be quite a logical solution, I would think. Human needs at the deepest level are such that I think it is reasonable to apply them to all human beings. I think, e.g., that everyone needs to be loved by other people. Seeming exceptions to this can easily be potentially explained by the reaction of having been abused or hurt, by repression, by mental illness, etc.

*****

This truly is an amazing dialogue. Thanks so much. You’ll never know how much I appreciate such an enlightened, constructive discussion, conducted by you in perfect amiability and courtesy. I gladly attest to the fact that you are an excellent representative of your position, even though I remain unpersuaded of it.

I attest the same for your good self, of course. :) And I, too, am unpersuaded, but as a Humanist I perhaps represent the most fundamental spirit of the ecumenical approach you espouse, the promotion of unity and fellowship that comes from the acceptance of the common ground that applies to all people, not just to those in special categories of circumstance or belief. Fundamental to Humanism is a recognition that we begin together, as humans and as persons, and share far more than we do not.

I think it is sometimes difficult for apologists who are used to trying to bring together all Catholics or all Christians or all people who believe in God-However-They-See-Her to extend their ecumenism towards the ultimate outsiders, the atheists, and try to see things from their point of view at least well enough to argue them around. Suddenly the basic common ground — belief in God — is swept out, and you have to start from scratch. You’re doing an admirable job, I think, and I respect that. Listservs like this force us to examine –or curb — our dogmas — not just religious ones, but secular ones. And as a Humanist, I think that a darn good thing.

Peace, Love, Harmony, and All That Humanist (how many “Hippies” were accused of Scientism?) Crap,

Sue Strandberg (Sastra)

APPENDIX ONE: Worldviews Being Theoretically Disproven
***
I hold all my beliefs – however strong and epistemologically “certain” — provisionally, subject to correction by superior reasoning and additional factual data brought to bear (and for that matter, revelation newly understood) which may come around to overthrow it.

I’ve a quick question, just help me understand your position:

Sure, anytime.

Assume for the moment that you are mistaken not only about the truth of Catholicism and Christianity, but about the existence of God. That is, the universe is as we both agree it is, but God does not and never has existed. The universe is natural, and your experiences have all been natural experiences. What lines of reasoning or additional factual data would or could persuade you that this is the case? Thanks. :)

All of the arguments and evidences I put forth for the existence of God and Christianity would have to be overthrown, viz., the alternatives would have to seem superior and more plausible to me. This would include counter-explanations to the cosmological and teleological arguments (including macroevolution and cosmology), satisfying answers to the “problem of good” and the meaning and purpose of life, and the moral argument, and the argument from longing and desire, and what I call the “reverse pragmatic argument” (i.e., “Christianity isn’t true because it works, but it works because it is true”), Christian experience, transformed lives, the basis of aesthetics, the seeming universality of the religious impulse, the negative cultural and ethical results of secularism and atheism, and so forth.

Then all the historical evidences would have to be overthrown: explanations for Jesus, the Resurrection, heavily-documented and substantiated miracles, fulfilled prophecies, the continuing existence of the Jews against all odds, the uncanny accuracy and extraordinary nature of the Bible, the noteworthy cultural contributions of Christianity, answered prayer, the incredible institutional continuance of the Catholic Church, and on and on.

In other words, since the reason I am a Christian is a huge “cumulative amount of varying evidences,” all pointing to one conclusion, these would have to be overthrown one-by-one, shown to be inadequate or fallacious, and alternatives demonstrated to be more plausible. At the point that the alternatives seemed to have equal weight to my present proofs, then my paradigm would be in crisis (as I went through in my odyssey from Protestantism to Catholicism). If they started to become more weighty, then I would have to – as a matter of intellectual honesty – consider forsaking Christianity and becoming an agnostic and perhaps an atheist.

Let me ask you in return: “What lines of reasoning or additional factual data would or could persuade you that atheism is not the case”? And that some form of Christianity or other brand of theism is true?

APPENDIX TWO: Conscience: A Trustworthy Guide for Morality?

I was asked by an atheist about survivor’s guilt, or guilt after a sexual assault or the suicide of a loved one, and what those phenomena implied for the objective status of the conscience as a moral guide (the questioner thought this meant that conscience was “deeply flawed”). I replied as follows:

I would submit that such instances are much more so manifestations of emotion, than of conscience. Or perhaps they could also relate somewhat to one’s self-image, which is something other than conscience as well.

For example, with survivor’s guilt a person (I imagine) would simply feel really bad about the senseless, unexplained, or unjust death of friends or family and in trying to deal with that grief, they would tend to blame themselves: “who am I to live through this while x and many others had to die?” One feels that there is a certain unfathomable unfairness about the whole affair, which then translates into self-blame.

I think it may also partly be due to the tendency of human beings to think that – overall – bad people get punished and lead lives of suffering, whereas good people do not (an untruth dealt with at length in the biblical books of Job and Ecclesiastes, and somewhat in Jesus’ Sermon on the Mount). A horrific event like the Holocaust, or the Vietnam War obviously brings harm to many “good” people. So in the survivor’s mind this “turns upside down” felt reality. If “good” people were killed, then maybe the survivor thinks, “well, I am no better than themI should have been killed too.” Or he could reason: “if bad things happened to good people, then good things must happen to bad people (such as myself).” And to make themselves “bad,” they then feel “guilt.”

In the non-rational (or supra-rational) world of emotions, this would be entirely possible. People don’t seem to be able to handle either extreme misfortune or fortune. In both cases, they tend to think “I don’t deserve this.” They feel they aren’t good enough to receive too many good things, or bad enough to receive really bad things. That, in turn, may tie into their self-image, which is sustained or harmed by many other events in their lives. In any event, in my opinion, survivor’s guilt is better explained by such emotional reactions brought on by extreme trauma or inability to comprehend or “process” what happened, rather than conscience per se.

In fact, I would say that the Christian view (or the religious Jewish one) would tend to mitigate against this, if believed and thought through properly (prior to the trauma). For Christians hold that all people are fallen sinners, but also potentially capable of much great good, by God’s grace; also, that being a good person doesn’t necessarily translate into having a trouble-free life (Job, again). Bad people sometimes (even oftentimes) get away with murder (literally). Good things can happen to bad people, and bad things to good people (as in the bestselling book by Rabbi Harold Kushner – I think that was his name). There is a certain disturbing “randomness” to suffering and evil, which doesn’t depend on the individual. We feel this to be most “unfair,” and so we explain it to ourselves by various techniques; this sort of “guilt” being one of them.

But (in the Christian/Jewish view) all will be set right with the Judgment to come in the next life. God will balance the scales. Furthermore, self-image is ultimately grounded in the knowledge that human beings were created by God in His image, thus giving every individual almost infinite worth, regardless of what anyone else thinks of them.

These sorts of concepts within Christianity (along with faith itself) might perhaps lead to less cognitive dissonance in the event of trauma, and hence, a lessening of survivor’s guilt. Yet emotions, surely, can easily overcome one’s theological or philosophical views.

The felt “guilt” after rape could be explained on similar grounds: the victim tells herself: “Something this horrible doesn’t happen to good people. Therefore, I must be a bad person. I caused this /[or] I am being punished.” Again, that sort of thought (apart from the completely understandable emotions from the trauma) isn’t consistent with the view just set forth above, because that view recognizes that horrible things can happen to relatively good people, so that it doesn’t have to be their fault. Observation alone would be sufficient to establish this, too, I think, wholly apart from Christian reasoning.

Child abuse (either beating or sexual) is another example. The child obviously wants to love (and be loved by) its parent (or relative or close “friend,” as the case may be). In a child’s reasoning (or even as an adult, thinking back), they would think: “parents wouldn’t do a bad thing like that unless the child deserved it. Therefore I must be a bad child.” Again, these things deal with very deep emotions and perceptions of wanting to be loved, and how things ought to be. They are far more emotional than based in a conscience.

For suicide, take the example of parents facing the horrific experience of their child killing themselves. It is only natural to feel/think:

1. I thought I was a pretty good parent.
2. Good parents produce happy and well-adjusted children.
3. But happy and well-adjusted children do not kill themselves.
4. Therefore, I must not be a good parent.
5. Ergo: it was my fault that my child killed himself/herself.

To the extent that this is guilt at all (it may be – again – merely the emotion resulting from trauma and grief), it is based in the conscience only insofar as it can be proven that the parents were clearly directly responsible for the child’s behavior. Say, they had kept them locked up in a closet for 10 years, or beat them with a 2 by 4 daily, or some other unthinkable behavior. Then they would truly be responsible, and whatever guilt they felt would indeed be a function of a normal conscience, whose purpose is to help us feel guilt when we ought to.

If, on the other hand, they weren’t moral monsters, but halfway normal parents, the “guilt” felt is arguably not guilt at all, and not derived from the conscience. People are free agents, and some go in a bad direction, and some in a good, positive direction in their lives, according to temperament, weaknesses, illness, experience, absorbing true and false ideas, jealousies, felt injustices, hurts, drug abuse; any number of things. One can’t automatically blame the parents. They might raise all their children the same, yet one or two goes off in a bad direction (such as in the movie The River Runs Through It). So obviously environment alone (how they were raised) cannot account for the anomalous behavior of one or more children.

Or, the common reaction of “I could/should have done more to help them” is a natural response, from love. We want to believe the best about the person, because that is the loving outlook (especially towards one’s children). So if they cause their own death, we will blame ourselves rather than them, because it is too unbearable and unthinkable to attach blame to them at all in such a situation (it’s very difficult to pity, regard as a victim, and also to blame). Again, this is the “language” of love and emotion, not conscience (unless one truly is a horrible, hideous parent, in which case it would be more applicable).

The long and the short of it is: I don’t think these scenarios pose any problem for the Christian position or for a developed notion of the conscience, primarily because this sort of “guilt” is usually no guilt at all, but rather, raw emotion, oftentimes indirectly based on fallacious reasoning in the first place.

***

(originally from 7-19-01; 21,270 words!)

Photo credit: TeroVesalainen (1-13-06) [Pixabay / CC0 Creative Commons license]

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